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AMERICAN POLITICS

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

A SKETCH OF AMERICAN PARTY HISTORY AND OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS OF PARTY MACHINERY, TOGETHER WITH A CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PARTY PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATIONS TO POLITICAL MORALITY

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book, as indicated in its table of contents, has to do, not with forms of government and the duties and functions of public officers, but with the party spirit and forces that underlie and operate our Government. The book is a study of parties in America,—of party history, party machinery, party morality, party problems. Party has always been the agency by which America has been governed, and therefore party politics is pre-eminently a subject that demands the constant attention of intelligent and patriotic citizens. The book is published in the hope that it may aid in promoting, in school and home, the study of American Politics.

Politics is the science and art of government, the study of the state, its life, and its conduct. Whether looked to as a field of study or as a field of practical endeavor, Politics is a noble sphere of manly thought, energy, and enterprise. It has been said of History that while it is not a valuable study for the education of men it is invaluable for educated men. In keeping with this half-truth it may be thought that while Politics is a fit subject for the attention of mature and educated men, and while educated men are invaluable in political life, yet as a subject for the education of youth Politics may not be looked to with any assurance of profit. This view of political education, if it ever had any serious hold on public thought, is rapidly disappearing. It is quite certain that the study of Politics in American schools and colleges has

received a notable increase of attention within the last decade. Other educational agencies, the home, the press, the pulpit, the literary club, the civic federation, have all been emphasizing the need of civic training. All education by the State has the education of its citizenship for its primary purpose. While it is to be fully recognized that all subjects in the schools—the mathematics, the languages, science, history, literature—may be equally useful in producing an educated citizenship, and while all education has this largely for its aim, yet there is a widespread and natural public demand for the special study of those subjects that relate directly and especially to our political life. All educational agencies in America are recognizing this demand, and consequently the study of "Civics"—Politics is a better term—is being very widely cultivated and promoted. No effort that may still further promote this educational tendency can come amiss.

The true student of Politics will understand that the only firm foundation for his science rests on History. To study Politics in any serious sense is but to make a large use of History, to learn the lessons of experience for future guidance. With this thought in mind I have devoted nearly half of my volume to a sketch of party history, in the attempt to reduce within a narrow compass, not what may be claimed as a history, but what may be offered merely as an outline sketch of American parties under the Constitution. The sketch may serve to introduce the reader to further inquiry and study, and this study will surely lead him to appreciate the truth for which the late Professor Seeley so ably contended, that the chief purpose in the study of History is to study Politics, to study the life and progress of the state, the motives, means, and processes by which men have built and conducted their commonwealths. When we come to reflect on the political spirit of man, and the wonderful part it has played in the history of the world, especially

in the Anglo-Saxon state, it will be conceded that no part of man's being is more worthy of attention and cultivation. It is a field which a great teacher, Thomas Arnold, has called the most important for the ripened human mind,—that one may become a factor in the greatest problem in human history, the problem of governing men. In all possible ways history should be used for political education and for the cultivation of the true political spirit that is so important in popular government. This relation of Politics to History it has been my aim to emphasize. In my sketch of party history I have sought also to have the reader appreciate more fully and more highly than is usually done certain positive and aggressive forces in third-party agitations that have effectually modified the course of national party history, that he may be led to see that even party history, after all, is not entirely machine made.

The cultivation of the political spirit suggests another phase of Politics which I have sought to emphasize,—the political morality of the state. Education in Politics is not chiefly a question of knowledge: it is a question of character. As the wit and wisdom of Sidney Smith long since observed, "the only foundation of political liberty is the spirit of the people." It is not forms of government, nor the machinery of parties, but civic character on which the state relies. As President Hadley has very well said, "Better the worst form of government with character and righteousness in the rulers and the ruled than the best form of government with the rulers and the ruled indifferent to moral principles." Because of this close and vital relation of politics to ethics, and because of the direct dependence of national character on political conduct we may well conclude that De Toqueville was right when he said that "politics is the end and aim of American education." If the life of the Republic depends upon the moral character of its citizenship all

instruction should constantly, if not consciously, keep in view this aspect of political literature and education.

Horace Mann used to say that what America wishes to put into the life of the nation she must first put into her schools. But no saving force can go into the schools of a nation that does not first exist as a vital force in the nation's homes. In all periods of our history Politics should be *brought home* to the people; but the present, it seems to me, is a time when this demand should be made especially emphatic. Ordinary political issues may not call for discussion in school and home. But when the political rectitude of the people is brought into issue; when rich men are known to buy their way into high office; when it becomes an actual question whether a State shall surrender its virtue to outrage and its people to pillage; when unscrupulous men deliberately, openly, and unblushingly set about to corrupt the electorate of great commonwealths and yet are permitted to stand for the highest honors of their States,—at such times ordinary issues would seem to fade into insignificance and appeal should be made to the moral forces that constitute the foundations of our political society. In the face of such issues teachers, parents, and the moral pastors of the people should make Politics a matter of personal concern. There are many lines of influence, of thought, and of activity, along which these forces may make themselves felt. The study of Politics is one of these, and this book is offered as a plea for the awakening of greater civic interest in parties and party government, and as an introduction to subjects that touch vitally the political life and character of the people.

J. A. W.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA.
February 21, 1903.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

PART I

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES



CHAPTER I

POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION

IN another volume we have considered the structure of the State and National governments, their legal framework, and the relation of these governments to one another. In this volume we shall consider the political forces by which these governments are operated. Ours is a government by party. The actual forces that operate the government are party forces. In all forms of popular government, wherever men are striving to govern themselves and to realize government by the people, political parties exist. People divide according to their views on public measures. The only way we have yet found to carry on free government is by organized, drilled, and disciplined parties.[1] We must, therefore, study the origin and growth of political parties in America, their present constitution and machinery, and the methods by which this machinery is worked. "In America," says Mr. Bryce, "the government goes for less than in Europe, the parties count for more. The great moving forces are the parties."

Popular Government Is Government by Party.

Party history in America may, for convenience, be broadly divided into certain periods. In this chapter we shall deal with:

[1] See Bradford's *The Lesson of Popular Government*, vol. i., p. 493, on "The Spirit of Party."

4 Political Parties and Party Problems

The Colonial and Revolutionary Period.—There were throughout this period no party organization and machinery as we understand those terms to-day. There were men of different views, and they may have been divided into bodies of conflicting opinion. Before the Revolution what party conflicts appear were between the royal governor, standing for royal prerogative and power, and the colonial assemblies, standing for the enlargement of colonial rights and liberties. In 1812, John Adams said that party division began in America with its first plantation, arising from human nature, and that in all the Colonies a court party and a country party had always contended.[1] In a general way party divisions in the Colonies corresponded to the party divisions in England. These were Whigs or Liberals, and Tories or Conservatives. At the opening of the Revolution the Whigs opposed the policy of King George and his Ministers, while the Tories supported it. The Americans were mostly Whigs. They had been dissenters at home, politically and religiously,—men who were inclined to resist governmental interference and authority and stand for their personal rights and liberties.

Colonial Parties.

Samuel Johnson, in his *Taxation No Tyranny*, written in 1774, in opposition to the American Revolution, referred to the fact that there were not only three million men in America in resistance to government, but that there were *three million Whigs*. Lord Chatham, January 20, 1775, on a motion for withdrawing the troops from Boston, said in Parliament:

"This resistance to your arbitrary system of taxation might have been foreseen. It was obvious from the nature of things, and of mankind; and, above all, from the *Whiggish* spirit flourishing in that country. The spirit which now resists your taxation in America is the same which formerly opposed loans, benevolences,

The Whig Spirit of the American Revolution.

[1] *Works*, vol. x., p. 23.

and ship-money in England; the same spirit which called all England on its legs and by the Bill of Rights vindicated the English Constitution; the same spirit which established the great fundamental essential maxim of your liberties,—that no subject of England shall be taxed but by his own consent. This glorious spirit of *Whiggism* animates three millions in America who prefer poverty with liberty to gilded chains and sordid affluence; and who will die in defence of their rights as men and as freemen." [1]

These colonial Whigs and Tories corresponded in opinion and character to the English parties of the same name. It may be profitable to understand the origin and the underlying characteristics of these English parties.

The Origin of Modern English Parties.

Macaulay attributes the first appearance of modern parties in English history to the time when the English Parliament had under consideration their Grand Remonstrance to Charles I., in 1641. During the previous troublous years under the Stuarts, the Parliamentarians who were contending for the rights of Englishmen under the law in opposition to royal prerogative, acted as a united body. When the Long Parliament finally assembled, their popular leaders struck down abuse after abuse without a struggle. The abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commission Court, the Triennial Act requiring frequent Parliaments, the impeachment of Laud, and the attainder of Strafford occasioned no serious divisions in the Commons.

"But," says Macaulay, "when in October, 1641, the Parliament reassembled after a short recess, two hostile parties, essentially the same with those which, under different names, have ever since contended, and are still contending, for the direction of public affairs, appeared confronting each other. During some years they were designated as 'Cavaliers' and 'Roundheads.' They were subsequently called 'Whigs'

[1] Goodrich, *British Eloquence*, p. 130.

and 'Tories.' One of these represents a party zealous for authority and antiquity, the other was zealous for liberty and progress. . . . Everywhere there is a class of men who cling with fondness to whatever is ancient, and who, even when convinced by overpowering reasons that innovation would be beneficial, consent to it with many misgivings and forebodings. We find also everywhere another class of men, sanguine in hope, bold in speculation, always pressing forward, quick to discern the imperfections of whatever exists, disposed to think lightly of the risks of change, and disposed to give every change credit for being an improvement." [1]

Conservatism vs. Radicalism.

On this general ground of the difference between conservatism and radicalism, Mr. Macaulay bases the origin and distinction of English parties. It was in 1679, during the agitation on the Exclusion Bill, that the terms "Whig" and "Tory" were first applied to these parties. Those who were beseeching the king, Charles II., again to summon the dissolved Parliament in order that they might compass the exclusion of a Catholic prince from the throne, were called "Petitioners." Those who expressed abhorrence at such an attempt to restrict the king's prerogative were called "Abhorrers." These soon became known as Whigs and Tories. The nickname "Whig," according to Macaulay, was first given in reproach to the Presbyterian zealots of Scotland, who, driven mad by persecution, were in outlawry against the forces of the king. The term was soon transferred to those English politicians who showed a disposition to oppose the Court and to treat Protestant Nonconformists with indulgence. According to the same authority, the term "Tory" was first applied to the Catholic outlaws in the bogs of Ireland, and was soon transferred to those Englishmen who refused to concur in excluding a Roman Catholic

"Petitioners" vs. "Abhorrers."

"Whig" and "Tory" Originally Nicknames.

[1] Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. i.

prince from the throne. Lecky says that the "Tory" was originally an Irish robber and that the term was afterwards extended to the opposers of exclusion: and the term "Whig" began when the Cameronians took up arms for their religion, and was derived from the whey, or refuse milk, which their poverty obliged them to use.[1]

We may think of the Tory, then, as a supporter of the English Church and the prerogatives of the English Crown. Those who were for tolerance toward Nonconformists were naturally Whigs. The Tories were for the country aristocracy, the landed gentry, and were jealous of new men, of the growing commercial classes, of the commonalty. The Whigs stood for these latter classes.

The difference indicated by Macaulay between the Whig and the Tory—the difference between the radical and the conservative—is supported by Hallam. In a notable passage Hallam says:

Hallam on the Difference between the English Parties.

"They differed in this: The Tory looked to the Constitution as an ultimate document from which he could not swerve and which it was political heresy to think of changing. The Whig regarded the public welfare the highest law and stood ready for any change in the Constitution or for any form of government by which the public welfare would clearly be promoted. The Whig had a natural tendency to improvement, the Tory an aversion to it. The Whig loved to descant on liberty and the love of mankind; the Tory on the mischiefs of sedition and the rights of kings. The Whig made the privileges of the subject, the Tory the privileges of the Crown, his peculiar care. The Tory might aid in establishing despotism, the Whig in subverting monarchy. The Tory was generally hostile to the liberty of the Press, to freedom of inquiry, to freedom of religion; the Whig was their friend. The principle of the Whig was

[1] Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*. According to another version, *Whig* was derived from "Whiggam," a word employed by Scotch cattle-drovers in the west in driving their horses.

amelioration; of the Tory, conservation. The Whigs appear to have taken a far more comprehensive view of the nature and ends of civil society; their principle is more virtuous, more flexible to the variations of time and circumstance, more congenial to masculine intellects. The parties bear some analogy to the two forces which retain the planetary bodies in their orbits,—the annihilation of one would disperse them into chaos, that of the other would drag them to a consuming centre." [1]

It will be seen from this description why the American colonists were mostly Whigs. While the analogy between the English and the American parties cannot be traced throughout our national history, it may be well to keep in mind this general distinction between the radical and the conservative, and to observe how the distinction between the Whig and the Tory colored the politics of the Colonies and of the Revolution. The ruling class in the Colonies, their governors and others sent out by royal appointment to govern the colonists, and those with large landed interests, were, as a rule, Tories; but the masses of the common people, the small home-owners and the actual tillers of the soil, the immigrants who were driven by hardships to find new homes in the new world, the Puritan and Quaker English, the Irish, the Scotch, and the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, "poor, vagrant, and adventurous immigrants," as Mr. Lecky calls them,[2] were Whigs, if they can be politically classified.

Constituency of the Colonial Parties.

During the Revolution the parties were called Patriots and Tories, or Whigs and Loyalists. The Loyalists, or Tories, opposed the Revolution, and in many cases they fought on the side of Great Britain. They numbered probably one third of the population.[3] The Loyalists were, as a rule, the men of

Parties of the Revolution.

[1] *Constitutional History of England.* [2] *American Revolution*, p. 224.
[3] John Adams's *Works*, vol. x., p. 87.

property and rank who had most to lose by upheaval and innovation, the men of culture and education who rather despised the Whigs. Washington was one of the few officers of the American Army who was regarded by the Tories as a gentleman by birth, while the Continental Congress was continually derided as a body of "bankrupt shopkeepers" and "word-spouting cobblers and tinkers," who found "mending the State a more lucrative job than mending kettles and patching shoes." [1]

Tories Disappear in America.

After the Revolution and the complete triumph of the Whigs, or Patriots, nothing of the Tory party remained in America. Those of its members who had not gone to Halifax or to other English settlements accepted the results of the war; and among the most important of these results was the dominance of republican popular government in America. All the people were now Whigs. Strictly speaking, the people in this period were without parties, but were ready to divide into opposing parties when a divisive issue arose.

Parties in the Constitutional Convention.

In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 we observe this new party division. With the division in this Convention begins the real history of parties in the United States. There were many points of difference and conflicting opinion in the Convention: but the one which was most constant, which ran through a large part of the debates, was the difference between the *Large State* party and the *Small State* party, between those who wished to form a *National* government and those who wished to retain a purely *Confederate* government. The National party, composed mostly of the representatives from the large States, led by Madison of Virginia, Wilson of Pennsylvania, and King of Massachusetts, wished to form a government

Large States vs. Small States, the National vs. the Confederate Principle.

[1] *The Outlook*, March 3, 1900, article on "What Social Democracy Means."

in which representation according to population should be provided for in both Houses of Congress, in which the controlling power should be vested in the National Government. Their opponents wished the supreme power left with the States. The States' rights, or Federal, party believed that the Government should be a confederation of States, that the States should be the source of all power, that the Central Government was to be looked to as merely a convenience for certain general concerns. These conflicting opinions on Nationalism and Federalism determined a member's position on many of the questions before the Convention. The Nationalists favored, while the Federalists opposed,

(*a*) Proportional representation,

(*b*) Popular election of national officers,

(*c*) The subordination of the States to the nation, and the vesting of large powers in the central federal authority.

The fundamental difference was whether political power should be drawn from the States as such, or from the people directly. Thus the question of proportional representation, whether power should be exercised in proportion to numbers, struck at the root of the difference. If the National party had its way power would then rest, not upon the States as such, but upon the people of the States in proportion to their numbers.

The Confederate or Small State Party.

The other party, composed chiefly of the delegates from the small States, led by Martin of Maryland, Paterson of New Jersey, Ellsworth and Johnson of Connecticut, wished to have a government which would provide for equal State representation in both Houses of Congress, without reference to population. This idea involved a purely confederate government, resting upon the States, drawing its powers and resources from the States. There were moderate men from the small States who "were friends to a good National Government," but, as one of

them said, they "would sooner submit to a foreign power than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the legislature."[1] These men, as we know, forced a compromise, so that the Convention formed neither a purely national nor a purely federal government. The terms that would most nearly describe the parties of the Convention would be *National* and *Federal*, for on other questions throughout the debates of the Convention the same difference is to be observed as is seen on this main question of equal or proportional representation,—one party generally favoring, the other opposing the grant of power to the proposed new Federal Government. When the Constitution was adopted by the Convention and submitted to the States for ratification or rejection, while it was not entirely satisfactory to the *Large State*, or National, party, it was more satisfactory to them than to their opponents, and they became the friends and advocates of the Constitution before the people of the States. They took the name of *Federalist*, since they favored union under the new *Federal* Constitution, as it was then called. Their opponents, though they claimed to be true Federalists, were forced to take the name of *Anti-Federalist*, a term which is to be understood as describing those who opposed the adoption by the States of the new Constitution. Strictly, the *Federalist* party might have been called *National*, and the *Anti-Federalist* party might have been called *Federalist*, as these terms more nearly describe the ideas for which the respective parties stood. But as the Anti-Federalists were merely in opposition to the proposal then before the people, they are known merely as an *anti*-party.

Federalist and Anti-Federalist Parties.

As the questions raised and discussed in the Convention were settled by the adoption of the Constitution, these parties, or bodies of opinion, were too short-lived to be

[1] Dickinson, Madison's *Journal*, p. 163.

called parties properly. *Party* carries with it the idea of continued activity over a considerable period. We should notice, then, that these two parties represent merely two tendencies, the centrifugal and the centripetal. The Anti-Federal party stood for the desire to maintain the freedom of the individual citizen and the independence of the several States. The members of this party thought that the Federal Government, with large central powers, would endanger these interests. The Federal party, on the other hand, stood for the opposite tendency, the increase of central power. Besides the extreme States' rights men like Lee, Henry, Clinton, and Lowndes, the Anti-Federalists were made up of those who had favored paper-money in the States, who believed in leniency, if not discrimination, in favor of debtors, and of those who believed their ambition and interests could best be gratified in the smaller arena of State affairs. The Anti-Federalists would have succeeded in preventing the adoption of the Constitution if it had not been agreed that certain amendments should be added,—a "bill of rights" guaranteeing, on the part of the new Central Government, as the States had already guaranteed, the muniments of civil liberty to the citizen, and expressly reserving to the States all powers not delegated to the Central Government.

CHAPTER II

THE HAMILTONIAN FEDERALISTS AND THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS, 1789–1800

AFTER the Constitution was adopted and Washington became President, the conflicting tendencies observed in the struggles over the adoption of the Constitution reappeared. The parties under Washington are to be known as the Federalist and the Republican. Sometimes the latter were called by their opponents, in derision and reproach, *Democrats*, and the hyphenated word *Democratic-Republican* was also used to designate them. It is often supposed that these parties are identical in principle and purpose with the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists of a few years before. This is an error. To be a Federalist in 1787 and 1788 was to favor the adoption of the Constitution. To be a States' rights Anti-Federalist was to oppose that. Madison was a National-Federalist with Hamilton then. But to be a Federalist in 1791 was to favor the adoption of Hamilton's financial measures and a broad construction of the Constitution. On these issues Madison ceased to be a Federalist with Hamilton and became a Republican under Jefferson. Both Jefferson and Madison, the originators and organizers of the Republican party, favored the adoption of the Constitution. That is, they were Federalists in 1787. But they opposed Hamilton's financial measures and broad construction of

Federalist vs. Democratic-Republican.

the Constitution and joined issue with the Federalists on other measures proposed under the leadership of Hamilton. On the other hand, some of the Anti-Federalists, like Patrick Henry, who had opposed the adoption of the Constitution, gave their adherence to Hamilton and his policy. Yet the major part of the old Anti-Federalists gave their support to the Jeffersonian Republicans, and the great body of the Federalists who did battle for the Constitution continued to be Federalists under Washington and Hamilton. In its underlying principles the Anti-Federalist party was the forerunner of the Jeffersonian Republicans.

The main issues separating these two parties from 1790 to 1801 were as follows:

Issues between the Federalists and Republicans.

1. Hamilton's Financial Measures.

1. Hamilton's financial measures.—Hamilton's funding scheme, by which no discrimination was to be made between the holders of government securities, but by which all classes were to be paid in full whether speculators who had bought at great discount or original holders who had held at great sacrifice; the assumption of the State debts by the National Government; the scheme of the First United States Bank; the excise, and the vigorous exercise of the national authority in its collection, as also the suppression of the "Whiskey Rebellion," all these measures the Hamiltonian Federalists favored while the Jeffersonian Republicans opposed them.

2. Foreign Relations: a. Franco-English War.

2. Questions of foreign policy:

(*a*) The war between France and England. The Federalists were the friends of England, the Republicans, of France. The Federalists, as the party of law and order and of established government, were shocked at the outrages and excesses of the "Reign of Terror" in France, and they thought it most important to restrain the democratic excesses promoted by the French Revolution. They therefore

counselled neutrality in the war which France had declared against Great Britain. The Republicans, as the party of liberty and the rights of man, looked with more leniency upon the French excesses as necessary accompaniments of a struggle of a people to be free. Jefferson thought a little revolution or resistance now and then was a good thing, to keep governments in order and to remind them of the rights of the governed. Party spirit ran high on this Franco-English war, so much so that one party, the Federalists, was called the English party, while the Republicans were called the French party. A Spanish traveller remarked that there were to be found in America many Englishmen and many Frenchmen but, unfortunately, there were no Americans. The Republicans organized secret democratic clubs in the cities, modelled after the Jacobin Clubs of France, and if they could have had their way we should have been embroiled in a war with England. On the other hand, the Federalists, led by Hamilton, were ready to have us break our French alliance of 1778 in such a way as would have led to a breach with France. Washington held to a moderate and fair course and issued his proclamation of neutrality, a policy which was favored by both Hamilton and Jefferson, though from different inclinations and motives.

(*b*) This difference of attitude toward France and Great Britain led to a party issue over Jay's Treaty. The Federalists favored the treaty, as it enabled us to maintain a friendly relation with Great Britain, while the Republicans opposed it because, as they thought, it sacrificed our interests and did not maintain a proper spirit of independence toward England.

b. Jay's Treaty as an Issue.

3. The Federalists favored, while the Republicans resisted, the increase of governmental authority by the nation. The Republicans opposed the increase of executive

authority at the expense of legislative control, as well as the increase of national authority at the expense of State control. Their desire was to keep power close to the people, and they therefore insisted upon a Federal system in which the greater power should rest with the States; and in the exercise of central authority power should lie rather with the representatives of the people in Congress than with the President, who stood for the monarchical element in the State.

3. National and Executive Authority vs. State and Congressional Authority.

This is seen in the contest over the Jay Treaty. The Republicans believed that Hamilton sought to incorporate in a treaty provisions as to the regulations of commerce (a subject committed by the Constitution to both branches of Congress) that he knew would not be enacted into law by the popular branch of the National Legislature. He, therefore, took a more convenient method of securing this legislation—merely by the co-operation of the President and Senate. The Republicans insisted on the right of the popular branch of Congress to prevent this exercise of power on matters committed to the representatives of all the people.

The Republicans insisted that the interests of the people would be better cared for and republican government better promoted by retaining power within the States and the subdivisions of the States. They therefore urged the importance of local self-government as against the increase of national powers and functions. Jefferson asserted that he would preserve both the General and State governments in their constitutional form and equilibrium: he would observe sharply the line between them, but in doing so he would draw that line so as to limit the powers of the Nation while enlarging the functions of the State. "Encroachments," he said, "are more to be feared from the General Government. Encroachments from the State governments will tend to an

excess of liberty which will correct itself; while those from the General Government will tend to monarchy which will fortify itself from day to day instead of working its own cure, as all experience shows."[1] Later, writing upon the importance of local self-government and the issue of States' rights as against national power Jefferson said:

"Were not this great country already divided into States, that division must be made that each might do for itself what concerns itself directly, and what it can so much better do than a distant authority. Every State again is divided into counties, each to take care of what lies within its local bounds; each county again into townships, or wards, to manage minuter details; and every ward into farms, to be governed each by its individual proprietor. Were we directed from Washington when to sow and when to reap we should soon want bread."[2]

4. From what has been said it will be seen that underlying these differences on practical policies and measures proposed by Hamilton and the Federalists, or growing out of them, were differences of view as to the construction of the Constitution. Both parties under Washington accepted and professed to venerate the Constitution. Both appealed to the Constitution for support. The difference between them was a difference of construction. The Federalists favored a construction of the Constitution which allowed large power to the Federal Government, while the Republicans favored a construction which tended to restrict that power. The Federalists were broad and liberal—the Republicans called them loose—in construing the powers conferred upon the Federal Government. The Republicans were strict—the Federalists called them

4. The Interpretation of the Constitution.

[1] Jefferson to Stuart, December 23, 1791. Randall's *Jefferson*, vol. ii., p. 23.

[2] Jefferson's *Autobiography*, vol. i., p. 68, Ford's edition.

narrow—in construing the national powers. Many Republicans, in fact, were so strict, Jefferson among them, that they would have reduced the Federal Government to a department for foreign affairs.

This difference between the parties in the construction of the Constitution is to be seen in the Federalist legislation of 1798, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of the Republicans, by which these measures were opposed. In resisting these Federalist measures Jefferson and Madison in their resolutions fell back upon a strict construction of the Constitution, denying that the Federal Government could be the judge of the extent of its own powers, and denying that it had a right to punish any crimes other than those specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.

In addition to setting forth an important constitutional doctrine, these resolutions were designed to direct attention to the assumptions of national power and to the alarming nature of Federalist legislation. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were, in one sense, the first party platform ever published in America, and they were prepared by Madison and Jefferson, the leaders of the Republican party, as a constitutional defence of the State and the citizen. "The friendless alien had, indeed, been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment, but the citizen will soon follow as the prey and victim of governmental power."[1] Such was Jefferson's representation of the purpose of the Federalists.

5. These differences on policies and constitutional construction indicate a still more fundamental difference between the parties, a difference based on the character of men and their attitude toward the functions of govern-

[1] Kentucky Resolutions, art. ix. See p. 75 in the author's *The American Republic and Its Government*, for the constitutional doctrine set forth in these Resolutions.

ment and the nature of the State. The difference is between those who are the advocates of power for the defence of order, the preservation of the rights of property, and the promotion of enterprises, and those, on the other hand, who are devotees of liberty in resistance to tyranny and governmental interference. Jefferson declared that the Alien and Sedition Acts and other acts of those in power had a tendency to drive the people of the States into revolution and blood, and that they would thus furnish

5. Differences as to the Functions and Sphere of Government.

"new calumnies against republican government and new pretexts for those who wish it to be believed that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron; that it would be a dangerous delusion if a confidence in the men of our choice were to silence our fears for the safety of our rights; that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism; free government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power." [1]

Here Jefferson expresses very clearly the difference between the early parties in their attitude toward government. One looked with favor and confidence on the increase and exercise of governmental powers; the other regarded government with jealousy and would as much as possible limit its authority in restraint of the people. One party were the advocates of power, the other the lovers of freedom. Jefferson and his party were democratic and they wished their government and its agents to be kept in close touch with the people and easily controlled by the people. This accounts, in part, for their opposition to Hamilton's financial policy. They knew that policy was designed to strengthen the Federal

[1] Kentucky Resolutions, 1798, art. ix.

government over which the people had remote control, and thus weaken the State Government over which the people had direct control, and that Hamilton's policy would foster a moneyed aristocracy and make the moneyed class a permanent ally of the National Government. As true democrats the Jeffersonian Republicans opposed this. They wished to revive and advance the republican spirit that had produced the American and French Revolutions, to oppose class rule and class privilege, and to make the government a government of the people. It has been said that Hamilton, contending for power, would make the Union great and glorious, and that Jefferson, contending for liberty, would make every citizen strong and free. To accomplish his great purpose, Jefferson would provide a school of politics for every citizen in local self-government, in the discussion and control of public affairs in town, city and school district.

The Continuing Basis of Division between Parties.

In the two differences,—in constitutional construction and in the differing attitudes of the two parties toward government and liberty,—writers have found the "continuing basis of division" between the two great historic parties in America. One party, known by its several names, Federalist, Whig, Republican, has favored broad construction, the growth of national power, increasing functions of government, the larger exercise of force and authority in restraint of social disorders. The other party, under its various names, Anti-Federalist, Democratic Republican, Democratic, has held to strict construction, the rights of the States, the largest degree of individual and social liberty, without annoyances from government. The one of these parties has been called *the party of political measures*, the other the *party of political principles*. The one, the Federalist-Whig-Repub-

[1] See a suggestive article by Professor A. D. Morse on "The Significance of the Democratic Party," in the *International Review* for October, 1900.

lican, were the advocates of governmental schemes and projects, the financial plans of Hamilton, the excise, the Alien and Sedition Acts, the protective policy, internal improvements, Congressional restraint of slavery, energetic measures in prosecution of the Civil War, and Congressional Reconstruction. The other party, from its principles of attachment to individual liberty and constitutional restraint on government, has usually opposed these measures in the purpose of preventing government from attempting too many things on behalf of the people and for the purpose of preventing objectionable measures urged on behalf of special and powerful interests.

While it is generally true that the Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans have been the advocates of broad construction, of the exercise of authority, and the increase of national power, the generalization will not uniformly hold. There have been times when the reverse has been the case. While the Federalists generally favored a liberal construction of the Constitution as favorable to the enlargement of national power, yet, while out of power, under Jefferson and Madison, prompted by their local interests, they resisted the Executive and Congress, and urged, under the States' rights compact view of the Constitution, that the acts of the administration were unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Democratic-Republicans, when they came into power under Jefferson, began to stretch the Constitution to cover the exercise of powers which they had previously denied. They did this to such an extent that they nationalized their own party and effectually killed the Federalist party as a party of opposition. Marshall said that Jefferson killed the Federalist party by adopting its principles. Thus it is, party experience has gone to show, that in large measure the *ins* have been inclined to broad construction and the enlargement of national authority, and the *outs* to strict

Parties out of Power Tend toward strict Construction.

construction and the restriction of that authority. Each party has, in its turn, fallen back upon the rights and powers of the States to preserve its interests from the political measures of its opponents while these were in control of the national administration. In the purchase of Louisiana, Jefferson attempted to preserve his consistency by acknowledging that the purchase was unconstitutional on the theory of strict construction, but he claimed that, like a guardian for a ward, he was justified in making the purchase in contravention of the Constitution with the expectation of having his action endorsed by a subsequent amendment. But, rejecting this view, the Republican leaders in Congress accommodated themselves to a constitutional doctrine more liberal than they were disposed to assert while they were out of power,—a doctrine that enabled them to vote for the purchase of Louisiana as constitutional. On the other hand, the Federalists, now in opposition, resisted this purchase as unconstitutional. Josiah Quincy, a Federalist leader, resisted the admission of Louisiana in 1811 as a violation of the "compact" between the States such as would justify secession and revolution; the admission of Louisiana, he said, would be the dissolution of the Union, and it would be the right and duty of the States to prepare for separation, "amicably if they can, forcibly if they must."[1] The Federalists also resisted as unconstitutional the Non-Importation and Embargo Acts, in 1807 and 1809, and they carried their factious opposition to the War of 1812 almost to the verge of secession in 1814.

Again, between 1850 and 1860, when the States' rights Democracy of the South, being in power, called into exercise the power of the National Government within the States for the recovery of fugitive slaves, the Republican leaders like Sumner and Wade fell back on the reserved

[1] Speech of Josiah Quincy, Johnston and Woodburn's *American Orations*, vol. i., p. 182.

rights of the States, and the compact principle in the Constitution, in resistance to this exercise of national authority. Wade and Sumner did not deny, as Quincy did, that the Constitution was a national instrument, but they insisted that the fugitive slave clause was a "compact" clause, not a power-conferring clause, and they asserted that its enforcement was a matter of inter-State right and comity.[1] It will be seen that the general statements to which we have referred as to the permanent and continuing differences between parties, cannot be accepted without qualification.

What the Early Parties Thought of One Another.

Coming again to the Hamiltonian Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans, we are aided in understanding the differences between these parties by noticing what they thought of one another. The Federalists, regarding themselves as the champions of order and the upholders of law, looked upon Jefferson and the Republicans as anarchists and repudiators; as the enemies of property, of society, and of vested rights. The Federalists were afraid of social upheaval and convulsion. It was for this reason that they looked to the Constitution as a means of promoting a strong and energetic government for the defence of the rights of property. In Federalists' eyes democracy was the bane of the country, and the radical, French, democratic views of Jefferson seemed altogether revolutionary, and, consequently, the Federalists were brought more and more to believe in the need of stringent measures. "Fears of French Jacobinism almost created a panic among the staid New England Federalists. Frenzied mobs, universal license, atheism, communism,—these bogies terrified the conservative, easy-going Puritans as if all they held dear were to be engulfed."[2] Marshall,

[1] See the speeches of Wade, 1854, of Sumner on the Fugitive Slave Law, 1852, and the case of Ableman *vs.* Booth.

[2] H. C. Lodge's *Life of George Cabot.*

speaking for the moderate Federalists,[1] said that that party desired no stronger government than the Constitution allowed, or than was necessary to security; that Hamilton's treasury schemes were sound and salutary, and that Republican opposition to them originated in a desire to avoid the payment of the public debt, in a dislike of the restraints indispensable to good order, and in the narrow and unprincipled ambition of local demagogues, and in a desire for the "loaves and fishes" of political power; that the Federalists were but a moderate and truly republican party, and the "representations of their opponents to the contrary were but pretences fabricated by demagogues or mad enthusiasts and addressed to the passions and prejudices of ignorant mobs."[2]

On the other hand, the Republicans, regarding themselves as the friends of liberty and the rights of man, looked upon the Federalists as "monarchists" who were ready to subvert the Constitution and "administration" the government into whatever they wished to make it. The contest, according to Jefferson, was between the advocates of republicanism and the advocates of kingly government. According to the Republicans, the Federalists wished to revive royalty and nobility by assuming high-sounding titles, by observing stately and dignified ceremonies, by setting up a splendid government, and thus, by parade and splendid pageantry, after the manner of kings, they would dazzle, or "razzle-dazzle," the people, and a ruling class would be recognized such as England had always maintained. All this meant social ranks and special privileges established by law, paraphernalia of office, official levees, large civil and military establishments, navies, armies, extravagance, and burdensome taxes. The result would be the oppression of the people. A privileged few would continue to lord it over

[1] *Life of Washington.*

[2] Randall's *Life of Jefferson*, vol. ii., pp. 37–39.

the masses of their fellow men. Against all these things Jefferson set his face. His party, therefore, opposed the extension, or perpetuation, of a public debt; they opposed large expenditures of the public money; a large army or a large navy; the exercise of governmental functions for private interests or enterprises; and, looking upon the Judiciary as being far removed from popular control and as inimical to popular interests, they opposed life tenures for judicial offices. To the Jeffersonian Republicans "government by injunction" would have been a terror. Jefferson, having witnessed great evils under a despotic government, and having an optimistic confidence in the masses of men, believed that the people would take care of themselves without governmental interference. Hamilton, in the more pessimistic faith that men were to be governed only by force or by appeals to their material interests, believed that agencies of government should be multiplied and strengthened to keep men in order.

Of the constituencies of these two parties, Mr. Bryce says:

Mr. Bryce on the Constituencies of the Early Parties.

"The small farmers and Southern men generally followed the Republican standard, following the lead of Virginia, while the strength of the Federalists lay in New England and the Middle States, led sometimes by Massachusetts, sometimes by Pennsylvania. The commercial interests were with the Federalists and the staid solid Puritanism of all classes, headed by the clergy. Some one has described the struggle from 1796 to 1808 as one between Jefferson, an avowed free-thinker, and the New England ministers. The revolt of New England Puritanism against the supposed atheism of the French Revolution, and the desire of the New England shippers and merchants for a Central Government strong enough to make and enforce treaties with other commercial countries, the desire for a uniform currency and a strong government able to command order and enforce law,—

these were the forces behind and in support of the Federalists. . . . Jefferson's importance lies in the fact that he became the representative not merely of democracy, but of local democracy; of the notion that government is hardly wanted at all, that the people are sure to go right if they are left alone; that he who resists authority is *prima facie* justified in doing so because authority is *prima facie* tyrannical; that a country where each local body in its own local area looks after the objects of common concern, raising and administering such funds as are needed, and is interfered with as little as possible by any external power, comes nearest to the ideal of a truly free people."[1]

Jefferson's National Democracy and his States' Rights Republicanism.

A distinction has been drawn between Jefferson's national democracy and his States' rights republicanism. Jefferson was both a States' rights Republican and a National Democrat, but his national democracy was the stronger force of the two. As a Southern Republican he represented republicanism as opposed to monarchy; as a National Democrat he represented republicanism as opposed to oligarchy. He was not a Social Democrat, and was called one merely as a term of reproach and opprobrium. His Northern followers were mostly Democrats, the levellers of rank and the advocates of equal opportunities.[2] Political democracy was Jefferson's great desire, that government should be of, by, and for the people; that there should be equal rights for all and special privileges for none. This was the *end* he had in view. Retaining large rights and powers to the States was the *means* he would employ. When, therefore, the National Government was democratized, after it was saved from kingcraft by the people's entrusting power to the Jeffersonian democracy; when it was seen that the National Government could be used as an instrument to

[1] Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, vol. ii., p. 9.

[2] See Adams's *History of the United States*, vol. i., pp. 162 and 209.

promote great popular interests under the management of popular representative leaders, it was inevitable that national powers should increase at the expense of the rights of the States. This was what occurred in Jefferson's administration. Jefferson himself promoted this movement, urged by forces within his party. Many small farmers at the North, and many recent immigrants and middle-class tradesmen, were not wedded to Jefferson's Kentucky views as to the rights of the States and the limitations on national power; but they were Democrats who believed in manhood suffrage and in equal opportunities for all, and they supported Jefferson as the champion of national democracy. Under Jefferson's leadership, this democratic element at the North was brought into alliance with the aristocratic planters of the South, the true States' rights Republicans, like John Randolph, of Roanoke, and other slave masters who despised the free common laborer as a "mudsill." That choppers and fishermen should constitute the state was very far from the thought of the blue-blooded aristocrats of Virginia and the Carolinas. But Jefferson's doctrines promoted democracy, and he looked to States' rights and local self-government as a means of promoting the democratic cause. When the cause of national democracy came in conflict with the reserved powers of the States, Jefferson's exercise of national powers for the promotion of popular interests proved his national democracy to be stronger than his States' rights republicanism.

The fall of the Federalists, in 1800, marks a revolution in party history. The Republican masses led by Jefferson overcame the ruling classes led by Hamilton and Adams. The result came about from various causes:

Causes of the Fall of the Federalists, 1800.

1. The dissensions and jealousies within the Federalist party. — Hamilton and Adams had become irreconcilable, and Hamilton attacked his official party

chief in an indiscreet and abusive political pamphlet. Most of the distinguished men of the nation were within the ranks of the Federalists. The party's strength lay, not in its popular following, but in the ability of its leaders. Hamilton was a leader of leaders, but he was not a leader of the people; and John Adams, a first-rate man, when elected to the official leadership of the party would not take a second place within his own administration beside any man. Adams could not brook Hamilton's imperious dictation. When these feuds broke out among the Federalist leaders the party fell to rise no more.

2. Certain measures of Adams's administration alienated support.—The act imposing duties on stamped paper and vellum, the naturalization act, increasing the time required for naturalization from five years to fourteen; the alien and sedition acts; a bill increasing the army and navy; certain excise taxes,—these measures Jefferson used effectually to rally support to the opposition.

3. Adams's personal unpopularity repelled many supporters. He was cold in temper, suspicious in nature, and had an excessive sense of his own official dignity and importance. His lack of tact and of the politician's art contributed to his defeat.

4. On the other hand, Jefferson was a master of tactful political leadership, and his organizing power, by which he brought together into one party the democratic element of the country, both local and national, was one of the important factors in the triumph of his party in 1800.

5. The country was, in its spirit and constituency, essentially democratic. There was an intense feeling of opposition to royalty, kingly forms, and class government. Jefferson played cleverly and effectually upon these feelings and prejudices. The revolutions in America and France had aroused a strong democratic impulse throughout Europe and America. This was especially strong among the recent immigrants and the middle-class Ameri-

cans. Consequently, the "mercantile and manufacturing classes, with all the advantage of their wealth and intelligence and habit of co-operation, were yet vanquished by the agricultural masses." [1]

When the Republican party came into power, in 1801, their great leader, who, take him all in all, was the most influential and most masterful personal factor that has ever appeared in American politics, published in his first inaugural address a state paper which ranks second only to the Declaration of Independence. This address sums up more than any other state paper the permanent platform of Jefferson's historic party. It became a standard by which "all future political movements were to be measured, and it went out of fashion only when its principles were universally accepted or thrown aside." [2] In this historic address, Jefferson attempted to compress the principles of his party within the narrowest possible compass:

Principles of Jeffersonian Republicanism.

"Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights as the most competent administrations of our domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and our safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people,—a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority,—the vital principle of Republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia,—our best reliance in peace and for

[1] Bryce, vol. ii.

[2] Adams's *History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 199.

the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burdened; the honest payment of our debts, and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce its handmaid; the diffusion of information, and the arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the *habeas corpus;* and trial by juries impartially selected;—these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and the blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment; they should be the creed of our political faith, the text of our civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety."

By this moderate statement of his party principles, Jefferson hoped to win to his party's support a large body of moderate Federalists, and in this he succeeded. The body of the people in Pennsylvania and New York, and even in New England, were democratic in temper and in spirit, and though the international situation brought the Republican administrations of Jefferson and Madison into a reluctant and unpopular conduct of a commercial war, the wise principles of their party, combined with the factious opposition of the New England Federalists, soon led to the complete dominance of the Republican party. Jeffersonian democracy has never since been seriously combated by any political party, but all subsequent parties have assumed to represent its principles.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL POLITICS

THE second period of our party history under the National Government may be said to extend from 1816 to 1832, from the final collapse of the Federalists to the appearance of the Whigs. This was a time of transition, of reorganization, when the political forces of the country were finding new lines of division. With the close of the War of 1812, the Federalist party disappeared. It could not survive its factious opposition to that war. The party could not stand the opprobrium of the Hartford Convention. Many of the Federalist leaders had given their support to that most unpopular gathering, while many others of them felt that the Hartford Assembly should have adopted even more "effectual measures" of opposition to the war. The party could not remove the public conviction that its little conclave of leaders had been secretly plotting treason and disunion. Thirty-four Federalist electors voted for Rufus King for President in 1816, but they were the last surviving remnants of the party of Hamilton and John Adams, and their vote was the party's last expiring act.

The Second Period of Party History.

Jefferson had said in his famous inaugural address: "We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans." The dictum was realized, at least the half of it that Jefferson desired,—the Federalists had ceased to be, and the people were all Republicans.

Monroe and Tompkins were elected in 1820 without opposition, the only instance of its kind in our history since the election of Washington. Because all parties were merged into one, this period has been called the "era of good feeling." But there was anything but "good feeling" among the rival political leaders of the time. Voters grouped themselves about their favorite party leaders, the rival Republican aspirants for the presidency. Among these leaders and their respective groups, bickerings and animosities were fierce and bitter. This aspect of politics at that time has caused this to be called the "period of personal politics." There were "Adams men," "Jackson men," "Clay men," "Calhounites," and "Clintonians." But all these leaders and presidential aspirants, both in 1824 and 1828, belonged to the same party. The "Adams and Clay Republicans" and the "Jackson Republicans" acknowledged, for a while at least, each other's claim to the party name.

"Era of Good Feeling."

"Principles, not men," has been a notable maxim in our political history. It is not to be understood that this maxim was reversed in this period of personal politics. The personal groups were not without principles. All were Republican, and each group believed that its leader best represented the true principles of Jeffersonian Republicanism. The "Clintonians," for instance, who first conducted a presidential contest on the basis of a personal following, represented opposition to Madison in 1812, but they professed to do so on principles which they considered important. The "Clintonians," in supporting DeWitt Clinton, a Republican, against Madison, opposed the nomination of presidential candidates by Congressional caucus as being by undelegated authority; they opposed an official regency and the Virginia dynasty as being a monopoly by particular States of the offices of the Government. This, they held, was unrepublican and tended to oligarchy. They

The Clintonians.

were particularly opposed to continuing a citizen of Virginia in the presidency "unless it can be shown that that State enjoys a corresponding monopoly of talents and patriotism." Virginia had already had the presidency for twenty years out of twenty-four,—a practice that had arrayed the "agricultural against the commercial interest of the country"; and the "Clintonians" urged especially opposition to Madison, who was "lacking in energy, decision, and efficiency." The Federalists in 1812 made no nomination, but united with the discontented Republicans in support of Clinton, but the effort to defeat Madison was unavailing. The opposition was tainted with Federalism.

Monroe allayed opposition; but after his administration the personal candidacies in politics revived, and the election of 1824 became famous for the contest between the six great Republican leaders who divided among them the support of the country,—Adams, Jackson, Clay, Crawford, Clinton, and Calhoun.

Soon after this conflict around personal leaders in 1824, the various Republican elements began naturally to line up into two opposing parties on the basis of principles and public policies. New parties were forming according to the leanings of men toward the three great public domestic questions of that time,—the Bank, the Tariff, and Internal Improvements. The banking interest desired a strong national banking institution, with national regulation of the currency; the commercial interest desired good roads, improvements in rivers and harbors, and consequent easy communication between the States. A new manufacturing interest had also arisen which desired protection to manufactures. Thus the conditions were ripening for a new party alignment. Those who advocated these public measures, who favored the agency and the activity of the National Govern-

Divisions on Public Policies again Appear, 1828.

The Bank, the Tariff, Internal Improvements.

ment in their support, and who believed that the Constitution conferred the necessary power to advance these ends, became *National-Republicans*, under the leadership of Clay and Adams. On the other hand, the *Democratic-Republicans*,—those who thought more of local self-government by the people directly and less of national power, the former Republicans of the more strict States' rights school who had a leaning to strict construction, limitation of the powers of the General Government, and who were especially opposed to bank corporations and internal improvements, except under State control,—these were ready to enlist under the banner and name of *Jacksonian Democrats*, or plain *Democrats*,—the only "true blue" Republicans, as they soon claimed to be.

National Republicans.

Jacksonian Democrats.

The name *National-Republican* was assumed by the party of Clay and Adams towards the end of John Quincy Adams's presidency. Adams, from 1825 to 1829, was the official leader of the party. But his personal animosities, his lack of tactful address and of the politician's art, and his quarrels with the old Federalists of New England, whom he charged with a design to dissolve the Union and to establish a separate confederation in 1808,—these factors alienated much support from Adams, and the leadership of the party passed to Clay. Adams became a free lance in isolated independence.

In the campaign of 1828, politics were still chiefly personal. Jackson was to be vindicated. The election did not turn on the candidates' public views or public policies. What Jackson stood for, either on the matter of internal improvement, the tariff, or the bank, was not positively, or, at least, not publicly known. It was, in the minds of the Jacksonians, a question of the people against political management and combinations. Throughout Adams's administration, Jackson and his managers cultivated the feeling among the masses that

the people had been defrauded of their choice. Jackson had received more votes in the Electoral College than Adams; he had surpassed Adams in the popular vote; when the election came to the House of Representatives, Jackson and his friends contended that the Representatives there should vote as their States had voted in the College. This was not done; but, on the other hand, a combination, a "corrupt bargain," as was falsely charged, was formed between Adams and Clay, by which Clay was to make Adams President and Adams was to make Clay Secretary of State. With all these personal grievances in mind the Jackson party entered on a four-years' campaign to beat Adams in 1828. After Jackson's personal victory and vindication in this campaign, during his first administration and under his leadership the modern Democratic party, as we know it to-day, came into being.

Jackson's decisive success in 1828 clearly revealed the fact that the masses were coming into larger political control. With Jackson, the people had come into their own. The "plain, common people" were now to rule. Patrician leaders should no longer presume to arrange candidates and policies for the people, but the people themselves should give their commands to their leaders.

"Hitherto the country had known the leadership only of New England and the South, regions peopled straight out of the Old World; the one ruled by a professional aristocracy of ministers and lawyers, the other by a social and proprietary aristocracy of land-owners; both governed alike in thought and action by old traditions, and both smacking, whatever their profession of democratic principle, of an Old World taste for privilege and for the authority of a trained, experienced disciplined minority." [1]

The Presidents before Jackson had been aristocrats,

[1] Woodrow Wilson, *A History of the American People*, vol. iii., p. 237.

four from Virginia, two from New England. The difference between Jefferson and Jackson was not in their political principles—they professed the same beliefs—but in social stock and breeding, in their life and habits, in their antecedents and material conditions. The democratic spirit represented in Jackson had been promoted by the Westward movement, by the equality among the pioneer settlers, by the removal of suffrage restrictions, by the admission of Western States. Jackson could not plead pride of ancestry, for he had been born in a hut of poverty and had been reared in trial and adversity; by this he came the better to know and represent the humble people. Jefferson's teachings had borne their fruit. The people had come to take him at his word, and in Jackson they were now to make real the democracy that Jefferson had taught the nation to profess. Property-holding, education, an influential clergy in New England; men of manor lands, of counting-houses, ships, and commercial connections, in the Middle States; the aristocracy of slave-plantations, of cavalier gentlemen, of traditional "first families," in Virginia and the South,—these were the forces that had been in actual control of the country. The perversion of the popular will in 1824 was the natural and logical result of this aristocratic régime, and it had been possible because these classes continued to have the audacity to think that they were wiser and could govern better than the people themselves,—the plain honest folk, whom these aristocrats looked upon as an incompetent and ignorant mob. Such was the democratic feeling.

The Masses Reject the Leadership of the Classes.

Jackson's triumph was partly personal, and therefore his election fittingly belongs to the era of personal politics. But it also closes that era, and with his administration another era begins because his triumph represents a political purpose and conviction adapted to become the unifying basis of a new party alignment. This unifying

cause struck deeper than questions of policy and construction, deeper, even, than States' rights and nationalism which had been so potent in Jefferson's triumph. The unifying force that welded Jackson's supporters into a great party lay at the root of republican government; —it was in the determination that the government should be of and by the people. Men in Pennsylvania who believed in protection; men in the West who believed in internal improvements; men in the South and West who believed in free trade; men in the South who believed in States' rights; men in all sections who believed in nationalism and broad construction,—all joined with Jackson to make the government one of the people. These democratic forces, ready for real party life, needed only astute political managers and organizers, who were at hand in men like Martin Van Buren and William B. Lewis, to be brought to triumph. As the party of the "plain people" these forces were no longer ashamed to call themselves *Democratic*. Under this new democratization of the government the name that had been originally applied to the followers of Jefferson in derision was to be borne by the followers of Jackson as a decoration of honor.

CHAPTER IV

THE WHIGS AND THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRATS

THE third period of our party history, under the National Government, is marked by the rise and decline of the Whigs, from 1832 to 1856. This was the period of party conflicts over the Second United States Bank, the Tariff, Internal Improvements, the Sub-Treasury, Jackson's Executive Veto and power of removal, the Annexation of Texas, the War with Mexico, and, finally, the compromises touching slavery in 1850.

Third Period of Party History.

The principles and organization of the National Republicans—so far as they had an organization—became the nucleus for the new party of the Whigs. The party, still under the name of the National Republicans, in a national convention at Baltimore, on December 12, 1831, unanimously nominated Clay for the presidency. Following the recommendation of this convention, a "Young Men's National Republican Convention" met at Washington on May 7, 1832, and adopted a series of ten resolutions as expressive of the principles of the party,—"the first platform ever adopted by a national convention."[1] These resolutions favored "adequate protection to American industry"; "a uniform system of internal improvements by the General Government"; the decision of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court; defended the Senate

Origin of the Whigs.

The Whig Platform.

[1] Stanwood, *History of the Presidency.*

against the Executive, and denounced the "indiscriminate removal of public officers for the mere difference of opinion as a gross abuse of power, corrupting to the morals and dangerous to the liberties of the country." This platform is sometimes referred to as that of the National *Democratic* party, which shows that the term "Democratic" had become popular, and that the opponents of Jackson were not willing that his wing of the old Democratic-Republicans should monopolize the popular name. But the Democratic name was already too well attached to the followers of Jackson to allow of its being otherwise appropriated, and the opposition had to cast about for another. The name *Whig* was not applied till 1834, when it was taken up as a popular rallying term that would appeal to all political elements in opposition to Jackson. "Whig" called up old Revolutionary sentiment and loyalty. The Whigs announced themselves as the true followers and successors of the men of '76. They would stand, as their sires of the Revolution had stood, in stout opposition to executive prerogative and usurpation, whether on the part of King George in 1776, or of "King Andrew" in 1834.

The Whig Name.

The Whigs, then, assumed to stand for the true Republican and Patriot position of opposition to the increase of the power of the Executive at the expense of the legislature, as Jefferson did in 1798 and 1800, and for opposition to the high prerogative, or Tory, doctrine of Jackson, who, by his defiance of the Supreme Court, his disregard of the rights of the Senate, his high-handed use of the veto, his summary political removals without cause, seemed to be usurping all the functions of Government to himself, like an absolute monarch.

It has been said by an eminent writer that, in its permanent significance, the real question raised by the Whigs was (and it was fundamental in the American political system), whether we should have parliamentary govern-

ment or presidential government in the United States. Should the Executive be co-ordinate with, and independent of, the legislative branch, or should Congressional control be established over the Administration? If the people had allowed the Senate's censure of Jackson to stand; if they had authorized his impeachment by the House; if they had reversed his policy on the deposits and the bank, the Executive would have been subordinated to the control of Congress, and executive independence would have been ultimately destroyed.[1]

Significant Interpretation of the Whig Position.

It is not evident that this interpretation of the issue was in the minds either of the Jackson Democrats or of the Whig opposition. The Whigs never defined and announced the idea of legislative supremacy for themselves. They did not claim to embody that principle; they, rather, made use of the old Whig anti-prerogative sentiment, the opposition to one-man power, and the popularity of *representative* government, in order to rally opposition to Jackson. They did not come out for a change in the Constitution modifying the veto power in restraint of executive influence over public policies until their own Vice-President had used his veto (upon succeeding to the presidency) to defeat a policy that had been clamed as distinctively Whig. When the bank question and the tariff question had dropped out of public notice, after Tyler's administration, the question of governmental form disappeared too, which may go to show that the latter was not regarded as *fundamental* by the Whig leaders of that day, but merely as accessory to the economic policies that were really *Whig*.

The Whigs, in 1834, when the party name first came into use (if we consider the party as distinct from the National Republicans), are to be looked upon chiefly as a party of opposition. Jackson's positive policies had

[1] Professor Burgess, *Middle Period*.

aroused many elements against him. The Whigs stood for marshalling these forces under one banner. The diverse, not to say conflicting, elements making up the early Whigs were as follows:

1. The National Republicans, the advocates under Clay and Adams of the "American System,"—a national tariff, a national bank, and national internal improvements. This group represented positive economic principles, but at this time they were National Republican principles rather than Whig, and they had found party formulation before the Whigs, as a party, appeared in the arena.

Constituent Elements of the Whigs.

2. The Nullifiers and the extreme States' rights men, who were offended at Jackson's policy toward South Carolina, which, as they thought, threatened the legitimate rights of the States. In addition to Calhoun and the South Carolinians, John Tyler and other representatives of the Old Virginia School were illustrations of this kind.

Nullifiers.

3. A majority of those known as "Anti-Masons."

4. Former Jackson men who condemned his high-handed conduct in the use of the veto and the removing power,—the "immolation of Duane and the subserviency of Taney," as Greeley expressed it.

5. The personal opponents of Jackson,—those who considered him incompetent and as guilty of executive usurpations.

There was no basis in these diverse elements for a party of organic unity. The Whigs were never a party of fixed principles and harmonious purpose. It spent most of its campaigns in "beating up recruits regardless of principles,—the bane of the party throughout its whole national existence."

"No delegate could come amiss to their conventions: the original Adams Republican, the Nullifier of South Carolina,

the Anti-Mason of New York or Pennsylvania, the States' rights delegate from Georgia, and the general mass of the dissatisfied everywhere could find a refuge in its councils. It asked no questions: it ventured but twice in its history (1844 and 1852) to adopt a platform of principles, and it ventured but once (1844) to nominate a candidate for the presidency with any avowed political principles." [1]

Its only avowed principles were involved in its advocacy of the measures included in the "American System,"—its inheritance from the National Republicans,—and opposition to the veto and executive encroachments. The Whig platform in 1840 was but a shout for harmony among all the forces that were anti-Jackson and anti-Van Buren, while its campaign was but an effort (all too successful) to drown the national reason in a hullabaloo of political excitement, with its "claptrap of processions, songs, emblems, and slang" [2]; while in 1848 its platform was but a eulogy of Taylor and an attempt to convince the voters that its candidate was a Whig. In 1844, in connection with longer planks commending and eulogizing their candidates, a brief plank summarized the party principles:

"A well-regulated currency; a tariff for revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the government, and discriminating with special reference to the domestic labor of the country; the distribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public lands; a single term for the presidency; a reform of Executive usurpations; an administration of practical efficiency, controlled by a well-regulated and wise economy."

Whig Platform of 1844.

In addition to these, and conspicuous among its proposals, was its demand for the limitation of the executive

[1] Professor Johnston in Lalor's *Cyclopedia of Political Science.*

[2] Stanwood, p. 206.

veto, so that the "will of the nation should be uncontrolled by the will of one man." [1]

As Jackson's personality disappeared as an issue, as the economic questions sank in importance, and the slavery question arose to prominence, the Whigs were even more unable to act unitedly. The Northern and Southern wings could not be held together. The Wilmot Proviso,—the proposal to prohibit slavery by Congressional action in the newly acquired Territories,—acted as a dividing wedge. It is true that the Whigs elected their candidate, another military hero without any known political principles, in 1848; but this was because of the divisions within the Democratic party. The Whigs included strong pro-slavery men in the South and radical anti-slavery men in the North, while a very large body of Northern Whigs cared very little about the slavery question. The latter were opposed to the agitation of the subject and wished to evade, or avoid, it altogether. It is said that Thaddeus Stevens, one of the keenest satirists that ever sat in Congress, suggested to the Speaker in 1850, after the Fugitive Slave Law had been voted on, that he had better send a page into the lobby to inform the Whig members there that they might safely return to the House, as the slavery question had been disposed of. This well expressed how impossible it was, with the slavery question becoming more and more prominent, that the Whig party should meet the situation and take any decided stand on the dominant issue. How could Toombs of Georgia, and Giddings of Ohio, get on together in the same party? Could a pro-slavery "fire-eater" and a "fanatical Abolitionist" abide together? Could the "Conscience Whigs" (radical anti-slavery men) and the "Cotton Whigs" (for peace at any price on slavery for the sake of the cotton

Division among the Whigs.

[1] Address of Whig members of Congress, Niles's *Register*, September 18, 1841; see p. 153, the Author's *American Republic and Its Government.*

trade) and the "Silver Grays" (the administration forces under Fillmore),—could these forces all stand together in support of the same platforms and the same candidates? One more effort, at any rate, was to be made, and, in 1852, the Whigs attempted to hold together these conflicting elements of their party on the basis of the compromises of 1850. These compromises they accepted as a final settlement of the slavery question,—as a "finality," —in the historic resolution of their platform of 1852:

Notable Whig Declaration of 1852.

"The series of acts [of 1850], the act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included, are received and acquiesced in by the Whig party as a settlement of the exciting questions which they embrace; we will maintain them and insist upon their strict enforcement; and we deprecate all further agitation of the question thus settled as dangerous to our peace, and will discountenance all efforts to continue or renew such agitation whenever, wherever, or however the attempt may be made; and we will maintain this system as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union."

It was this resolution that led to the remark that the "Whig party died of an attempt to swallow the Fugitive Slave Law."

The campaign of 1852 was the last national effort the Whig party ever made. General Scott, its presidential candidate of that year, carried but four States,—Massachusetts and Vermont in the North, and Kentucky and Tennessee in the South. The party was as good as dead, and with the increasing anti-slavery agitation brought about by the events between 1852 and 1856, especially by the attempted enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, a new party had to be found to oppose the Democracy. Remnants of the Whigs under the name of the American party nominated Fillmore and Dayton and cast 874,000 of the

popular votes in 1856; and the "Constitutional Union" party of 1860, which nominated Bell and Everett in 1860 and cast 587,000 popular votes and carried three States with 39 electoral votes, was composed very largely of "old line" conservative Whigs. Mr. Schouler says:

"Whiggery in its time had been less patrician, less distrustful of the people than Federalism; but the Federalists in their day had accomplished much for history that was permanent while the Whigs left nothing. Its honorable epitaph may be that 'it loved the Union and sought sincerely to preserve it.'"[1]

Personnel of Whig Leadership.

While the Whigs as a party left little in permanent results, yet when we look to the personnel of its leadership it will be seen that the party must be accorded a high rank on account of the individual services of its statesmen. Clay, Webster, and John Quincy Adams are a trio of names without many peers in American political history, and Calhoun acted with the Whigs until 1840; there were no abler leaders from the South than Bell of Tennessee, Berrien, Forsyth, Toombs, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia; while Fessenden of Maine, Collamer of Vermont, Winthrop, Choate, and Everett of Massachusetts, Gideon Granger, Millard Fillmore, Greeley, Weed, and Seward of New York, Bayard and Clayton of Delaware, Mangum, Badger, and Graham of North Carolina, Giddings, Corwin, and Ewing of Ohio, Richard W. Thompson and Caleb B. Smith of Indiana, were all leaders of the first rank. These names suggest an array of talent and leadership certainly not excelled, perhaps not equalled, in the ranks of any party in our history.

In this period of our party history the Whigs were confronted by the Democratic party. This party inherited the name and prestige of Jeffersonian Democracy, and for the larger part of this period they were under the

[1] *History of the United States*, vol. v., p. 249.

leadership of two of the most astute of party captains, Jackson and Van Buren. The Jacksonian Democrats denounced the Whigs as Federalists, while they themselves claimed to be the champions of the common people. In the first contest in which the Democrats met the opposing party, in 1832, Jackson embodied in himself and in his record the principles and policies of his party. He had made a record as a "Tribune of the People," against Nullification, against the "monster," the United States Bank, and against "Nick" Biddle, the king of the "Money Power." Jackson, it was contended, had come in by a spontaneous movement of the people,—but it was by a spontaneity that had been carefully cultivated by Van Buren, Hill, Lewis, and other Jackson managers and advisers who afterwards became known as his "Kitchen Cabinet,"—the backstair influence of Jackson's administration.

Jackson, the "People" and the "Money" Power."

The Democrats published no national platform either in 1832 or in 1836. But in 1836 the Democrats of New York State published a platform which was generally accepted by the party as a declaration of principles. This asserted:

Democratic Position in 1836.

"(1) Unqualified hostility to bank notes and paper money as a circulating medium, because gold and silver is the only safe and constitutional currency."

"(2) Hostility to all monopolies by legislation, because they are violations of equal rights of the people."

"(3) Hostility to the creation of vested rights in corporations beyond the reach of succeeding legislatures, as dangerous usurpations of the people's sovereign rights; all acts of incorporation might be altered by succeeding legislatures."

This party proposed that the people should not be put into the power of monopolies and corporations through a

system of vested rights or by means of irrepealable charters.

In 1840, the Democrats published a notable platform in National Convention. They asserted:

Democratic Platform of 1840.

"(1) That the National Government is one of limited powers, to be administered under strict construction.

"(2) That the Constitution does not grant power to the National Government to carry on a system of internal improvements.

"(3) That 'justice and sound policy forbid the General Government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another,' or 'to cherish one portion of the country to the injury of another,'—an expression in manifest opposition to the tariff.

"(4) That Congress has no power to charter a United States Bank; that such an institution is 'one of deadly hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a concentrated money power and above the laws and the will of the people.' Government moneys should be separated from banking institutions.

"(5) That Congress has no power under the Constitution 'to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the sole and proper judges of everything pertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the Constitution; that all efforts by Abolitionists or others, made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or take incipient steps in relation thereto [referring to petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and of the inter-State slave trade] are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people and endanger the stability and permanence of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend to our political institutions.'"

They reasserted the principles of the Declaration of Independence and favored easy naturalization of foreigners as in harmony with these principles. The resolution touching the slavery question was essentially the position of the party on that subject throughout this period of its history.

Democratic Position in 1844.

In 1844, the Democrats reasserted the platform of 1840. On the question of territorial expansion they declared for the "re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas," asserting that the American title to the whole of Oregon was "clear and unquestionable." Texas for the South, "fifty-four forty or fight," as a rallying cry for the North, a tariff for revenue for the country at large, with sufficient evasion of the tariff issue in Pennsylvania to carry that State,—this was the campaign combination that carried the Democrats back into power in 1844. The party measures of Polk's administration were all opposed by the Whigs; the aggressive attitude toward Mexico leading to the Mexican War, the backdown on Oregon in the adjustment of the Northwest boundary line; the Sub-Treasury, and the *ad valorem* Walker Tariff of 1846,—these items indicate the record of the Democratic party on the industrial and territorial questions of that day. In 1848, the Democrats were defeated because of factional divisions in New York. In that year, and again in 1852, the party reasserted its historic platform of 1840. In 1852, the resolution of 1840 touching slavery [1] was held to embrace the whole subject of slavery as agitated in Congress, and the party promised to stand on that national platform and to abide by a faithful execution of the compromise measures of 1850, including the Fugitive Slave Law. As the party of strict construction and States' rights, finding its strength largely in the South and leaning toward Free Trade, the party promised

[1] See p. 47.

"to abide by and uphold the principles laid down in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, and in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia Legislature in 1799; that it adopts those principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed, and is resolved to carry them out in their obvious meaning and import."

CHAPTER V

THE ABOLITIONISTS AND THE LIBERTY PARTY

THE years from 1854 to 1856 mark a turning-point in American party history. It was then that parties were reconstituted on the basis of resistance to the extension of slavery. The influence of the slavery issue on the Whig and Democratic parties in this period is one of the most important themes in our party history. To understand that influence is to understand the facts and forces leading to the origin of the modern Republican party, which conducted its first national campaign in 1856. To understand how these facts and forces worked together for the formation of a new party it is necessary to take an historical survey of the anti-slavery struggle covering the preceding twenty-five years. Only an outline of that great controversy can be presented in this sketch.

The Crisis of 1854.

We have briefly referred to the neutral or hostile attitude of the old parties toward the anti-slavery cause. This attitude weakened and finally disrupted the Democrats; it demoralized and finally annihilated the Whigs. The anti-slavery agitation was acting like a dividing wedge within the organization of both parties. This agitation was promoted,—the wedge was being driven in,—sometimes by men who cared little for party and all for the cause of the slave, but oftener by events in the progress of pro-slavery aggression which seemed destined to promote the crisis

Beginning of the Anti-Slavery Agitation.

which Lincoln defined when he said that the people had to decide whether the Republic should become all slave or all free. The student of our party history must notice these positive forces in the slavery controversy that brought about this crisis.

On January 1, 1831, William Lloyd Garrison issued the first number of his *Liberator*. On the subject of slavery he proposed to "be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice." On that subject he did not wish to speak, or think, or write with moderation.

Garrison and the "Liberator."

> "Urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present; I am in earnest; I will not equivocate; I will not excuse; I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard. The apathy of the people is enough to make every statue leap from its pedestal, and to hasten the resurrection of the dead." [1]

It was the office of Lundy, Garrison, Johnson, Phillips, May, Lovejoy, Whittier, and their Abolition coadjutors to arouse the national conscience. The early Abolitionists were stirring agitators. In 1832, the New England Anti-Slavery Society was formed. In 1833, the cause advanced to the organization of the American Anti-Slavery Society. The Declaration of Principles of this Abolition Society re-proclaimed the undying principles of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal, endowed with certain inalienable rights among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; they asserted that the "guilt of our national oppression was unequalled by that of any other nation on the face of the earth, and therefore the nation is bound to repent instantly, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free; that no man has a right to enslave or imbrute his brother, or to treat

Declaration of the American Anti-Slavery Society, 1833.

[1] *Liberator.*

him for one moment as a piece of merchandise; that there is no difference in principle between the African Slave Trade and American Slavery; that every American citizen who retains a human being in bondage is, according to Scripture, a man-stealer[1]; that the slaves ought instantly to be set free and brought under the protection of the law; no matter how long they had been in bondage their right to be free could never have been alienated; and that all laws now in force admitting the right of slavery are, before God, utterly null and void." They demanded *immediate emancipation without compensation.*

As to the constitutional aspects of slavery, these early Abolitionists "fully and unanimously recognized the sovereignty of each State to legislate exclusively upon the subject of slavery which is tolerated within its limits; we concede that Congress under the national compact has no right to interfere with any of the Slave States in relation to this momentous subject."[2] This principle was embodied in the constitution of the Society and Judge William Jay, one of the Abolition leaders, held that he could consistently take his oath to support the Constitution of the United States. But these Abolitionists held that Congress had a right, and "was solemnly bound to suppress the domestic Slave Trade between the States, and to abolish slavery in those portions of our territory which the Constitution has placed under its exclusive jurisdiction." Wherein the Constitution made a citizen liable to be called upon to help suppress a slave insurrection; wherein it authorized a slaveowner to vote for three fifths of his slaves; wherein it required a standing army, or a navy on the coast, for the support and protection of slavery in the South; wherein it authorized the seizure and return of an escaping slave,—these guarantees, nomi-

[1] Exodus xxi., 16.

[2] Declaration of the American Anti-Slavery Society, December, 1833, *Life of Garrison*, vol. i., p. 411.

nated in the constitutional bond, must be declared forfeit. Such relation to slavery is criminal and full of danger and *must be broken up.*

Such were the principles of the early Abolitionists. Their purpose was:

Purposes of the Abolitionists.

"(1) To organize anti-slavery societies, if possible, in every city, town, and village in our land.

"(2) To send forth agents to lift up the voice of remonstrance, of warning, of entreaty, and of rebuke.

"(3) To circulate anti-slavery tracts and periodicals.

"(4) To enlist the pulpit and the press.

"(5) To purify the churches from all participation in the guilt of slavery, and to spare no means to bring the nation to speedy repentance."

Effect of the Abolition Agitation.

This promulgation was like a declaration of war. It was accepted as such by the South. The Southern people looked upon the Abolitionists as incendiaries and madmen, a band of reckless and unreasoning fanatics, who were bent on exciting a slave insurrection; who were wild enthusiasts for the amalgamation of the races; who were seeking to spur on the National Government to violent and unconstitutional abolition of slavery within the States; who were "ready to fulfil the fiend-like errand of mingling the blood of the master and the slave, to whose fate they were equally indifferent, with the smouldering ruins of our peaceful dwellings."[1]

It is easy to see that between the Abolitionists and the defenders of slavery there was an inevitable and an irrepressible conflict. Between such forces there could be no peace.

The intense antagonism aroused by the abolition agita-

[1] Governor MacDuffie's message on the slavery question to the South Carolina Legislature, 1835.

tion was not confined to the South. It stirred to resentment also the conservative elements, the political and commercial classes in the North, whose peace and interests the agitation disturbed. It was felt that unless the Abolitionists could be put down the whole North would be held responsible. The immediate effect of the agitation seemed to strengthen the institution of slavery. The South felt driven to its defence. The slave codes of the Southern States were made more drastic; voluntary emancipation was restrained; the life of free colored people in the South was made more intolerable; demands were increased for the return of fugitive slaves; public prices were set upon the heads of prominent Abolitionists; and Southern public men, instead of speaking of slavery as a social and political evil, came now to defend slavery as a "positive good," "the most perfect system of social and political happiness that ever existed"; "instead of being a political evil, domestic slavery is the corner-stone of our republican edifice."[1]

Resistance to Abolitionism.

In the country at large the Abolitionists were met with obloquy and violence. Their meetings were disturbed, their speakers were egged and stoned, and their constitutional rights of free assembly, free petition, free press, and free speech were denied them. Birney's meetings were broken up, Garrison was mobbed, Lovejoy was killed, and John Quincy Adams and Joshua R. Giddings were bound by gag rules while struggling in the House of Representatives in defence of the right of petition and the freedom of debate. These persecutions and denials of constitutional rights made martyrs of the Abolitionists and multiplied converts and recruits to their ranks. They ceased to be mere champions of abolition. In view of the violent outrages heaped upon them, it now seemed to more moderate men that in the persons

[1] MacDuffie's message. See also the speeches of Calhoun and the "Corner-Stone Speech" of Alexander H. Stephens, in 1861.

of the Abolitionists "the most sacred rights of freemen had been assailed. They were sufferers for the liberty of thought, speech, and press, and in maintaining this liberty against insult and violence they won for themselves an honored place among defenders of American liberty." [1]

In spite of the fiercest and most raging opposition that any cause ever encountered, the Abolitionists steadily and rapidly increased in numbers. Within nine years after the organization of their first society there were two thousand anti-slavery societies, with two hundred thousand members. They were consecrated to their cause, being ready to seal their testimony with their lives, and many of them sacrificed property, home, and friendship, and even life itself for the slave. In the face of the furious opposition which they had excited they would pursue their way, stand bravely and persistently for their rights, and let the heathen rage! It was by such devotion, not to say heroism, that the moral foundations were laid on which a party was to rise to power to resist the aggressions of slavery.

Growth of Abolitionism.

The increase in the anti-slavery forces was caused not so much by the agitation and arguments of the Abolitionists themselves as by the progress of events. Among these events the dominant fact in the decade between 1835 and 1845 was the movement for the annexation of Texas. With the question of territorial expansion was inseparably connected the extension of excessive and inequitable political power that came to slaveholders by their three-fifths representation for their slaves. This led many anti-slavery politicians to resist slavery extension from political as well as from moral considerations. Before the movement for Texas was fully under way Abolitionism had passed from being merely a moral agitation into a political force. In so passing from the field of morals and religion into the

Abolition Schism, 1839-40.

[1] William Ellery Channing, letter to Birney, 1836, *Works*.

field of politics there occurred the Abolition schism of 1840. In that year the American Anti-Slavery Society was rent into factions.

By this year (1840) the aggressive anti-slavery forces are to be distinguished in three groups.

1. The Garrisonian Abolitionists. 2. The Liberty Party Abolitionists. 3. The Anti-Slavery men of abolition proclivities who for some time remained in affiliation with other parties.

The Garrisonians formed "an extreme small wing" of the Abolitionists. These were the fanatical radicals. In 1840, the Garrisonians, in opposition to the great body of the Abolitionists, divided the American Anti-Slavery Society by "hauling it off to engage in various hobbies,"[1] and by attempting to load up the anti-slavery cause with all sorts of moral and social fads. Woman's rights, perfectionism, anti-church, anti-clergy, anti-Sabbath, anti-marriage,—these terms indicate the radical and eccentric ideas to which the Garrisonians were more or less committed. Finding in Church and State, not co-operation and favor for his cause, but hostility and persecution rather, Garrison became hostile to both these institutions. He denounced the Church and the clergy as immoral. He and his followers were the disunion Abolitionists; they denounced the Constitution, contended for abstract and absolute righteousness according to their own canons, and they refused all co-operation with any one who would not go the full length of their extreme positions. "No union with slaveholders," "The Constitution is a covenant with death and a league with hell!" These are familiar Garrisonian maxims. Garrison's followers became committed to the non-coercion, non-resistance, no-government theory in politics, like theoretical anarchists. They refused to vote or to act with others for political ends. They hoped to reform

The Garrisonians.

[1] Birney's *Birney*.

the Government by renouncing all connection with it; to remove political evils by refusing all association with political parties. They claimed to rely on moral suasion alone, on appeals to the consciences of the people. They were typical "come-outers," seceders, and non-conformists, especially resisting all the ordinary associated means of political action.

Of the anti-slavery forces aroused to action by the revival between 1830 and 1840 only a very small part were "Garrisonians," probably not more than one fifth of the members of the anti-slavery societies existing at the time of the schism of 1840.[1] Nor did they increase in numbers or influence during the next twenty years. Their fidelity, devotion, courage, conviction, persistency, and energy were unexcelled, and these qualities may have given them an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. These factors also, in addition to the designs of their pro-slavery opponents, brought it to pass that the term "Abolitionist" became identical with this small band of fanatical agitators. It was the wild vagaries and the desocializing attitude of this extreme group that brought such opprobrium to the name "Abolitionist," and it was this that led the later and really forceful leaders of the anti-slavery movement, like Seward, Chase, and Lincoln, always to deny that they were ever Abolitionists of the Garrison stripe. No anti-slavery statesman or politician was, of course, a Garrisonian. And of the nearly two million voters who, between 1856 and 1860, fought the good fight that the Republic might be all free, the Garrisonian Abolitionists were but a mere handful.

Very different were the men of the Liberty party. These were the political Abolitionists who believed in the formation of a third party to promote their cause. These men believed in keeping clear of entanglements with other causes. Abolitionism was the

The Liberty Party.

[1] Wilson's *Slave Power*, vol. i.

only *ism* they had organized to promote. To promote this cause they thought they were justified in voting, holding office, and in organizing a separate party machine. These were Abolitionists like Birney, Whittier, the Tappans, Gerritt Smith, and, later, Salmon P. Chase, Giddings, Hale, and Julian. Many joined the party in 1844 who did not believe in its necessity or wisdom in 1840. The party cast but seven thousand votes for Birney in 1840, but they increased their voting strength to sixty-two thousand, again for Birney, in 1844.

The Liberty party, in its purpose, was a national, not a sectional, party. It asserted that it was organized, not merely for the overthrow of slavery, but for the vindication of the great underlying principle of democracy, equality of human rights. Equality of human rights was in harmony with the spirit of American liberty, and the "true spirit of the Constitution." Slavery was the greatest and immediate obstacle to the realization of this noble ideal of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. On that subject the Liberty party asserted:

"That there should be absolute and unqualified divorcement of the General Government from slavery.

"That slavery is strictly local and rests only on State legislation. All slavery within the limits of national jurisdiction should be abolished.

"That the General Government has no power to establish or continue slavery anywhere. All treaties, or acts of Congress, continuing or favoring slavery in the District of Columbia or the national territory (Florida) are unconstitutional."

Thus the Liberty party held slavery to be a creature of State law; it was sustained, not by the common law, nor by the law of the Constitution, but only by positive enactments within the States which admit and sanction it. The Constitution is an instrument of liberty. The

nation is non-slaveholding, and all patronage and support hitherto extended to slavery by the National Government should be withdrawn, and the influence of the national authority everywhere ought to be arrayed on the side of liberty and free labor.

The third wing of the positive anti-slavery forces in 1840 and 1844 were the political Abolitionists who yet thought the formation of a third party was inexpedient. These readily accepted the general principle underlying the contention of the Liberty party: That slavery was sectional, freedom national; that responsibility was co-extensive with power; that wherever the National Government had power over slavery, wherever it was in any way responsible for it, there that power and responsibility should be exercised for its restraint and extinction. Opposition, not support, should be the national policy. Slavery was not to be looked upon merely as an inconvenience about which the nation could be indifferent. It was not an ordinary "domestic institution" (a misleading and deceitful euphony) entitled to national protection and patronage. But slavery was to be regarded rather as a blighting and ruinous evil; a great wrong, a fearful and barbarous power, which was now fighting, not only for security at home, but for expansion and empire within the nation. As such it should be everywhere opposed.

Political Abolitionists in the Old Parties.

These were bedrock and enduring principles, and they formed the moral basis on which the conflict against slavery was fought to a finish. The issue thrust into American politics by the Liberty party in 1840 was essentially this: Who shall control the National Government,—those who believe that slavery is right and wish to fortify, defend, and extend it, or those who believe it is wrong and wish to prevent and restrict it? Lincoln recognized and defined this issue nearly twenty years later:

Liberty Principles.

"We want and must have a national policy as to slavery which deals with it as being a wrong. Whoever would prevent slavery becoming national and perpetual yields all when he yields to a policy which treats it either as being right, or as being a matter of indifference. We admit that the United States Government is not charged with the duty of righting or preventing all the wrongs in the world. But the government rightfully may, and, subject to the Constitution, ought to, redress and prevent all wrongs which are wrongs to the nation itself. It is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We think slavery impairs and endangers the general welfare. Those who do not think this are not of us and we cannot agree with them. We must shape our own course by our own judgment." [1]

This was clearly a defensible position. But there were those among the Liberty party men who went farther.

Attitude of the Liberty Party toward the Pro-Slavery Clauses of the Constitution.

In their desire to hold to the Constitution as an anti-slavery, or at least as a non-slavery, instrument, they asserted that the principles of the Declaration of Independence, by which all had the "inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," had become constitutional law. On the basis of the amendments guaranteeing the inviolability of free speech, free press, free petition, free trial by jury, and guaranteeing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," they declared that the clauses of the Constitution allowing representation for three fifths of the slaves and providing for the rendition of fugitive slaves, were anti-republican and ought to be abrogated. Whereas, they said, "we should obey God rather than man; whereas, the fugitive slave clause binds us to violate a principle of universal morality; whereas, it is a principle of common law that any contract or agreement to do an act derogatory to natural right is vitiated and annulled by its inherent immorality,

[1] Lincoln, 1859, December 3–5, *Works*, vol. i., p. 593.

we therefore give notice to the nation and the world that we regard the fugitive slave clause as 'utterly null and void and, consequently, as forming no part of the Constitution whenever we are called upon or sworn to support it.'"

This was the convenient plea by which the Liberty men proposed to abrogate that part of the Constitution which they did not like. It was the first announcement of the "higher law,"—that there was a law higher than the Constitution, and that whenever the Constitution contravened this higher moral law they would disregard the Constitution. This was of the spirit of the Garrisonians, the pure moralists. Whether this extreme position was defensible was a moral rather than a constitutional question, but it had at least the merit of candor and honesty.

The Character of the Liberty Party Men.

While the demands and principles of the Liberty party on slavery contained more than the platform on which the anti-slavery cause was finally won, the party should be given the credit of being the first to formulate the cardinal political principles, as applied to slavery, around which the great Republican party was finally gathered for victory. The Liberty men are not to be regarded, as were the Garrisonians, as a set of impracticables. Their opponents looked upon them as formidable antagonists, and Calhoun recognized in their course the greatest menace to the slave system. They had among them able lawyers and men of political sense and sagacity. They constantly held their party subordinate to their cause; to them party was always a means, not an end. They easily and consistently merged with the Free-Soilers in 1848 and with the Republicans in 1856. In 1844, holding the balance of power in New York State, they exercised a decisive influence in politics. Their fifteen thousand votes cast in that State for Birney were mostly withdrawn from Clay, and the result was

that Polk, an avowed annexationist, carried the State by the "lean plurality of five thousand votes" and was elected to the presidency. The Liberty men have generally been reproached for the course they then pursued.[1]

Was the Liberty Party Responsible for Slavery Extension, 1844?

They are accused of responsibility for slavery extension in permitting the annexation of Texas by causing the defeat of Clay. But it is pure assumption to assert that the course of our history with reference to Texas would have been materially different had Clay been elected instead of Polk. Mr. Rhodes expresses the judgment that Clay's election "would certainly postpone, and might defeat, the project of annexation." It does not seem to me that this conclusion is sustained by the facts in the situation. Texas was annexed under Tyler; and if it be said that Polk's election was held by Tyler as a popular mandate for that policy, it can by no means be said that Tyler would have construed Clay's election as a mandate against it. The majority of the country evidently favored annexation, the South partly on account of slavery, and a large part of the North on other accounts. The Democrats were well united on the issue and they forced the fighting. But the Whigs were not united in opposition, as Clay's apparent willingness to appear for annexation in the South, but against it in the North, clearly indicates. There is no ground for the assumption that Greeley, Giddings, Seward, and the abolition Whigs of the North represented the party. Clay represented the party. The sagacity of the Liberty men can hardly be impeached for refusing to commit their cause to Clay, who had said that "personally he would be glad to see Texas annexed," and that in any case annexation ought to be considered without reference to its bearing on slavery. Certainly Clay could not have been trusted to resist annexation.

[1] Greeley says the Liberty votes were "votes thrown away on Birney," and Rhodes that a "vote for Birney was indirectly a vote for Polk."

The strictures on the Liberty men are made on the assumption that Clay and the Whigs were opposed to slavery. Thurlow Weed's remark in 1860, that "the Whig party was always opposed to slavery,"[1] seems somewhat grotesque in the light of the party's record. Just when, where, or how the Whig party was opposed to slavery no historical writer has ever attempted to explain. Clay was like the Whigs whom he led,—he was in a strait betwixt two, without reliable political convictions or fixed political purposes on the subject of slavery. Some Whigs were opposed to slavery, but Clay was not one of them. He was a slaveholder who had favored slavery extension in 1820 in order to "dilute the evil." What opposition he had expressed to the annexation of Texas had no reference to the interests of the anti-slavery cause, and in the face of the first pressure that confronted him he virtually withdrew what he had said. Clay was a "Union-Saver," one of that group of men who were at all times ready to sacrifice the freedom of the slave, or the cause of freedom in the Territories, if such a course seemed at all necessary, in order to preserve the Union. They may have *preferred* the Union without slavery, though as a rule their anti-slavery consciences were easy to satisfy. They were for justice, if possible or convenient; but, as is evident from their compromising habit, they were for peace on slavery at any price. The most sacred thing in their eyes was the "compromises of the Constitution," and all their energies were bent toward preserving the Union as it was, half slave and half free. It was evident that the slavery question could not be settled on its merits within the Union so long as panic and fear were to dominate the minds of the people at every threat of secession and dissolution. There was no limit to the concessions the "Union-saving" Whigs and Democrats

Clay and Slavery Extension.

"Union-Savers."

[1] *Autobiography*, vol. ii., p. 306.

would have been willing to make as the alternative of a disruption of the Union.[1] The bold Southern leaders like Calhoun saw this, and in discussing the slavery question they offered the alternative of an unconditional submission or the dissolution of the Union. The conduct of the "Union-saving" Whigs, who controlled and led the party, misled the South to believe that the North would regard no concession too great in order to avoid this extremity.[2] It is plain from Clay's career, and from the subsequent career of his party, that upon the subject of slavery he would have moved in the line of least resistance. Had he presumed to oppose the incoming of Texas the South had only to threaten disunion to induce him to yield.

[1] Rufus Choate urged that the return to slavery of fugitive slaves was an insignificant sacrifice on the altar of the Union as compared to the hecatombs to be sacrificed through civil convulsions.—Adams's *Life of C. F. Adams*, pp. 59–60.

[2] See Von Holst, vol. iii., pp. 315–316.

CHAPTER VI

THE FREE-SOILERS

THE Free-Soilers were more nearly than the Liberty men the forerunners of the Republicans. The record of the Liberty party shows clearly that the movement against slavery proceeded along two lines, moral and political. The earnest anti-slavery men in all parties, or in none, kept up the agitation, in literature and song, on the platform, in the pulpit, and in the press. The growing evils and aggressions of slavery, its arrogant spirit and its attempt to prevent discussion, came very forcibly to their aid. But mere moral appeals for abolition, or for immediate emancipation, could not arouse the people of the North—of Connecticut or Michigan, for instance—to organize themselves for the purpose of putting out the fires of slavery in Louisiana or Georgia. The Yankee in the North felt that he was not responsible for slavery in Louisiana or Georgia. But the successful movement for the annexation of Texas, followed by the Mexican War, with the certainty of increased territory, changed the aspect of the question. It then became a question not of abolition but of restriction. Men whose ears were closed to arguments for the abolition of slavery, for which they felt no responsibility and over which they had no control, were yet quite sensitive to pleas against the extension of slavery to the national Territories under the protection and the auspices of the national power. In

The Free-Soilers.

1846, in anticipation of negotiations looking to increased territory following the Mexican War, to the bill appropriating $3,000,000 for use by the President in purchasing territory from Mexico David Wilmot, a Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania, offered his famous proviso that neither "slavery nor involuntary servitude" should ever exist in any territory to be ceded by Mexico. This was the central principle on which the Republican party was subsequently formed. It was the principle to which the anti-slavery Whigs and anti-slavery Democrats endeavored to commit their respective parties. Failing in this, they left their parties and, sinking previous and minor differences, they merged with the Liberty men into the Free-Soil party.

"Conscience Whigs."

The Free-Soilers who came out from the Whigs were sometimes called, especially in Massachusetts, the "Conscience Whigs." On the subject of slavery their consciences were too tender for their party managers. They were ready to give up their party, they were even ready to see their party leaders defeated for office, rather than to swerve from a course to which their consciences impelled them. The "old-line" Whigs, sometimes called by their opponents the "Cotton Whigs," because, as was charged, they wished to avoid the slavery question in order not to injure the cotton trade, desired to commit the party to economic issues alone, as the best means of preserving the harmony of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union. They were for "our country however bounded," and were therefore not opposed to expansion merely from fear that expansion might increase the slave area, and they were opposed to committing the party to the Wilmot Proviso. They were led by men like Webster, Clay, Choate, Winthrop, Corwin, and Fillmore. The "Conscience Whigs" were determined to resist at all hazard the further extension of slave territory. They

"Old-Line," or "Cotton Whigs."

were led by men like John G. Palfrey, Charles Francis Adams, John A. Andrew, Henry Wilson, Charles Sumner, E. Rockwood Hoar, R. H. Dana, George W. Julian, and Joshua R. Giddings. They objected to the spread of slavery, not only because that would tend to perpetuate and increase the slave trade and the other moral and social evils of slavery, but because such expansion would add greatly to the political power of the slaveholders. These men were determined, if possible, to commit the Whig party against slavery. Sumner wrote to Webster, beseeching him to place himself at the head of the Whig party and commit the party definitely to an anti-slavery policy,—to make it a great national party of freedom. Webster politely refused. It was for the course that Webster then pursued, subsequently voiced in his Seventh-of-March Speech, that Motley spoke of him as "that golden-headed but clay-footed image," and that Emerson wrote of him: "Mr. Webster is only following the laws of his blood and constitution. He is a man who lives by his memory; a man of the past, not a man of faith and hope." The moralist felt that the party cause of the future was to be found in positive resistance to slavery extension, and that Webster and the "old-line" Whigs were not the men for the hour.

Webster's Conservatism.

In the Massachusetts Whig Convention of September 26, 1846, Sumner, speaking for the "Conscience Whigs," urged it as the duty of the party to give open and distinct expression against slavery, not only against its further extension, but against "its longer continuance under the Constitution and laws of the Union." Winthrop replied, urging the tariff, public economy, and internal improvements, as the economic issues on which the Whigs were united to do battle. This was a representative collision, and the anti-slavery men were defeated in the making of the platform. The course that was seemingly expedient and morally

The Whig Organization vs. the Whig Conscience.

indifferent had won. Upon hearing of this result, Whittier spoke in one of his *Voices of Freedom*, giving expression to the Free-Soil conscience that was impelling the disruption of the Whig party:

" Tell us not of Banks and Tariffs,—cease your paltry peddler cries,—
Shall the good State sink her honor that your gambling stocks may rise?
Would ye barter man for cotton?—that your gains may sum up higher,
Must we kiss the feet of Moloch, pass our children through the fire?
Is the dollar only real?—God and truth and right a dream?
Weighed against your lying ledgers must our manhood kick the beam?

" Sons of men who sat in council with their Bibles round the board,
Answering England's royal missive with a firm, 'Thus saith the Lord!'
Rise again for home and freedom!—set the battle in array;
What the fathers did of old time we their sons must do to-day." [1]

The poet as well as the moralist was calling for moral leadership, and the spirits of men were being stirred for moral conflict.

Free-Soil Secession from the Whigs.

In spite of their defeat in Massachusetts the "Conscience Whigs" were determined to make opposition to the extension of slavery a political test in the presidential contest of 1848. They proposed to support no candidates for President and Vice-President but such as were known to oppose slavery extension. "The sacramental sanction of a regular nomination" would not suffice. "We cannot say, with detestable morality, 'Our party right or wrong.' Loyalty to prin-

[1] *The Pine-Tree.*

ciple is higher than loyalty to party."[1] When, therefore, in 1848, the Whig National Convention voted down the Wilmot Proviso, Henry Wilson announced the revolt of the anti-slavery Whigs. To these men the slavery question had now assumed an aspect not within the range of expediency and compromise. "To be wrong on this was to be wholly wrong," as Sumner expressed it.

There was also resistance to Democratic acquiescence in slavery and a corresponding schism in that party. Polk's nomination and election in 1844 caused grief and disappointment to thousands of Democrats who were opposed to the annexation of Texas and to the extension of slavery. Van Buren was defeated for the party nomination in 1844 by sharp practice, because as President he had obstructed annexation, and as a candidate he had given positive expression against it. Upon his defeat for the nomination, William Cullen Bryant, David Dudley Field, and other Van Buren Democrats in New York, while loyally supporting Polk, urged the choice of Congressmen opposed to annexation. Silas Wright, the lieutenant and close friend of Van Buren, who had refused to accept second place with Polk, accepted his party nomination for the governorship of New York. Wright's popularity contributed materially to Polk's success in New York, though Wright ran ahead of his national ticket.

The two contending factions of the Democracy in New York became known as the "Hunkers" and the "Barnburners." The "Hunkers" were the "old-line" regulars, the "slow, plodding conservatives," the supporters of annexation, those ready to combine with the Southern Democracy in order to defeat Van Buren; who relied mainly on patronage and spoils for a motive to maintain a party organization and to promote party success,—"respectable, dull men of easy consciences" whose most marked characteristic, according

"Hunkers."

[1] Storey's *Sumner*, p. 55.

to their opponents, was their *hankering* after the emoluments of office. Men of this kind were called by the anti-slavery men "Dough-Faces," "Slavocrats," or "Northern men with Southern principles." Marcy and Dickinson of New York were types of leading "Hunkers," honorable men who were unmoved by abolition noise.

"Soft Hunkers."

When the Wilmot Proviso came up in Congress it was supported there, not only by the New York Whigs, but by all the New York Democrats, following the leadership of Van Buren. A resolution favoring the Wilmot Proviso was carried in the New York legislature by the Van Buren Democrats and the "Soft Hunkers," the latter being less friendly to the extension of slavery than the "Hard Hunkers." Polk, Marcy, and Dickinson, angered at the Democratic opposition in New York to the pro-slavery Mexican policy of the Administration, threw all the weight of the Federal patronage against the Van Buren Democrats. In 1847, in the New York State Democratic Convention at Syracuse, occurred a struggle corresponding to that in the Whig Convention of Massachusetts of 1846.[1] David Dudley Field, leading the anti-slavery Democrats, proposed a resolution, that "while the Democracy of New York would faithfully adhere to the Constitution and maintain the reserved rights of the State they would still declare their uncompromising hostility to the extension of slavery into territory now free." Upon the defeat of this resolution by Hunker office-holders, the anti-slavery Democrats walked out. They resolved to cut loose from and defy the Administration and the State machine, and to appeal to the National Convention of the party. These were the "Barnburners." Their nickname came from their supposed resemblance to the Dutch farmer, who, troubled with the rats in his barn and swear-

The New York Barnburners.

[1] P. 67.

ing that he would be rid of them, finally resorted to the extreme expedient of burning his barn to get rid of the pestiferous rats.[1] They were resolved, like the Conscience Whigs, to be anti-slavery men first and party men afterwards, and to abandon their party if it were to be given over to the pest of slavery.

The Barnburners charged fraud in the defeat of their anti-slavery resolution at Syracuse, and they called a convention of their own at Herkimer to speak for the "free democracy of New York,"—"an important preliminary," says Mr. Shepard, "to the formation of the modern Republican party."[2] Wilmot addressed this convention. John Van Buren, the son of the ex-President, and one of the most effective political orators of the day, reported the resolutions. The fraud at Syracuse was denounced, and a call was issued for a convention on Washington's Birthday, 1848, to choose Barnburner delegates to the National Convention to contest the seats of those chosen by the Hunkers. It was declared that the freemen of New York would not submit to slavery in the conquered provinces; and that "against the threats of Southern Democrats that they would support no candidates for the presidency who did not assent to the extension of slavery, the Democrats of New York would proclaim their determination to vote for no candidate who did so assent."[3]

The National Democratic Convention in 1848, wishing to avoid offending either faction in New York, admitted both the "Hunker" and the "Barnburner" delegations from that State, allowing that each delegate should have half a vote, and that the seventy-two delegates should cast the thirty-

Natoinal Democratic Convention, 1848.

[1] Another origin for "Barnburners" refers it to "a name borrowed from recent disturbances in Rhode Island, where the defeated Dorrites had sought revenge by burning the barns of the law and order party."—MacLaughlin's *Cass*, which cites also the *Autobiography of Thurlow Weed* and the *Whig Almanac* for 1849, p. 11.

[2] Shepard's *Van Buren.*

[3] Shepard's *Van Buren*, p. 358.

six votes of the State. This did not satisfy the Barnburners, and being convinced that the Wilmot Proviso would be voted down and that a candidate favorable to slavery extension would be chosen, they withdrew from the convention. They met again in State convention at Utica in the summer of 1848, declared that the surrender of congressional power over the Territories and the refusal to use that power to exclude slavery was not in harmony with Democratic principles, and they nominated Martin Van Buren for President and John A. Dix for Governor of New York. Such was the anti-slavery revolt among the Democrats.

National Free-Soil Convention at Buffalo, 1848.

The National Free-Soil Convention, designed to unite into one party all these bolting elements, the Barnburner Democrats, the Conscience Whigs, the Liberty men, and all others who would sink past political differences in opposition to slavery extension, met at Buffalo in August, 1848. This convention may be looked upon as marking the inception of a great party.[1] "Here was, at last," says Professor Burgess, "the principle and party of the future. Those who composed it held to the Union and the Government, vindicated the national character of both, and while they denied none of the constitutional rights of the Southern Commonwealths, and none of the compromises of the Constitution with the slaveholders, yet they refused to allow the great evil under which the country suffered to spread into regions uncontaminated by it."[2] The Liberty party had already nominated John P. Hale for President, and the New York Barnburners, as we have seen, had nominated Van Buren. Although many of the Barnburners of New York had pushed forward Van Buren's candidacy in order to pay

Van Buren's Candidacy, 1848.

[1] Over the platform behind the president's desk was a picture of an old barn burning under the inscription, "Let it burn for conscience' sake."

[2] *The Middle Period*, p. 348.

off their personal and party grudges against the Hunkers, and although the anti-slavery convictions of Van Buren and some of his followers were seriously questioned, especially by the Hunkers and the anti-slavery Whigs who were asked to endorse his nomination, yet the fact that fully half the Democrats of New York State were ready to follow Van Buren's leadership against a pronounced pro-slavery Democracy seemed to present an opportunity too good to be lost, and the Free-Soilers accepted Van Buren as their presidential candidate. Hale, the Liberal party candidate, withdrew in Van Buren's favor.[1]

Associated with Van Buren upon the Free-Soil ticket was Charles Francis Adams, the son of his life-long political opponent, and it seemed somewhat odd to see Jackson's first lieutenant and the son of John Quincy Adams running together in a presidential race. The combination was laughed at as inconsistent and grotesque. Old-line Whigs like Corwin, Choate, and Webster satirized Van Buren's candidacy on a Free-Soil platform. Webster, though indignant that the Whigs had taken up Taylor instead of himself, refused to desert his party for the new coalition, and said[2] that for "the leader of the *Free-Spoil* party to become the leader

Van Buren and Free-Soil.

[1] President Polk desired a settlement of the slavery question in the Territories by the extension of the Missouri line to the Pacific. If this were done before the election of 1848 it would tend to neutralize the effect on the party of Van Buren's bolt, which Polk denounced as a most dangerous attempt to organize geographical parties upon the slave question. "It is more threatening to the Union than anything that has occurred since the meetings of the Hartford Convention in 1814. Mr. Van Buren's course is selfish, unpatriotic, and wholly inexcusable. The effect of this movement of the seceding and discontented Democrats will be effectually counteracted if the slave question can be settled by adopting the Missouri line as applied to Oregon, New Mexico, and Upper California at the present session of Congress."—Polk's *Diary*, cited in Sydney Webster's *Two Treaties of Paris*, pp. 81, 82.

[2] Scudder's *Life of Lowell*, vol. i., p. 224.

of the *Free-Soil* party was a joke to shake one's sides," and that if Van Buren and himself should meet upon the same platform they could not look each other in the face without laughing. Anti-slavery Whigs like Seward and Greeley also refused to follow Van Buren's leadership. They still clung to the old Whig party in the belief that it was, or could still be made, an anti-slavery party, and they led most of the anti-slavery Whigs to the support of Taylor. Seward, though disappointed in the neutral silence of the Whigs as a party, reasserted his allegiance to the anti-slavery cause under whatever name, and he pledged himself to stand "for emancipation and against slavery, whether my party go with me and live or go against it and fall."[1] Seward and Greeley and the Whigs who followed them looked upon the Van Buren candidacy as insincere, and they believed that to support it was but to support a guerrilla warfare.

Seward, Greeley, and the Anti-Slavery Whigs.

But whatever one may think as to the charge that there was to be found a mere play of politics in the conduct of the Van Buren faction of the New York Democrats, one may not doubt the high and earnest purpose of the great body of the Free-Soil party which spoke its deep convictions at Buffalo. They asserted that they were assembled as a "union of freemen for the sake of freedom, to secure free soil to a free people," and putting their trust in God for the triumph of their cause they planted themselves firmly "upon the national platform of freedom in opposition to the sectional platform of slavery." They resolved that slavery in the several States depended upon State laws alone, "which cannot be repealed or modified by the Federal Government, and for which laws that Government is not responsible. We, therefore, propose no interference by Congress with slavery within the limits of any State"; that

Free-Soil Platform, 1848.

[1] Bancroft's *Life of Seward*, vol. i., p. 162.

"Congress has no more power to make a slave than to make a king; no more power to institute or establish slavery than to institute or establish a monarchy; that it is the duty of the Federal Government to relieve itself of all responsibility for the existence or continuance of slavery wherever the Government possesses constitutional power to legislate on that subject, and it is thus responsible for its existence; that the true, the only safe means of preventing the extension of slavery into territory now free is to prohibit its extension into all such territory by an act of Congress; that we accept the issue which the Slave Power has forced upon us, and to their demand for more slave States and more slave territory our calm and final answer is: No more slave States and no more slave territory. Let the soil of our extensive domain be kept free for the hardy pioneers of our own land and the oppressed and banished of other lands seeking homes of comfort and enterprise in the new world: There must be no more compromises with slavery; if made, they must be repealed. We inscribe upon our banner, 'Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men' [to this slogan the Republicans in 1856 added Frémont], and under it we will fight on and fight ever until a triumphant victory shall reward our exertions." [1]

"Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Speech, Free Men."

It will be seen from this declaration that the Liberty men could easily unite with the Free-Soilers. In essentials they were at one. When the Free-Soil statesmen declared that slavery was the concern of the States with which the Federal Government had no right to interfere in any way, they announced this, not especially as an anti-slavery doctrine, but as the doctrine of the Constitution, the doctrine of both sections, of North and South alike. But, with the Free-Soilers, it followed from this that if the Federal Government had no constitutional right to abolish slavery it had no constitutional right to support it. If the people of a slave State had a right to be perfectly

[1] Free-Soil Platform, 1848.

free from Federal interference with their "peculiar institution," the people of the free States had a right to be entirely exempt from the guilt and expense of its support through Federal agency. If Congress had no more power to abolish slavery in South Carolina than it had to abolish the free-school system in Massachusetts, then South Carolina had no more right to ask Congress for legislation supporting slavery than Massachusetts had for legislation supporting her free schools. There was complete reciprocity of rights in exemptions and burdens between the slave States and the free. The Free-Soilers were willing to allow that three fifths of the slaves should be counted in the basis of representation in States where slavery originally existed, and that fugitive slaves should be delivered up if the free States were willing to do it under such restrictions as would safeguard the liberty of free colored persons by guaranteeing, as another clause of the Constitution enjoined, that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Beyond these concessions to slavery they had no duty to perform. The South asserted the right to be let alone with its slavery. But this local immunity of slavery by no means involved its extension under national protection with all its social and moral evils and with its unfair increment of political power. Therefore, with the extension of national territory arose the Free-Soil determination to see that slavery should be required to remain where it was, and that it should not be allowed to spread into the new Territories to blight the prosperity and happiness of future States. The Free-Soil program, therefore, was:

The Constitutional Doctrine of Non-intervention with Slavery in the States.

Free-Soil Program.

1. Slavery should be barred from national territory by national power.
2. There should be no more slave States.
3. Slavery should be abolished in the District of Columbia.

4. The inter-State and coastwise slave trade should be prevented.

5. The national power should not be used in diplomatic intercourse for the protection of slave property. This was peculiar property, not property by the Constitution nor by the common law, and it was to be protected only by the laws of the State. If this 'two-legged property' got away there was no obligation resting on the National Government to reclaim it.

6. For the same reason slavery should be abolished in all the forts, arsenals, dockyards, and public buildings of the United States.

7. They would allow the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution to become a dead letter by regarding it as a compact clause and thus leaving its enforcement to the option of the several States.

In brief, the Free-Soilers would confine slavery and all support of it to the narrowest limits possible under the Constitution, while proposing no interference with it in the States where it existed.

This presented, at one and the same time, an unmistakable and positive expression of moral conviction as to the evils of slavery, and a definite and consistent constitutional and political program for its extinction. But the Free-Soil program contained too many particulars and endangered too many interests to find acceptance. The constituency to which it appealed was too limited. The nation was not ready in 1848 and 1852 definitely to proclaim this policy. It proposed too great an interference with the situation, with the *status quo*. The danger of the nationalization of slavery—that the nation would become all slave—was not then seen to be imminent. The Free-Soil policy was too specific, too positive, too radical, to receive the support of the conservative anti-slavery constituency of the North. These conservatives, whose support twelve years later made possible a party agency sufficiently powerful to restrain the national domi-

nance of slavery, held that the rendition of fugitive slaves was clearly agreed to in the constitutional compact; that slavery in the District of Columbia had been ceded to the National Government with the soil, and that abolition there without the consent of Maryland as well as of the residents of the District would seem like a breach of faith and would endanger the social peace and welfare of these adjacent States; that if a union with slave States was to be maintained, what the slave States held to be property was property under the Constitution, not only within those States where slavery existed, but without those States, as in our foreign negotiations for legal claims for slaves carried by stress of weather or mutiny to foreign ports whose laws declared them free,—especially since the slave States had surrendered all right and power to push their own claims in foreign affairs. Without such national protection there could be no claim on these States to a national allegiance. A few years later, under changed circumstances in which the issue of slavery extension had been pushed preponderantly to the front, the Republicans found it inexpedient as well as unnecessary to make declarations on these particular matters. But in its direction and purpose, in its underlying essentials, the Republican position was the same as that of the Free-Soilers. Each came into existence, the one the forerunner of the other, from the conviction that *slavery was wrong* and that the national power should be used in its restraint. The fact that the Republicans adopted the cardinal principle of the Free-Soilers enabled the minor party readily to merge with the greater anti-slavery army of 1856 and 1860.

The Conservative Anti-Slavery Position.

Free-Soilers and Republicans Identical in their Underlying Principle.

The struggle over excluding slavery from the Mexican cessions, the admission of California, escaping fugitive slaves, slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, the boundary claims of Texas,—these matters,

after a controversy that seemed to threaten the continuance of the Union, were settled by compromise in 1856. This settlement was generally accepted by the public sentiment of the country. Both parties resolved to observe it, and on the basis of it the two wings of the Democrats were reunited. The Free-Soil vote of 292,000 of 1848 fell to 152,000 in 1852, while of the 120,000 Free-Soil votes cast for Van Buren in New York in 1848, only 25,000 were reported for Hale in 1852, which shows that nearly 100,000 Democrats had gone off in that State in 1848 on other than anti-slavery opinion, or that they were reconciled to the settlement of 1850. There was, after 1850, a grim determination that slavery should be banished from public discussion. On the adjournment of Congress in 1850 Douglas is reported to have gone to his home in Illinois declaring that he never expected to make another speech on the subject of slavery. "This determination," says Hay and Nicolay's *Life of Lincoln*, "was echoed and re-echoed, affirmed and re-affirmed by the recognized organs of the public voice, from the village newspaper to the presidential message, from the country debating school to the measured utterances of Senatorial discussion." Sumner found it difficult to get an opportunity to speak on the Fugitive Slave Law in the United States Senate in 1852, and he compared the determination to make final the laws of 1850 to the proposition of the Greek lawgiver, who, in order to secure the permanency of his laws, proposed that a halter should be placed around the neck of any citizen who suggested repeal, with the understanding that he should be drawn if his proposition failed.

Compromise of 1850. Effect on Parties.

The "Finality" of the Legislation of 1850.

The Free-Soilers who felt that unsettled questions have no pity for the repose of nations and that a question is never settled until it is settled right, were far from thinking that the slavery question was settled; they refused to

recognize the settlement of 1850 as final. They were as determined to continue the agitation as the majority were to suppress it. They concentrated their opposition chiefly on the Fugitive Slave Law, which was to them the utmost abomination. Sumner said in the Senate:

Sumner Protests against Suppression of Discussion.

"On the subject which for years has agitated the public mind, which yet palpitates in every heart and burns on every tongue, which in its immeasurable importance dwarfs all other subjects, which by its constant and gigantic presence throws a shadow across these halls, they impose the rule of silence. . . . This challenges the very discussion it pretends to forbid. Debate, inquiry, discussion, are the necessary consequence. Silence becomes impossible. Slavery, which you profess to banish from public attention, openly by your invitation enters every political meeting and every political convention. The discussion of slavery will proceed wherever two or three are gathered together,—by the fireside, on the highway, at the public meeting, in the Church. The movement against slavery is from the Everlasting Arm. Even now it is gathering its forces, soon to be confessed everywhere. It may not be felt yet in the high places of office and power, but all who can put their ear humbly to the ground will hear and comprehend its incessant and advancing tread." [1]

"Finality Men."

The Free-Soilers called those who endeavored entirely to hush the slavery agitation "Finality Men." One of their newspaper epigrams expressed their feeling of certainty that the slavery question would soon come up again:

"To kill twice dead a rattlesnake
And off his scaly skin to take
And through his head to drive a stake
And every bone within him break

[1] Johnston and Woodburn's *American Political Orations*, vol. ii., p. 279.

And of his flesh mince-meat to make;
To burn, to sear, to boil, to bake,
Then in a heap the whole to rake,
And over it the besom shake,
And sink it fathoms in the lake,
Whence after all quite wide awake
Comes back that very same old snake."

Again we are led to see that it was the course of events rather than the conscious purpose of man that determined the course and fate of parties. Neither the determination of the Abolitionists and the Free-Soilers that the country should have no rest on the subject of slavery, nor the determination of the "Finality Men" that peace should be had even at the expense of repression, determined the outcome. It was rather the unexpected aggressions of slavery and the events to which these aggressions led that brought on another crisis and the final struggle. It was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854 by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, that called into existence a National party that was destined to resist successfully the extension of slavery. It was the striking down of that historic landmark, that barrier that had stood for a generation against the extension of slavery to the great West, that brought into existence the new Republican party whose first great office it was to save Kansas and Nebraska and thereby to save the nation from the dominance of the slave power.

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Origin of the Republicans.

CHAPTER VII

THE EARLY REPUBLICANS

IN urging the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, by the organizing act for Kansas and Nebraska, Douglas claimed to stand on the principle of the compromise legislation of 1850. In this legislation the principle of non-intervention was applied to the territories acquired from Mexico. It was now announced by Douglas that this principle of 1850 was intended not only for application to the Territories then under discussion (New Mexico and Utah), but for application in all subsequent organization of Territories. The principle of 1850 (non-intervention) had superseded the principle of 1820 (prohibition), and Douglas now boldly declared that he was but carrying out the spirit of the greater and later compromise which the country had so generally accepted as final.

Douglas's Doctrine of Supersedure.

But the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, as well as the doctrine of the adroit politician who sought to defend that repeal, was a startling surprise to the country. It aroused again the independent anti-slavery Democracy. The repealing act opened up all the unorganized territory of the nation to slavery, in violation of "the sacred compact which was regarded by the common consent of the American people" as consecrating the Northwest Territory to freedom. "For more than thirty years,—during more than half the period of our national Constitution,—

this compact [the Missouri Compromise] had been universally regarded and acted upon as inviolable American law." It was now repealed; and the freemen of all parties were called upon to resist. The "Independent Democrats" arraigned this bill as "a gross violation of a sacred pledge; as a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our States." The people were called on to rally in an effort to save the great West from being converted into "a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves."[1] The repeal of the Missouri Compromise placed freedom and slavery face to face for the final grapple.

The elements to be united in the new party needed to commit the nation to freedom were:

Constituent Elements of the Republicans.

(*a*) The greater part of the Northern Whigs, whose representatives had voted solidly in Congress against the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.

(*b*) The Anti-Nebraska Democrats,— the anti-slavery men of the Democratic party who were resisting again, like the former Barnburners, the opening of new territory to slavery. Nearly half of the Democratic Representatives from the North had voted against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

(*c*) The Free-Soilers, both of Democratic and Whig antecedents.

Of the elements thus proposing to enter into combination it is probable that the Whigs were the most numerous. But it was evident that the Democrats and Free-Soilers could not become Whigs. To all Democrats, Whig principles meant a protective tariff and large internal improvements; and to enroll under the Whig banner would be to adopt principles that they had always

[1] Address of Independent Democrats, Schucker's *Life of Chase*, American History Leaflets.

opposed. Consequently, the new party fell back to the old name, Republican, approved by Jefferson, and they called upon the nation to walk again in the path of their Republican Fathers, in the path marked out by Jefferson, the original Free-Soiler, who, with other Republicans of his day, had so persistently striven to prevent the extension of slavery to Western territory,—an attempt that had won such notable success in the immortal Ordinance of 1787.

The transition from the old parties to the new was made easier, in some instances, by the rise of the "Know-nothings" in 1854 and 1855,—a secret political movement of native Americanism in opposition to foreigners and the Roman Catholic Church. The members of this party were pledged to *know nothing* of the doings in the secret lodges and conventions of the party when inquired of by any outsider. "Americans should rule America,"—this was the fundamental doctrine of the Knownothings. "Put none but Americans on guard to-night"—a command of Washington in the midst of threatening dangers—was a motto of the Revolution now adapted to their uses by this new party of anti-alienism. The movement spread rapidly and carried local elections in some of the States, both North and South. It served to detach men from old party loyalties and traditions, and many Whigs and Democrats and some Free-Soilers passed through this channel to become Republicans.

The "Know-nothings."

The dominant characteristic of the new Republican party was its opposition to slavery. By its opponents, especially those of the South, it was always called the "Black Republican" party, as if it were hopelessly and dangerously tarnished with the pitch of hated Abolitionism. Like the Free-Soilers, the new party proposed to observe all the constitutional guarantees, and it therefore proposed no interference with

The "Black Republicans."

slavery where it existed. The party resolved that under the Constitution Congress had sovereign power over the Territories; and that "in the exercise of this power it is both the right and duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery"; that

Republican Platform of 1856.

"as our Republican Fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing slavery in the United States by positive legislation prohibiting its existence or extension therein; that we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial legislature, of any individual or association of individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States while the present Constitution shall be maintained." [1]

Thus by the reorganization of parties and the rise of the Republicans in 1856, the lines were drawn for the final conflicts over slavery. Though the Dred Scott decision of 1857 came to the aid of the aggressive movement for the nationalization of slavery, by declaring that the primary purpose of the Republican party, the political policy for which the party was born, was unconstitutional, and that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the Territories as the Republicans proposed, yet it was found in this instance, as in most others, that political purposes and programs are not much changed or affected by judicial deliverances. The Republicans, led by Lincoln and Trumbull, Seward, Chase, Morton, Wade, Fessenden, Colfax, Sumner, Greeley, Wilson, Collamer, and other powerful leaders,—lawyers, journalists, statesmen, and reformers, imbued with moral purpose and power, pursued unswervingly the policy that had called

[1] Republican Platform, 1856.

the party into being. In great historic speeches Lincoln and Seward defined the dominant issue then confronting the nation:

Lincoln and Seward Define the Issue before the Nation from the Republican Point of View.

"A house divided against itself cannot stand. This Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. The Union will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South."[1]

"These antagonistic systems (the slave labor system and the free labor system) are continually coming into closer contact, and collision results. Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think that it is accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and therefore ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It is *an irrepressible conflict* between enduring and opposing forces, and it means that the United States will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free-labor nation. Either the cotton- and rice-fields of South Carolina and the sugar plantations of Louisiana will ultimately be tilled by free labor, and Charleston and New Orleans become marts of legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rye-fields and wheat-fields of Massachusetts and New York must again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves; and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of men."[2]

Such, at the opening of Buchanan's administration, following the announcement of the Dred Scott decision, was the form in which the great Republican leaders presented to the nation the pressing issue in American politics.

[1] Lincoln, June 16, 1858.

[2] Seward, October 25, 1858, *Works;* Johnston and Woodburn's *Orations*, vol. iii., p. 201.

To meet the aggressive and vigorous young Republican party, with its able leaders, the Democracy was not able to present a united front. Repeatedly has the Democratic party been unable to hold its traditional forces together, and in 1857 it was on the eve of one of the most serious schisms in its history. The Southern wing of the party demanded national protection to slave property in all the Territories. This was inconsistent with Douglas's doctrine of "popular sovereignty," which insisted upon the right of the people of a Territory to exclude slavery if they chose. Buchanan committed his administration, under the influence of Southern leaders, to a pro-slavery policy in Kansas, and urged the admission of that Territory as a State under the Lecompton Constitution without giving the people of the Territory a fair opportunity to reject the Lecompton government. The policy was without justification or defence, not only in the view of all anti-slavery men, but also of all Northern Democrats who believed that the people of a Territory should have the right to determine upon their own domestic institutions in their own way. Douglas, while declaring that he cared not "whether slavery was voted up or voted down," denounced the Lecompton scheme and defied his party Administration. Buchanan warned Douglas of the fate of Democratic leaders who dared to resist an Administration of their own making,—their fate was to be crushed as Jackson had crushed Tallmadge and Rives. Douglas retorted that Buchanan would do well to remember that Andrew Jackson was dead! Douglas, in the Senate, spokesman and leader of the Northern Democracy, stood up stoutly against the Lecompton fraud. He knew that if the Lecompton constitution were submitted to a fair vote of the people of Kansas it would be voted down by an overwhelming majority. He stood for the right of the State to have

Democratic Schism under Buchanan.

Douglas and the Lecompton Question.

the constitution that it wanted. "If Kansas wants a slave-State constitution she has a right to it; if she wants a free-State constitution she has a right to it. It is none of my business which way the slavery clause is decided."[1]

Although Douglas's position by no means satisfied the South, he was far from coming to the Republican position. There was as sharp an issue, and one fundamentally more important, between Douglas and Lincoln as between Douglas and Buchanan. Douglas proclaimed his support of the Dred Scott decision, which asserted that Congress could not bar slavery from the Territories. If Congress could not do this it would seem that a creature of Congress, the Territorial legislature, could not do so. In the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln forced Douglas to answer whether the people of a Territory could exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution. If Douglas said that they could not, he must abandon his cherished doctrine of popular sovereignty and he would probably lose the senatorship. If he said they could, he would offend the South and rend the Democratic party. In answer to Lincoln's inquiry Douglas propounded at Freeport his famous doctrine of "unfriendly legislation": That the people of a Territory

"have the lawful means to introduce or exclude slavery as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or

[1] "I care not whether slavery be voted up or voted down,"—this was the declaration Douglas was constantly reiterating. To the evils of slavery and to the spread of slavery he was indifferent, or he thought it none of his or of the nation's business. All he would fight for was the right of the Territorial people to vote on that. He thought this platform would hold his party together and enable it to retain place and power. There were positive forces on either side of him, vital with conviction. It has been urged that Douglas's willingness to allow that the nation should be morally indifferent in the face of such a tremendous moral issue is sufficient to deny him the title of a national statesman.

an hour anywhere unless it is supported by local police regulations. If the people are opposed to slavery they will elect representatives to their Territorial legislature who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If on the contrary they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska Bill."

Douglas's "Freeport Doctrine" of "Unfriendly Legislation."

Such was Douglas's effort to support both the Supreme Court decision and the theory of popular sovereignty. The two were not reconcilable, except by some process of political legerdemain. Lincoln, denying the validity of the Dred Scott decision, and representing the Northern Republicans on the one hand, met this equivocal position of Douglas by the positive demand that national power should prohibit slavery from the Territories. On the other hand, Jefferson Davis, holding to the Dred Scott decision, representing the Southern Democracy met the Douglas position with an equally positive demand that the National Government should protect slavery in the Territories. Douglas's answer enabled him to carry the senatorship of Illinois, but it was fatal to his hopes of Southern support for the presidency. His Lecompton policy and his "Freeport doctrine" were a mortal offence to the slave power, and Southern leaders gave notice in Congress that no such Democratic doctrine and leadership would be accepted by the South. A widening breach between the two sections of the Democracy was inevitable.

The fourth period in the history of parties in America covers the two decades from 1856 to 1876, from the first national contest of the modern Republican party to the close of the reconstruction period. It is a period that covers the final struggle against the extension of slavery, the threatened

Fourth Period in Our Party History, 1856–1876.

nationalization of slavery by the Dred Scott decision, the secession movement, the war for the preservation of the Union, the reconstruction of the divided States, the financial issues growing out of the war, and the attempt to adjust and protect by national power the civil and political rights of the freedmen. It was in the first part of this period, the formative period of the Republican party, that the three proposed policies of the nation toward slavery in the Territories were formulated which resulted in the division of the Democratic party which we have described. This resulted in the triumph of the Republicans by the first election of Lincoln. These policies were submitted to the people in 1860 for final adjudication in the most notable, if not the most important, campaign in American political history.

Summary Re-Statement of the Three Platforms on Slavery and the Territories in 1860.

(1) *The Republicans under Lincoln* asserted that the national power should bar slavery from the national territory. Slavery existed only by State law. There was no law for it in the Territories. Congress could establish slavery nowhere, but was bound to prohibit and exclude it from all Federal territory.

(2) *The Southern Democrats under Breckinridge* asserted that national power should protect slavery in the national territory. The citizen of any State had a right to migrate to any Territory, taking with him anything that was property by the law of his own State, and Congress was bound to render protection to such property, wherever necessary, with or without the co-operation of the Territorial legislature.

(3) *The Northern Democrats under Douglas* asserted the doctrine of popular sovereignty, of non-interference; that slavery or no slavery in any Territory was entirely the affair of the white inhabitants of such Territory. If they chose to have it, it was their right; if they chose not to have it, they had a right to exclude or prohibit it.

Neither Congress nor the people of the Union had any right to interfere.[1]

One wing of the Democracy represented a sectional interest and a section of States. The other, though carrying fewer States, was more national in character and represented a larger mass of Democratic voters. Lincoln carried all the free States and was elected. Douglas carried but the single State of Missouri,[2] though in the popular vote he exceeded Breckinridge by more than a half-million votes.

With Lincoln's election the country was plunged into the issues of secession and war. With the final withdrawal of national troops from the Southern States by President Hayes in 1877, the period of Reconstruction may be said to have come to an end, and the issues growing out of slavery, secession, and the Civil War may be said to have been settled. In this period the Republicans, being the anti-slavery party and the party in power (after 1860), stood for the defence of the Union, for emancipation, and for the civil and political rights of the negroes, and, in order to accomplish these ends, they stood for all necessary extension of Federal authority. The party would save the Union at all hazards, and consequently as a means of war to this end, the rights of the States and of citizens were disregarded more than ever before in our history. On the other hand, the Democrats, being in opposition, were disposed to be more conciliatory toward secession, more lenient to the seceded States, more careful of the rights of the States, and more watchful of the rights of the individual citizen, more jealous and resistant toward the extension of executive and national authority. With but little regard to the moral aspects of slavery, they resisted the war wherein they thought it was in-

End of Reconstruction Period.

Democrats during the War.

[1] Greeley's *American Conflict*, vol. i., p. 322.

[2] He received also three electoral votes from New Jersey.

tended to work emancipation. They were opposed to an "Abolition war." They were conservatives,—moderate men who wanted to conciliate the South, stop war and strife, restore peace and order, and save the Union of the Fathers as it was. Oblivious of the moral progress of the world as to slavery, they execrated the radical extremists on both sides. To their minds the "Abolition fanatics" and the Southern "fire-eaters" were equally responsible for secession and war; war had come about from placing these radical extremists in power in the two sections.

The "War Democrats," a wing of the party in the North, loyally supported the war for the Union in all legitimate directions. But another wing of the Northern Democracy—in some States a dominant wing—denounced the war vigorously in all its stages, and, like forces firing in the rear, did much to harass Mr. Lincoln's administration. They called the soldiers "Lincoln hirelings"; they encouraged desertion; they resisted the draft, they rejoiced at Southern victories, and their public meetings, resolutions, and speeches were like aid and comfort to the enemy; and finally, in national convention in 1864, led by Vallandigham of Ohio, their voices and votes controlled the party and led it to demand an immediate cessation of hostilities "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war." The Northern temper was intolerant in the heat of civil strife of this factious opposition to the war, and these Democrats were called "Traitors," "Butternuts," and "Copperheads," indicative of their neutral shade, or their positive opposition to their country, or their treacherous and venomous conduct. As always in war, the party in power tended largely toward the suppression of such free discussion as might be calculated to give comfort to the enemy; those in opposition to the Administration were oftentimes deprived of the usual civil rights enjoyed in ordinary times. Many Democrats held that the Union could never be

"pinned together by bayonets," and that a Union under such coercion would not be worth the having. This opposition to the war caused many War Democrats to join the Republicans, and it made it difficult for the Democrats to gain support in the North on the issues of reconstruction and finance growing out of the war. For nearly a generation, the Democratic party suffered damage in public estimation at the North on account of its attitude during the war.

Reunion of Northern and Southern Democrats.

After the war the Southern Democrats, now including all white men, naturally looked to their Democratic friends in the North for relief from the hard reconstruction measures of the congressional party, while the congressional reconstruction policy of the Republicans, led by radicals like Thaddeus Stevens, had for its policy the vesting of political power in the hands of the negroes, or proportionately divesting the Southern whites of such power, to the end that the reunion of the two wings of the Democratic party would not be able to restore that party to power. The obvious incapacity of the negroes to protect themselves, and Southern election methods, prevented the realization of this purpose. The Republican party itself finally came to the policy (though not formally announced) of leaving Southern elections and Southern suffrage to the Southern States, without interference from national authority.

CHAPTER VIII

RECENT PARTY HISTORY

THE twenty years from 1876 to 1896 appear to mark another distinct period in party history. After 1876, the "Southern question"—including topics relating to slavery, the negro, the war, and reconstruction—no longer dominated politics. As effective issues these subjects were largely eliminated. The original mission of the Republican party had been accomplished, and in this period there were no very clear lines of division between the parties on political issues and public policies. The parties appealed to tradition, party prejudices, and the power of party habit for support; the party managers relied on the power of organization, the desire of the "ins" to remain in, of the "outs" to get in, on appeals to the past, on party names and party loyalty as forces for holding the parties together. The organizations were made more powerful, but vital force was lacking because of lack of distinct and clearly cut differences on public issues. The parties went on existing "because they had existed; the mill went on turning but there was no grist to grind."[1] There were, of course, public questions,—the tariff, civil service reform, governmental control of railways, silver and finance, the control of the liquor traffic,—but the parties assumed no pronounced or opposing positions upon these. There were

Fifth Period of Party History.

[1] Bryce.

Free-Traders and Protectionists in both parties,—Free-Trade Republicans and Protectionist Democrats; there were "Silver men" and inflationists as well as "Gold men" and contractionists in both parties. States' rights Democrats as well as nationalizing Republicans favored the enlargement of State agencies and governmental powers in the control of railways and other corporations. On minor issues each party was similarly divided. This was a period in which the contests tended to become personal, and factions arose within the parties. There were "Stalwarts" and "Half-Breeds" among the Republicans, and "Tammanyites" and "Anti-Tammanyites," "Snappers" and "Anti-Snappers" among the Democrats, and "Mugwumps" and "Goo-Goos" [1] among all parties. In the large parties, machine politics became highly developed, and bosses and rings rose to a flourishing state. Convention contests were about men rather than about principles.

Tendencies toward Party Divisions on the Tariff.

While party issues were not clearly defined in this period, there were party tendencies that were clearly marked. The Republicans tended to become distinctly a Protectionist party, while the Democrats tended, though not so positively, to become a party for Free Trade and a revenue tariff. By 1892, the parties came to a clear-cut issue upon that question, the Democrats coming out boldly for "a tariff for revenue only" (a policy which, after they had carried the election, they were still not able to carry out on account of divisions within the party), while the Republicans stood clearly, as they had done in the campaigns of 1884 and 1888, for the protective policy. It may be said that after the Republicans accepted the leadership of Mr. Blaine in 1884, their party may be considered as pronouncedly for Protection; that is, they had come to the policy of levying taxes on imports, not for

[1] A nickname for goody-goody reformers.

purposes of revenue primarily, but for purposes of protecting certain industries. The Republicans were not originally a Protectionist party. They were not brought into being for that cause, and former Free-Trade Democrats and Free-Soilers helped make up its voting strength. The first Republican platform in 1856 said nothing upon the subject of Protection, but, as the successor and heir to the Whigs, the Republicans inherited Protectionist tendencies and constituencies. In their platform of 1860, the Whig element in the Republican party gently led the Free-Soil Democrats in the direction of Protection by a mild declaration in favor of duties on imports so adjusted "as to encourage the development of the industrial interests of the whole country." This was looked to as a policy that would secure "liberal wages to the workingmen and remunerative prices to agriculture." This clever bid for the labor vote in the North and especially for Protectionist votes in Pennsylvania, may have had a decisive influence in the election of Lincoln.[1] After the war the Protectionist policy became more pronounced in the Republican party, and under the leadership of Mr. Blaine and Mr. McKinley the party became definitely committed to that policy, as much so as the Whig party in its best days under the leadership of Clay. After the election of the second Harrison in 1888, the Republicans, led by Mr. McKinley in the House of Representatives, enacted a high-protective measure, the McKinley Bill, in 1890. Industrial depression, labor troubles, and hard times caused reaction against the Republicans and the consequent election of a Democratic Congress in 1890 and a Democratic President in 1892. These elections were called Democratic "landslides," *i. e.*, overwhelming Democratic victories. Traditional Republican States, like Illinois and Wisconsin, were carried by the Democrats, and Ohio was almost lost to the Republi-

Republicans and the Tariff.

[1] Blaine's *Twenty Years.*

cans. The Democratic party, though united in securing the victory, was greatly disappointed in its results. Their President, Mr. Cleveland, was unable to lead his party or keep it united on public policies. It had been held together by the cohesive power of the organization, or the hope of office, or the hope of better times under a change of administration, and by an evasive platform, as in 1856. But, internally and really, the Democracy was hopelessly divided. This is seen in its divisions on the tariff, but more especially by internal differences on finance,—in the respective attitudes of its Eastern and Western wings toward financial policies and the moneyed classes. A new sectionalism had arisen, based on differing financial views and conditions. The West and South, the agricultural sections, were demanding a change in the financial policy of the Government. Under these conditions Mr. Cleveland's administration suffered one of the most sweeping and phenomenal defeats in the State and congressional elections of 1894 ever recorded in the annals of any party. The Republican "landslide" was unprecedented. The Democrats were buried under tremendous majorities in every Northern State. The "solid South" was all that was left to them. The Republicans under the leadership of Mr. Hanna and Mr. McKinley, the apostles of Protection, were preparing again to appeal to the country on the issue of the tariff, when they were called upon to face a realignment of parties brought about by industrial, social, and political forces that had been at work within the parties and in third-party organizations for two decades.

Democratic Schism under Cleveland.

Unprecedented Defeat of the Democracy.

The year 1896 will always be looked to as a landmark in party history. It is like the year 1860. It uncovered another notable division within the Democratic party. It marked a break-up in old party ties. Like the years 1856 and 1860, the year 1896

The Year 1896 a Political Landmark.

illustrated forcibly the influence of third parties and political agitation within and without party control, in modifying the course of the old party organizations. The contest of 1896 did not bring a new party into the arena to contest the supremacy with the Republicans, but it witnessed a considerable break in the Republican ranks on the silver question and such a modification in the direction and leadership of the Democratic party that it was frequently held that a new party was contending for power, and the contest presented a situation in which party lines ran across all traditions.

The New Democracy Repudiates the Old Leadership.

This new situation in party conditions should not be looked upon merely as the result of a sudden impulse, or excited frenzy, within the notable Democratic Convention that nominated Mr. Bryan in 1896. It was not a matter of surprise to those who had been intelligent observers of the course of events that the Democratic party cut loose from the moorings to which Mr. Cleveland and the Eastern wing of the Democracy had attempted to bind it. The Southern and Western wings of the party believed that the course the Democracy pursued in 1896 was essential to party preservation. If in the face of the industrial and political situation of that year it had renominated Mr. Cleveland, or followed in the course marked out by his leadership, it would probably have come in third in the count of the electoral votes. In that case the Populist party would have come into greater prominence and would, as the election returns of 1894 clearly indicated, have carried more States (though probably not in the aggregate a larger popular vote) than the Cleveland Democracy. It is conceivable that the National Democratic party would have given way, throughout the West and South, as it had already done in several of the Western States, to a new organization. The Populists were positive, aggressive, and growing. The times called for a

radical party. The Republicans had now clearly become a conservative party, as that party was standing for the industrial status, against any positive advance toward nationalizing the great quasi-public corporations and agencies, and they were standing practically for the same financial and industrial policies that had been promoted by Mr. Cleveland's administration. It was these new questions—money and transportation, not the tariff—on which men were now to divide. On the positive and radical propositions for a larger social control of monopoly powers, including the power of issuing money, the conservative Democracy and the Republicans were in essential harmony. This was so clearly the case that the Cleveland Democrats, when the new issues were presented, could easily, as they generally did, vote for the Republican candidate. The radical and social Democracy felt that the powerful classes were merged in a community of interests, feelings, and fears. The millionaire managers of great trusts, the presidents of great banking concerns, the presidents of the great railways, men who had large industrial and business interests at stake—disregarded party ties and traditions and united naturally with the conservative elements under Republican leadership. The agricultural and laboring masses, though discontented and distressed, and ready for radical change, did not perceive, or believe, that they had a community of interests in antagonism to those whose great commercial and moneyed interests had been threatened by the larger popular control of corporate forces toward which the Bryan Democracy was committed; and their voting strength was very largely influenced and controlled by the forces representing the powerful managers and captains of industry. Mr. Bryce has said that parties in Europe differ from those in America, because in this country the line of cleavage between parties is not

Premonitions of a Class Contest. Parties were Dividing Horizontally.

horizontal but vertical. That is, the line separating the Republicans from the Democrats in America runs up and down through all social classes, leaving the rich and the poor, the high and the low, and the well-to-do in approximately equal numbers in both parties; while in Europe the cleavage between parties cuts horizontally, leaving the rich, the powerful, the well-born in one party, and the poor, struggling proletariat, with tendencies toward socialism or anarchy, in the other. The campaign of 1896 is notable as marking a tendency, if not an accomplished condition, in the direction of European divisions. It is a most unfortunate line of division, and one which it was hoped American Democracy would be able to prevent, one most threatening to the peace and welfare of the republic. Where the responsibility lies for such a condition is, of course, a question for dispute.

This significant social change was not wrought in a single year. It was not the result of convention oratory. The action of the Democratic party in 1896 was but a symptom, not a cause, of the social conditions, or the social disease. This action was but a result of political and social forces and conflicts that had been in operation for years before. To understand the party schisms that then occurred it is necessary, as in studying the notable schism of 1860, to trace briefly the political agitations and movements within and without the old parties during the preceding decades. To this end it is important to note certain third-party movements and their causes.

Third Party Influence and the Democracy, 1896.

The *National*, or the *Greenback*, party had its origin in the financial legislation growing out of the Civil War. In the prosecution of the war it was found to be necessary, or thought to be by Congress, to issue a large quantity of Treasury notes, or greenbacks, as a means of securing money to conduct the war. Four hundred and fifty million dollars of these notes were

Greenback Discussion.

issued. They were declared by the law issuing them to be "lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public on private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debts." After the Civil War the question arose as to whether these notes should be retired from circulation, and whether also they could be fairly and legitimately used to pay a part of the bonded debt of the nation. The Administration, desirous of bringing the country back, as soon as possible, to a specie basis, held the orthodox view of regarding these notes not as money but as a debt of the Government, as promises to pay, as a forced loan: they should be paid off, or retired and cancelled, as rapidly as possible. The Administration held that the function of issuing notes to be used as money should not be exercised by the Government as a permanent policy, but that this function should be delegated to the banks, and that the bonds, held very largely by the banks, should be paid "in coin." [1]

Legal-Tender Act.

An Act of March 12, 1866, authorized the funding of a part of the bonded debt, or a change in its form, and the cancellation of $10,000,000 of the greenbacks within six months; and thereafter $4,000,000, or less, of the greenbacks each month should be

Policy of Secretary McCulloch.

[1] "The theory of the authors of the Legal-Tender Act was clearly understood. They held the issue of these notes to be simply creation of a Government floating debt, the notes being endowed with special privileges only in order that they might be floated. That the resort to legal-tender powers was an evil justified only by extreme emergency, and that the circulation of Government notes in any form was a purely temporary measure, were the unanimous convictions of the statesmen who contrived the system. The logical inference that these Government notes would be paid off and cancelled as soon as the war deficiency had ended, was publicly accepted. This fact is clearly proved by the record. The statesmen of the day built up the national banking system on the express theory that the bank-notes would provide the requisite currency of the future, whereas the Government notes would not."—Noyes, *Thirty Years of American Finance*, p. 8. This indicates clearly the attitude and policy toward the greenback currency which the Greenbackers opposed.

retired. Secretary McCulloch, who believed in the policy of retirement and contraction of the greenbacks, retired the maximum amount allowed by law, and, by 1867, the greenbacks had been reduced to $356,000,000. The friends of the greenbacks throughout the country exerted their influence on Congress, and an Act of February 4, 1868, forbade further retirement. The object of the gold-standard policy pursued by Secretary McCulloch was to convert United States notes into interest-bearing bonds, force immediate or rapid resumption of specie payments, and the substitution of bank-notes for greenbacks. Secretary McCulloch and his financial supporters urged firm and steady contraction, that the retirement of the greenback circulation should be definitely and unchangeably established, and that the process should go on as rapidly as possible. McCulloch held that the greenbacks were unconstitutional, and that to retain them would be "to dishonor our engagements and to wander far from the old landmarks both in finance and ethics."[1]

Friends of the Greenback Check Contraction.

This policy aroused strong popular opposition, which was reflected in Congress by representatives of all parties, by men like John Sherman, Oliver P. Morton, Thaddeus Stevens, William D. Kelley, and Benjamin F. Butler among Republicans, and men like Geo. H. Pendleton and Thos. A. Hendricks among the Democrats. The disordered markets during and following 1866 and the fall in prices were attributed in the public mind and by many public men to the Treasury policy of contraction, of reducing the outstanding notes.[2] The funding policy had increased the amount of six-per-cent. bonds by $637,000,000, and the result, it was asserted, was a contraction of the currency, or an appreciation of the money standard, an increase in the burden of public and private debts, a stringency in

[1] McCulloch's *Recollections*.

[2] O. P. Morton, Senate speech, Jan. 9, 1868.

the money market, a fall in prices, and a serious derangement of the business of the country.[1] It was held that the "amount of legal tender now outstanding is not too much for the present condition of the country," and it was asked why, "when we have $450,000,000 bearing no interest, and which need bear no interest, should these be taken up and put into bonds?"[2] It was this opposition that checked Secretary McCulloch's policy of contraction, that ended for six years all serious efforts at resumption of specie payment, and that introduced the country to "the beginning of the fiat-money party."[3] Between March, 1872, and January, 1874, the amount of the greenbacks was increased some $25,000,000, so that the outstanding amount by 1874 was $382,000,000. The panic of 1873 and the hard times resulting therefrom led to still further demand for the issue of Treasury notes, but the "Inflation Bill" of 1874, providing for an increase, was vetoed by President Grant. This veto aroused great opposition in Western communities that were favorable to the greenback circulation. The Resumption Act of 1875 was even more objectionable to greenback sentiment, as under its operation the greenback circulation was to be gradually reduced. The sentiment for the greenback again asserted itself in Congress, and by an Act of May 31, 1878, all further retirement or cancellation of legal-tender notes was forbidden, but "when redeemed or received into the Treasury they shall be reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation." Such is the law until this day.[4]

President Grant Vetoes Further Inflation.

Resumption Act, 1875.

The Greenbacks are Retained, 1878.

[1] Sherman, *Forty Years in the House and Senate*, vol. i., p. 385.

[2] John Sherman in the Senate, April 9th, and Thaddeus Stevens in the House, March 16, 1866, cited by Noyes, *Thirty Years of American Finance*, p. 13.

[3] Noyes, p. 16.

[4] The law of March 14, 1900, does not materially modify this status of the greenback.

In this period there was a constant struggle, in Congress and out, on the one hand to preserve or increase the greenbacks, to inflate the currency or to save it from contraction, and, on the other hand, to retire this currency in favor of bank-notes. This, the Greenbackers alleged, left the volume of the currency at the mercy of the banks. The advocates of the greenbacks looked upon these notes not as an obligation to be paid off or to be converted into bonds, but as money, constitutional currency, as better than bank-notes, for they were circulating without interest and were secured by the same Government credit; and, if they were to be regarded as a debt, they were, in any case, the least burdensome of all the forms of the public indebtedness; and they believed that the withdrawal of the greenbacks would add to the burden of all debts of the people and cripple industry.

Payment of the Bonded Debt.

Coupled with the issue over Government paper currency was the question as to the money in which certain Government bonds were to be paid. By the law they were payable in "lawful money,"—that is, in greenbacks. The bonds had been bought, while the Government was in doubt and distress, at forty or fifty cents on the dollar. In 1867, under Secretary McCulloch's policy, the five-twenties, more than $1,500,000,000 in amount, were made payable in coin. The Greenbackers asserted that this was not required by the public faith; that it was an act directly in the interest of public creditors and at the expense of a heavily burdened and tax-ridden people; that the money which was good enough for the soldier who had risked his life for the nation should be good enough for the bondholder, who had risked nothing, not even his gold, except at great odds, but who was now doubling and trebling his rate of interest; that with gold at a premium of 140 and with the bonds exempt from State and municipal taxation

The Greenbackers' Complaint of the Financial Policy toward the Bonded Debt.

the nominal interest rate on the bonds of six per cent. would be virtually increased to twelve per cent., and with Government securities bearing such a high rate of interest and with bonds thus being pushed to a premium, no capitalist would take his money out of Government securities to risk it in ordinary business; that appreciating bonds and increasing rate of Government interest were certain to crush the life out of industrial pursuits; that in the marts of trade money could not be obtained for legitimate business for less than twelve per cent. or fifteen per cent. as long as capitalists and bankers could get ten or twelve per cent. on their bonds; that under this system of gold payment even greater profits were being allowed to the banks; for under the financial system which the gold policy was promoting the banks were to be allowed to use their bonds (so cheaply obtained and now made so valuable) as the basis of issuing their bank-notes, and these bank-notes were to be substituted for the greenbacks and were to be loaned to the people by the bankers at a high rate of interest, while the greenbacks, the "money of the people," were to be retired and destroyed. These were, in brief, the main contentions of those who opposed the financial policy of the Government in the decade following the war.

It was this financial struggle, between 1866 and 1876, that gave rise to the Greenback party. The chief purpose of the party was to save the greenbacks from destruction, to increase their issue, and to make their use permanent, and to pay with these notes all Government obligations except such as were by existing contracts made payable in coin. This was virtually the position of the majority of the Democratic party in the West in 1868, led by men like Pendleton, Hendricks, and Voorhees. The greenback idea also received much encouragement from prominent Republican leaders.

The Greenback Party.

In Indianapolis, May 17, 1876, the Greenbackers nominated Peter Cooper, of New York, for President, and

Samuel F. Cary, of Ohio, for Vice-President. The party claimed to be called into existence "by the necessities of the people, to furnish relief to the depressed industries of the country."

They demanded "the immediate and unconditional repeal of the Specie Resumption Act of January 14, 1875, and the rescue of our industries from the ruin and disaster resulting from its enforcement."

Greenback Platform.

"We believe that a United States note, issued directly by the Government and convertible on demand into United States obligations [bonds], bearing a rate of interest not exceeding 3.65 per cent. per annum, and exchangeable for United States notes at par, will afford the best circulating medium ever devised. Such United States notes should be full legal tender for all purposes, except for the payment of such obligations as are, by existing contracts, especially made payable in coin; and we hold that it is the duty of the Government to provide such a circulating medium, and insist in the language of Thomas Jefferson that bank paper must be suppressed and the circulation restored to whom it belongs.

"We earnestly protest against any further issue of gold bonds to foreigners. The American people will gladly take these bonds if made payable at the option of the holder."

The Interchangeable Bond.

The greenback bonds and the greenbacks were to be interchangeable. If a man had more money than he could profitably use in business he could buy bonds; if he needed money for his business he could exchange his bonds for the money. Such an interchangeable bond would help to expand the currency, for any one buying a bond

"could deliver it to his creditor, and if the creditor wanted to dispose of it he could also deliver it as money, the money for it being in the United States Treasury to be had for the asking. So that the very bond would become an extension of the currency, being used in business interchangeably with currency." [1]

[1] *Butler's Book*, p. 957.

This plan was intended by the Greenbackers for the relief of the United States Government from a high rate of interest and of the people from a stringency in the money market.

The Greenbackers believed in "fiat money,"—that governments declare by their fiat what shall be money for their peoples; that all money, metallic or paper, should be issued and its volume controlled by the Government, not by banking corporations; that a precious or dear commodity, like gold, which may be limited in quantity by the fortunes of mining ventures, or by commercial corners on Wall Street, is not necessary to stability or honesty in currency; that the value of money depends not on its substance, nor the labor cost of its material, nor upon its "redemption," but upon the relation between the money-demand and the money-supply; that money-value is not intrinsic,—no value is intrinsic,—but that the value of money, like that of all commodities, will depend chiefly upon the great law of supply and demand. The Greenbackers held that money is the creature of law, not of custom; that gold was not a divinely appointed money substance, but that in civilized States, where men had ceased to rely on varying customs in determining the money substance, the statute law of the sovereign could determine that any cheap substance might be the final money of the realm, to be accepted everywhere for taxes and debts. Paper money, limited in supply, put forth by a financially responsible government, with the unlimited power of taxation, making it receivable for *all* debts public and private without exception, involving no promise, and guaranteeing no redemption except the redemption involved in receiving it for taxes, and compelling its acceptance for debts,—this, the Greenbackers held, would be the best and most rational money that could be devised. They did not demand an unlimited issue of paper. That oft-repeated

Greenback Idea of Money.

assertion was, of course, a canard to bring the party into disrepute. The issues were to be limited by the requirements of business, by the extent to which the notes could be absorbed by the country; and this, it was contended, would be automatic and self-regulating under the operation of the interchangeable bond. Nor did the Greenbackers assert that law could create value further than that the law could increase or decrease the amount of paper money, and add to the demand for Government paper by decreeing the universal use—payment of debts and taxes—to which it could be put.

Influence of the Greenback Idea on Politics and Parties.

The greenback idea of money has had a tremendous influence on politics and parties. It affected voters in all parties and became the basis of the money plank in later and larger parties than the Greenbackers. The constitutionality of greenback money has received the sanction of a Supreme Court decision, and recent party history shows that this idea of money is much more prevalent in America to-day than when it was first launched as the basis of a party.[1]

The new party and its demands were, as is usual with third parties, met with derision and ridicule. Its advocates were ever ready to talk on the money question on the street-corner or in the country cross-roads store; and they were ridiculed as impecunious debtors who wished to cheat their creditors, and who never worked "except with their mouths." But the Greenbackers were, as a rule, earnest, honest, and patriotic men, humble wealth-producers, whose interests had led them to an intelligent study, as far as their limitations permitted, of the issues on which they constantly challenged public discussion. The movement had its origin among common folk and it was without great scholars or leaders, though some able men among philanthropists and scholars gave their assent to it.

[1] Compare the vote of 1880 in support of this idea with that of 1892 and 1896. Noyes, *Thirty Years of American Finance*, p. 181.

In 1876 the Greenbackers cast 81,000 votes for Peter Cooper for President. In 1880 they nominated James B. Weaver of Iowa, and B. J. Chambers of Texas, for President and Vice-President, and cast 308,000 votes. In this campaign they advanced new and positive proposals on industrial questions; that labor should be protected by an eight-hour law, by inspection of factories, mines, and workshops; against the importation of cheap contract labor; against gigantic land-grants to railroads and corporations, and for the forfeiting of grants already made for non-fulfilment of contract; for the regulation of inter-State commerce; for a graduated income tax; and they denounced all tendencies and agencies calculated to deprive the people of direct power over their government.

Growth of the Greenbackers.

It will be seen from these declarations that the Greenbackers were the forerunners of, and largely identical with, the labor parties and Populists who came after.

In 1884, the Democrats, whose interests were more threatened by the presence in the field of the Greenback organization, brought about fusion between the two parties in some of the Western States,—and fusion with Democracy has been called "the bourn from which no reform party ever returns." The Greenbackers cast but 175,000 votes for B. F. Butler in 1884, who ran chiefly to draw votes away from Cleveland, and in 1888 the party passed into history. Its members either returned to their old parties or merged with the Union Labor party of that year.

The Greenbackers Disappear as a Party.

The *Union Labor* party of 1888 was the successor of the Greenback or National party. It reflected the cry of discontent among wealth-producers.

The Union Labor Party.

"Farmers were forced by poverty to mortgage their estates; low prices were forcing bankruptcy, and the laborers were sinking into greater dependence. Strikes afford no relief;

business men find collections almost impossible, while hundreds of millions of idle public money needed for relief is locked up in the United States Treasury, or placed without interest in favored banks in grim mockery of distress. Land monopoly flourishes as never before, and more owners of the soil are daily becoming tenants. Great transportation corporations still succeed in extorting their profits on watered stock through unjust charges."

The party asserted the existence of corruption in high places; that railroads and great corporations controlled legislation and judicial decisions; that the United States Senate "has become an open scandal, its membership being purchased by the rich in open defiance of the popular will." The party appealed to the voters to come out of the old parties and unite with the Union Labor party to relieve the distress of the country. The appeal was made on principles identical in essential respects with the purposes of the Greenbackers who went before and the Populists who came after. The Union Labor vote of 1888 (146,900) fell below that of the Greenbackers in 1884 (175,000), but at the same time there was a gain of more than 87,000 votes over the Greenback poll of 1884, in the five Western agricultural States, presumably among Democratic constituencies, of Texas, Arkansas, Kansas, Minnesota, and Missouri. The farmers' condition, their granges, alliances, and schoolhouse meetings were preparing the way for the Populists.

The People's Party, or Populists.

The *People's* party, or *Populists,* first appeared in American politics in 1890. It was the outgrowth indirectly of the previous party movements that we have described, and, immediately, of the Farmers' Alliance, and certain labor organizations of the cities, which attempted to combine rural and urban labor in a party for the control of legislation in the interest of the common people. It was a movement against plutocracy, against the great accumulations and

combinations of wealth, against the control of the country by the moneyed monopolies. The movement was promoted by economic discontent, hard times, and dissatisfaction, and it was prompted by a feeling that unjust burdens were being borne especially by the Southern and Western farmers; that wealth was being drained from the West to accumulate in the East. The three main grievances of which complaint was made related to: (1) *transportation*, (2) *land*, (3) *money*.

Opposition to Control by the Rich.

1. As to transportation, it had been noticed that Congress had been very lavish in Government aid and protection to certain great railroad corporations. The active participation of railroad companies in politics and their methods of controlling legislation, no matter which of the old parties was in power, excited strong opposition. Congress had been slow in regulating inter-State commerce by protecting the producers, and when a law was passed and a commission appointed to secure fair dealing for the public, the railways did what they could to violate and break down the legal provisions and regulations. These companies were charging exceedingly high freight rates, and they were often unjustly discriminating to the injury of the consumer and small producer. The farmers felt that the profits on their products were being eaten up by transportation rates, and that if they would successfully combat the power of the railroads in legislation they must combine in politics to bring the railroads under State control.

Grievances of the Populists: 1. Transportation.

2. As to the land question, it was found that much of the farming land in the West was bought up by city speculators. These men did nothing to improve the land, but held it and waited for the settler to come along, buy part of it, secure his loan by a mortgage, and by his own labor to enhance the value of the rest, and then it was only at higher prices, of course, that the settler,

2. Land.

whose sacrifice and toil had created the values, could buy any of the rest. Great tracts of land were held out of reach of the home-hunters for the enhancement of prices. These lands, in many cases, had been given as a free gift to the railroads.[1]

3. Closely connected with the land troubles were the money grievances. Farm products declined in price and the farmers could not make payment on their mortgages. Upon borrowing to prevent foreclosure, they found money close, or they had to pay what seemed to them an exorbitant rate of interest. The Farmers' Alliances were imbued with the quantitative theory of money, that an increased money-supply would raise prices. They believed that falling prices had been caused not by the increased plenty of their products, for their crops had repeatedly failed, but by the relative decrease of the money-supply. Short crops and low prices came together, and the farmers concluded either that the railroads were getting the profits, or that money, because too scarce, was becoming too dear in terms of their products. They therefore readily accepted the Greenback idea of money and they looked with favor on the proposal that the National Government should resume the free coinage of silver. Free coinage was calculated to increase the money-supply, and it would, therefore, be a temporary measure of relief and a step in the right direction. But the Populists, as a rule, would have preferred the demonetization of gold to the remonetization of silver,—the substitution of paper for metallic money and the consequent increase of legal-tender paper by Government issues. The Populist was only incidentally a silver man,—to him the silver policy was only a step in the direction of the ideal.

3. Money.

Farmers' Alliances and the Quantitative Theory of Money.

[1] The great social benefits of the railways were largely neglected in the Populist consideration of the subject.

As the result of these grievances the Farmers' Alliances in the South and West went into politics. In the West, especially, in Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, and South Dakota, the campaign of 1890 was remarkable. Schoolhouses were packed with political gatherings, and men deserted their old parties by thousands. This new party propaganda could not be resisted by the old party rallying cries over the issues of the war and the tariff. In the "Mining" and "Granger" States of the West, the Populists practically absorbed the Democrats. Republicanism was all that was left to oppose them. In some of the Southern States, notably in North Carolina, Alabama, and Texas, the Populists threatened Democratic ascendancy. There they either combined with or absorbed the Republicans. As a weapon against the dominant Democratic machine in the South, controlled, as the Populists asserted, by the class of political managers, or office-seekers, or by the old aristocracy, or by the commercial spirit of that section, many Southern Populists were ready to use the negro vote; they would go so far toward equal rights and fair play as to insist that intelligent negroes should be allowed to cast their votes and have them honestly counted. Populism was promoting divisions among the Southern whites in a way calculated to destroy, or at least to weaken, the force of the race line in politics. In South Carolina the Tillman Democracy, being on the economic issues entirely Populist in its disposition and sympathies, completely captured the Democratic organization of the State. Tillman aroused the small farmers of the Alliances against the former high-toned aristocratic slaveholders, like the Butlers and the Hamptons and other families, whose exclusive privilege it had been to control the politics of the State since the Revolution. Tillman organized the "wool hats" (though he

Farmers' Campaign in the West, 1890.

Southern Populists and Equal Rights.

The Tillman Democracy in South Carolina.

despised the *woolly heads*) against the "silk hats" and the "kid gloves." The Democratic party in South Carolina was committed, essentially, to Populist policies. The Democratic organization in other Southern States, as a means of retaining power and breaking the rising tide of Populism, was ready to follow in the same direction.

Populism and Jeffersonian Democracy.

The Democratic Populists in the South and the Republican Populists in the Northwest claimed that they were the true Jeffersonian Democrats and Lincoln Republicans, the true popular party as against aristocratic and special privileges; that they wished to get back to Jeffersonian simplicity, honesty, and economy in government, to secure a fair field for all; to resist commercialism, to oppose banks, "Wall Street," and the "money power," and the general corruption and cowardice of the old parties. The Populists felt that it was their mission to speak for the rank and file of the common people in all parties, to stand for the revival of a New Democracy. Formerly the congressional caucus nominated candidates and determined upon party policies. The people had overthrown this under Jackson's leadership and had substituted the convention system in which the people would be represented. But now party conventions and organizations were, to the Populist mind, mere machines for winning elections and keeping control of the offices. They were unscrupulous oligarchies, controlled by the rich. A few astute and wealthy managers and magnates, called "business men," controlling the party managers as their henchmen, set things up in private conferences, while the masses were being fooled and manipulated like voting herds. Then the business magnates, who dictated the nomination of the candidates and furnished the "sinews of war" for the campaign, were, of course, to conduct the government; and, equally of course, the laws were to be made and admin-

Populist Distrust of Old Party Machines. They had Ceased to Represent the People.

istered in such a way as to take good care of these managers' business interests. It was felt that if any President or Senator or Congressman, who began to urge honestly and effectively that the great mine-owners, or railroads, or trust combinations,—the moneyed forces that controlled the money, land, and transportation of the people,—should be actually brought face to face with the enforcement of just and equal laws, then some silent but powerful influence within the parties would retire such public servants to private life.

Such were the impressions in Populists' minds and in the minds of many others to whom Populists appealed.

"Like Socialism in Europe, Populism in America demanded a larger State agency and activity in solving the industrial problems for the common benefit of all. 'We, the people, in the control of monopolies now used for private ends, through State control will use these agencies for the good of all.' It was socialism, not paternalism. Let the Government do for all what natural monopolies, evading all law and control, were doing for only a few. It was a movement whose roots went deep in the past, and it arose from grievances that were real." [1]

Populists and Hard Times.

The Populists felt that in the great concentration of wealth and the consequent impoverishment and dependence of debtors and laborers, calamity had come upon the country, and their speakers were very generally derided as "calamity howlers." In their first national platform, adopted at Omaha, July 2, 1892, the Populists recited the ills of the country as follows:

First Populist Platform.

"The conditions which surround us best justify our co-operation. We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislatures, Congress, and even touches the ermine of the Bench. The

[1] Frederick E. Haynes, *Political Science Quarterly*, April, 1896, vol. x., p. 495. See also Frank L. McVey, *Economic Studies*, vol. i.

people are demoralized. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced, business prostrated, our homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires."

They represented the following ideas:

Populist Demands.

1. On money and taxation:

a. The free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the legal ratio of 16 to 1.

b. That Government paper money should take the place of bank-notes, and that the amount of this circulating medium be increased to $50.00 per capita.

c. That the money of the country be kept as much as possible in the hands of the people and hence all State and National revenue be limited to necessary expenses of Government economically administered.

d. Opposition to the issue of bonds.

e. That postal savings-banks be established by the Government for the safe deposit of the earnings of the people and to facilitate exchange.

f. A graduated income tax, to force the holders of great wealth to contribute according to their ability to the needs of the Government.

2. On Transportation:

Transportation being a means of exchange and a public necessity, the Government should own and operate the railroads in the interest of the people.

The telegraph and the telephone, being a necessity for the transmission of news, should be owned and operated in the interest of the people.

3. Land:

All lands held by railroads or other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands owned by aliens should be reclaimed by the Government and held open for settlement.

They recommended the initiative and the referendum.

The party nominated James B. Weaver of Iowa for President, and James T. Field of Virginia for Vice-President, and they cast about 1,040,000 votes. In five Western States at this election (Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Wyoming) the Democrats nominated no electors. This was partly because the Democratic voters had been absorbed by the Populists and partly because the Democratic managers regarded it as the most effective scheme to defeat the Republican electors in those States. If neither party should secure a majority in the Electoral College and the election should devolve upon the House, the Democrats, controlling a majority of the State delegations, would elect their candidate. The chief result of this course on the part of the Democratic managers, however, was to commit their voters to Populist policies and alliances. The Populists now came to be either the first or the second party west of the Mississippi and south of the Ohio. They had carried a group of States, elected Representatives and Senators, and they took rank as the strongest third party since the Civil War.

Populist Candidates.

Democrats in the West Endorse Populist Nominees.

Another factor must be taken account of in seeking the causes for the party changes of 1896. This is the Silver party. This had never been a party in the American sense; that is, they had never yet nominated candidates for President and Vice-President. They were a body of men from all parties organized into a Bimetallic League, who were ready to make the silver issue paramount in the elections, and to stand together in abandoning their parties and joining any other that gave

The "Silver Party."

promise of a restoration of silver to the coinage. They believed not only in international, but in national bimetallism; that is, in the coinage of all the gold and silver offered at the mints at the historic ratio of 16 to 1. International bimetallism was supported by high scientific opinion, and the American bimetallists believed that if America started on that course alone she could do so without injury, or even with profit, and that other nations would follow. These Silver men held that the demonetization of silver in 1873 was a serious mistake; to them it was "the crime of '73,"—an act that had been passed surreptitiously and corruptly at the behest of the creditor classes, without any public demand or without exciting public notice; the result had been an appreciation in gold or a fall of prices and great hardship to the producing classes. The bimetallists based their demand for the free coinage of silver as well as of gold upon an alleged insufficiency of metallic money for the increasing necessities of a growing population and an expanding commerce. They held that the value of money is measured by the other things for which it exchanges; that to maintain a stable dollar is to maintain a general level of prices, as nearly as possible; a continued fall of prices indicates a growing scarcity of money (relative to business), and is productive of disaster, the loss of property under the burden of debt, and the discouragement of enterprise. They asserted that from 1873 to 1896 the general level of prices fell throughout the gold-using world about fifty per cent.; that is, the value of the gold dollar had increased one hundred per cent. in a quarter of a century; this added value of gold was partly due to the increased demand upon it for money uses, and if silver bullion had fallen in price during this time, that was because it could not be coined into money. The monetary demand formerly placed on silver was transferred to gold, and the bimetal-

Bimetallism.

The Silver Contention.

lists contended that the fall in prices, or the rise of gold, could be best stopped by an increase of metallic money, and that this increase could be furnished by opening the mints again to the coinage of both silver and gold. While the same result would be produced by a vast increase of the supply of gold (the one metal retaining the privilege of unlimited coinage), yet this was an event not to be expected, and rising prices and prosperity could best be restored by restoring silver to coinage. The Silver men professed to hold this view not because they were "friends of silver," or wished to "do something for silver," but because they believed in the quantitative theory of money, —the more money the less a given amount will bring in products, and vice versa; that the law of supply and demand operates on *all* commodities, money included; and if both gold and silver might be brought to the mints and be coined, an increase in the supply of either would increase the joint quantity and would, therefore, prevent the downward tendency in prices. Such is a brief, though necessarily inadequate, statement of the bimetallic contention.[1] It will be seen that upon the money question there was an obvious basis of union between the Populists and the Silver men.

The Struggle to Restore Silver to the Coinage, 1878–1896.

For twenty years prior to 1896, the discussion over bimetallism and silver had divided parties and the country. The bimetallists were supported by the opinion of many students of finance, by the material interests of the silver-mining States, by the Greenback and Populist demand for more money, by the views of certain labor leaders and organizations, and by Farmers' Alliances and debtors struggling to pay mortgages on the farms. While they were not able to secure from Congress the repeal of the Act of 1873 and the consequent full restoration of silver to the mints, they were able to force a compromise from

[1] See C. A. Towne, *American Review of Reviews*, Sept., 1900.

the gold standard or "Sound Money" party. On February 28, 1878, the Bland-Allison Act was passed over the veto of President Hayes. A bill providing for the free and unlimited coinage of silver had passed the House in November, 1877, in answer to a strong public demand. When this Bland free-coinage act came up to the Senate it was amended there, as a means of preventing its passage, on a report offered to the Senate by Senator Allison of Iowa, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Senate, by a provision that the Government should purchase from $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion for coinage into dollars. At this time the bullion in the silver dollar was worth about ninety-two cents. Holders of the silver coin were authorized to deposit it with the United States Treasurer and to receive therefor certificates of deposit known as silver certificates. In the same year the celebrated Matthews Resolution was passed by Congress, declaring that all bonds of the United States "are payable in silver dollars of 412½ grains and that to restore such dollars as a full legal tender for that purpose is not a violation of public faith or the rights of creditors."

The Bland-Allison Act, 1878.

The Matthews Resolution, 1877.

The Bland-Allison Act was in operation from 1878 to 1890, during which time $2,000,000 in silver was coined each month, the minimum amount authorized by law. This was not satisfactory to the free-coinage sentiment, and in 1890 they secured the passage of another free-coinage act by the House. When this came to the Senate, again as a means of preventing its passage, another compromise and substitute was proposed, this time by Senator Sherman of Ohio. This was the so-called Sherman Act of July 14, 1890, which stopped the coinage of silver dollars as provided for in the Bland-Allison Act, and provided for the purchase of silver bullion to the amount of 4,500,000

The Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 1899.

ounces each month. Against this bullion, Treasury notes were to be issued, redeemable in gold or silver coin at the option of the Secretary of the Treasury. These notes were made a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, and receivable for all customs, taxes, and all public dues. It was also declared in this act to be "the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law." This language was interpreted by the Treasury Department, both under Republican and Democratic administrations, as guaranteeing gold payments, if desired, by the holder of Government paper, and the new Treasury notes were treated as gold obligations. That is, the Treasury refused to exercise its option to pay silver, and this displeased the Silver men. Under the Sherman Act $155,000,000 of Treasury notes were issued against silver bullion.

"Maintaining the Parity."

Thus, by the Bland-Allison Act of 1878 and the Sherman Act of 1890 the Silver party had forced into circulation about $450,000,000 of silver money. The currency had been expanded, but by no means as much as the Silver party and the paper inflationists desired. The question now was, in 1893, whether these silver notes were to be discontinued and the country brought definitely to the gold standard, or whether the policy of still further expanding the currency by free silver should obtain. For thirty years neither party to the financial controversy was able to have its way. The gold-standard policy, promoted chiefly by the banking and creditor classes, the money-lending sections, and the conservative business interests of the country standing for strict integrity in public and private contracts, opposed further expanding of the currency by silver and paper issues. They held that the country had

Extent of Silver Issues, 1878–1893.

The Financial Struggle had Resulted in a Series of Compromises between Conflicting Interests.

absorbed all the silver money it could hold; that to pursue silver coinage or to increase it would inevitably bring the Treasury to the silver standard and throw the country into financial confusion. This would mean national repudiation and dishonor. With them it was not a question of more money, but of "sound money"; whatever money we had should be "as good as gold," and, at all hazards, the public credit should be maintained at the highest standard; that is, all Government obligations should be exchangeable for gold, the money of the high-class nations of the world. The expanding or inflation policy, promoted chiefly by the debtor and poorer classes and by the agricultural and less wealthy sections, sought to maintain a steady relation between money and products; and they held that in its expansive qualities the currency should keep pace with population and trade; and whether there should be more or less of money issued was a Government question, not a banking question,—that is, it was a question of public policy to be determined by the political agencies and officials of the people and not by the officials and interests of private financial corporations. The financial controversy was, then, in a sense, a struggle between classes to determine the control and regulation of the volume of money, with the contending forces well represented in both the parties. The campaign of 1896 was an attempt to divide the voters on this line of cleavage. The silver question was pushed to the front for party purposes, but to the social reformer the conflict had a larger aspect: It was a struggle for the control of the *medium* of exchange, the *means* of exchange, and *land monopolies* as great agencies in exchange and in production.

In 1892, the constituencies of both parties were divided on the financial controversy. The campaign of that year was fought on other lines,—chiefly on the line of the tariff. The Populists alone were outspoken and aggres-

sive on the money question. Both of the old parties adopted evasive, not to say two-faced, resolutions on the financial issue. The Republicans asserted that the "American people, from tradition and interest, favor bimetallism, and the Republican party demands the use of both gold and silver as standard money." This was a bid for the Silver vote. Then followed, in deference to the Gold men,—"with such restrictions and under such provisions, to be determined by legislation, as will secure the maintenance of the parity of values of the two metals, so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar, whether of silver, gold, or paper, shall be at all times equal." [1]

Parties, Silver, and the "Parity," 1892.

The Democrats asserted:

"We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discriminating against either metal or charge for mintage."

This part of the artful and dodging platform was meant for use among Silver men and farmers in the West. Then followed:

"but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, or be adjusted through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts."

This was to justify those who wished to maintain the gold standard.

The Populists had the advantage of unity of purpose and of knowing what they believed. The money question, in its many aspects, they looked upon as one of the

[1] Republican Platform, 1892.

greatest in the history of civilization, as one most vitally affecting social happiness, and they were striving hard in the South and West to win voters of both parties to their views.

The Democratic party, in order to heal or to avoid divisions, pushed the tariff question to the front in the campaign of 1892, and Mr. Cleveland was elected chiefly upon that issue. Although elected on the issue of reducing tariff taxation, on which his party was fairly well united, early after his inauguration he convened Congress into extraordinary session for purposes of financial legislation, on which his party was hopelessly divided. His policy was to prevent further silver coinage, to stop expanding the currency, and to borrow whatever gold was necessary to make gold payments on all forms of Government paper. To maintain the gold standard he increased the bonded debt by $262,000,000, refused to use silver in Government payments, vetoed a measure for further silver coinage; and used the patronage of his administration to secure congressional votes for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act without substituting another for financial relief. All these acts were directly hostile to and antagonized by the Silver and Populist sentiment within the Democratic party. The party was disrupted, and in the West and South the great bulk of it refused to follow Mr. Cleveland's leadership. In the elections of 1894 the Democrats were defeated by overwhelming majorities. Legislative and congressional districts in the West that had never been known to elect Republicans did so that year. The Republicans carried the House of Representatives by more than two thirds majority. The Populist vote increased to nearly two million. Though members of the Administration and other Democrats in office, or in quest of patronage, abandoned their previous advocacy of free silver coinage, other Democrats, in Congress and out, like Altgeld of

Illinois, Bland of Missouri, Blackburn of Kentucky, Bryan of Nebraska, and Turpie of Indiana, opposed the Administration and set about to control the organization of the Democratic party and the next National Convention. They were aided in this by silver clubs, the Bimetallic League, by *Coin's Financial School* and other popular pamphlets on the money question, and by general Democratic dissatisfaction. The growth of labor organizations, the spread of socialistic agitation, the oppression of the corporations, the great railroad strikes of 1894, and the employment of the soldiery by Mr. Cleveland to repress the strikers, the hard times and calamities of other strikes and labor troubles, and, above all, the unprecedented hardship of the severe financial panic of 1893, for which Mr. Cleveland's administration was unjustly held responsible, all tended in the same direction, —toward discontent and revolt.

It was hardly expected that Mr. Cleveland would be beaten and repudiated within the convention of his own party in 1896. The managers of the People's party fully expected that both the old parties would be under the control of the "trusts and the gold bugs," and they therefore placed their convention after the conventions of both the old parties, in the expectation of gathering into the Populist ranks all the bolting Silver and anti-monopolist Republicans and Democrats and thus increasing its two million votes to the five and a half millions necessary to elect. In 1872, the Liberal Republicans who represented a bolt against their party Administration, held an early convention, and the Democratic Convention which followed had to face the alternative of a hopeless contest or an endorsement of the candidates and platform of the Liberal Republicans. The Democrats accepted the course that the Independent Republicans had marked out for them. But in 1896 the course of events took a different turn. The Populists were left to

endorse the Democrats or to run a second candidate representing, essentially, the same spirit and purpose. The Republican Convention was first to meet, and its leaders were still expecting to make the tariff the dominant issue in the campaign. When the convention refused to accept a resolution favoring the use of both gold and silver as equal standard money and pledging its power to secure free and unrestricted coinage of both metals at the ratio of 16 to 1, Senator Teller of Colorado led a Silver revolt. He was followed by a contingent representing Silver Republicans from the West who were ready to unite with the party that would give unequivocal support and the best promise of success to their cause. These represented one wing of the new combination that was forming.

In the struggle for the control of the Democratic Convention, the Silver Democrats and those who were opposing the gold-standard policy of Mr. Cleveland controlled the State conventions in the important middle States of Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, and the Democratic Convention met with its Silver wing in control of more than two thirds of the delegates, much to the surprise and consternation of the Eastern section of the party. Thirty Democratic State conventions had declared for free silver coinage. The Democrats felt that the time for "straddling" platforms on the money question had passed. The Democratic Convention declared the money question to be paramount to all others; that "gold and silver together were the money of the Constitution; that the demonetizing act of 1873 was without the approval of the American people; that it had resulted in an appreciation of gold or a fall of prices; that gold monometallism, a British policy, had locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times," and they demanded "the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other

nation, and that silver, equally with gold, shall be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private." They asserted that Congress alone had power to issue money and that banking corporations should be restrained from doing so; all paper money should be issued by the Government. They denounced the income-tax decision of the Supreme Court as contrary to the "uniform decisions of that body for one hundred years," and they declared that it was

"the duty of Congress to use all the constitutional power which remains after that decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may bear its due proportion of the expenses of the Government."

They denounced

"arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs,[1] as a violation of the Constitution and a crime against free institutions, and we especially object to government by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression by which Federal judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges, and executioners";

and the platform demanded trial by jury in certain cases of contempt.

These are the main features of the celebrated "Chicago Platform of 1896." On this platform the party nominated Mr. William J. Bryan of Nebraska for President, —a man who believed thoroughly in the righteousness of his cause and who represented fully the spirit and purpose of the convention.

It was expected that the Populists would ratify and

[1] Referring to the Chicago strike troubles of 1894.

support this platform and nomination. But there were "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists who refused to co-operate. They wished to "keep in the middle of the road," without fusion or alliance with any other party, and they would maintain their own organization, have a separate, independent platform and ticket. The Populist Convention, meeting a few weeks after the Democratic Convention had adjourned, endorsed Mr. Bryan's nomination, but the "Middle-of-the-Roaders" were strong enough to prevent the convention from accepting Mr. Sewall, the candidate of the Democrats for Vice-President, and Mr. Thomas Watson of Georgia was named instead. This complicated the situation.

The combination against the gold standard and the "money power"—of Silver Republicans, Populists, and Democrats—was still further prevented by a bolt from the Democrats. The gold wing of the Democracy, the supporters of Mr. Cleveland's policy, who had been defeated in the regular Democratic Convention, organized a movement in opposition to Mr. Bryan. Thousands of conservative old-school Democrats, who looked upon the Chicago platform as "revolutionary"; who deplored what seemed to them a menacing attack on the Supreme Court; who were fearful of the socialistic tendencies of their party; who were opposed to further enlargement of governmental activities in the control of transportation and commercial monopolies, united in this movement. A convention was held under the name of the "National Democratic Party," and John M. Palmer of Illinois was nominated for President and Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky for Vice-President. It declared for the gold standard and denounced the regular Democrats as Populists. As a "National Democratic Party" it was a mere temporary shift, or pretence, and a separate party movement was resorted to merely as the means best calculated to induce Democrats to withhold their votes from Mr.

Bryan. However, the movement was shown to have represented the sentiments of more than one hundred thousand Democratic voters throughout the country who were unwilling to vote for either of the old parties, though the majority of the Gold Democrats voted directly for the Republican candidate. The Silver Republicans who, in control of the Silver party, nominated Mr. Bryan, are to be looked upon in the same light, as maintaining the form of a third party as the best manœuvre for securing the defeat of the regular Republican candidate, Mr. McKinley. They soon afterwards merged formally into the Democratic party. The National Democrats and the Silver Republicans were third-party stalking-horses, though the Silver Republicans directly nominated the candidate that they favored.

The Gold Democrats of 1896 were conservatives. They favored the old ways, in that they opposed enlarging the scope of government. Both the Cleveland and the Bryan elements in the Democratic party claimed to be Jeffersonian, and the lineal inheritors of Jacksonian Democracy. The gold wing were regarded by their opponents as standing for the wealthy, the aristocratic, and privileged classes of the country, and it was against these that Jefferson and Jackson contended. To the Bryan Democracy the struggle was against plutocracy, against the subtle control and corruptions of wealth. To the Cleveland Democracy it was a struggle against socialism, disorder, dishonesty, and anarchy. The radical, progressive, social democracy represented by Mr. Bryan had now come to look upon government not merely as a means of repression, as it was regarded in Jefferson's day (who therefore sought to prevent the enlargement of governmental powers), but as an agency of a democratic state for the promotion of the people's interests. With this new and larger, if not truer, democratic tendency in the party it drew to its support in 1896 many who had never

supported it before,—those who felt that the greatest danger to the nation was in the domination of the Government by a commercial and corrupt plutocracy. On the other hand, the Democratic party lost the support of its millionaires and moneyed men, and of many conservative citizens, many of its best and most substantial supporters, who felt that menacing danger to the country was in the socialistic spirit, and that it would be safer to trust control of a more conservative party which would be more disposed to guard the interests of property and business. The business interests of the country were aroused against the new democracy.

The party situation has not materially changed since 1896. The same forces are in control of the two parties. The Spanish War and our colonial expansion brought into paramount importance a new issue in 1900,—whether the new colonial policy brought on by the war should be maintained. On that issue the Democrats are conservative and the Republicans stand for a departure,—in the control, outside of the Constitution, of subject peoples across seas, in the interest of expansion and commerce. The Democratic party is fairly well united in opposition to our foreign colonial policy, especially in the Philippines. But on the domestic problems touching monopolies of land, money, and transportation the struggle and division within the Democratic party still continue. The conservatives, or "reorganizers," represented by able and astute leaders and men of large affairs, capable managers of great enterprises, and represented also by the class of politicians who care very little about what policies and principles the party asserts if only they can gain a "victory" and get the offices,—these favor a non-committal policy in the social and industrial struggle. They would appeal to the support of moneyed men. They would therefore do nothing to disturb the promotion of great capitalistic enterprises and combinations. They favor

the abandonment of all agitation for the income tax and other radical propositions for the taxation of corporate wealth, and an abandonment of opposition to "government by injunction." They would check any tendency toward more government establishments and a larger control of business,—of savings-banks, of a parcels post, of inter-State commerce, of the telegraph and the railroads. This would mean that upon the industrial and social issues in our domestic politics the Democratic party should be brought substantially to the ground of its opponents, that it should be again a conservative party, and that party contests should be waged on general principles of opposition to the Administration in favor of a minimum amount of government, and for the old doctrine of a "tariff for revenue only." The conservatives desire to reorganize and harmonize the Democratic party,—with the conservatives in control, to restore the party conditions of 1892. It is an attempt to yoke Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Bryan in the same party harness, where apparently they do not belong.

The American voters have very generally accepted the idea that under our system of government there can be but two parties,—that a third party tends to break up the solidarity of the State and leads to impotency and confusion. But for this idea and habit, the conditions were favorable in 1896 and 1900 for the formation of another party with a purpose more permanent than merely to secure the defeat of one of the parties in a single campaign. This might have been composed of the Gold Democrats and others who were displeased with Mr. Bryan and free silver and too many government enterprises, and of disaffected Republicans and independents who were opposed to continued high protection and the foreign policy of the Republican party and who professed to vote the Republican ticket because they had no other which they could consistently support. The result was

a large body of malcontents. To a large element the situation presented a choice between two evils. The tendency to avoid the organization of a third party leads to an attempt among politicians to harmonize elements that are essentially out of harmony, that have no vital unity of principle and purpose. The result is sharp practice, evasive platforms, the suppression of men's honest convictions "for the sake of the party," and the final deception and disappointment of one wing or the other of the party forces.[1] It is in such a period of transition as from 1892 to 1900, when parties seek to adjust themselves to new conditions and new issues, that third parties increase their supporters, and a large element of discontent exists within the old parties. Such is the dominant characteristic of the party situation within the last decade. If the Democratic party should return to the conservative platform and leadership of 1892 it requires no very great foresight to predict, in the light of present industrial struggles and of the greatly increased Socialist vote of 1902,[2] that the new Socialist Democracy will rise to a commanding position as a third contestant for party supremacy.

[1] See an article in the *Forum* for August, 1901, on "The Failure of the Two-Party System," by Albert Watkins.

[2] The Socialist vote in the Fall elections of 1902 is estimated at about 500,000, a tremendous increase over that of any previous year. This is the most significant fact revealed by recent party contests.

CHAPTER IX

MINOR PARTIES

AMERICANS have generally accepted the two-party system. It is difficult to induce voters to leave their parties to vote with a "third party." The hope of such a party's coming into power seems very remote, as none has done so since the rise of the Republican party nearly fifty years ago. With the growth of the country in area and population the task of organizing and maintaining a new party throughout the nation, and the stupendous labor and expense of inducing the majority of the voters to come to its support, seem to most citizens hopeless and unavailing. No matter how disgusted men may be with their party, they will vote with it, or vote with the opposition to rebuke their party, choosing, for the time being, as they express it, "the lesser of two evils." Though there may be thousands of these disgusted voters of the same way of thinking, they cannot be induced to "throw away their votes" on a third party, nor do they feel that they can afford to organize a new party that would really represent them. This is often true of strong party men who remain "very still," sulking in their tents during the campaign, and absent themselves from the polls, or who vote with the opposite party as a means of defeating the dominant leader and faction in their own. However, such party men often organize a third-party movement for temporary purposes.

The Bi-Party System.

The two-party habit is also characteristic of most of the independent voters on whom party ties rest lightly.

This two-party system is supposed to be in harmony with the party custom in Great Britain, and different from the party life of Continental Europe, where, in each country, there are always several parties. The idea that in England third parties do not exist is a mistaken one, for in the more than two hundred years of party history since the Revolution of 1688, English history has been strewn with third parties, or with the "offshoots" and "wings" of the old parties. Perhaps a majority of the most important ministerial measures of the nineteenth century were carried and opposed by some kind of combination or coalition of varying party elements. The "Old Tories" and the "Peelites," in 1830, the "Adullamites" and the "Radical Liberals" of 1866, the "Irish Nationalists" and "Liberal-Unionists" of recent years will serve to illustrate the lack of unity in English party life.

English and Continental Parties.

In America third parties have played a very important part. They have had their abuses, as they have at times been used by designing men as a means of faction or of corrupt bargain and fusion. But they have also had their distinct and important uses. They have generally been composed of men of earnest convictions and zealous purposes, and they have exercised a very considerable influence on party history, sometimes modifying or restraining the course of one of the old parties and sometimes, as our sketch of parties has shown, even turning the course of party history. They are often organized and directed by earnest and patriotic men, who, caring little for the causes at issue between the old parties, use a third party as a means of agitation and education, and as a means of enabling a considerable body of political opinion to find rational expression at the ballot-box. The idea that men must vote with one of two parties is very illogical and

leads, at times, to absurd political inconsistencies.[1] It leads citizens to vote for men whom they do not trust, and to subscribe to principles in which they do not believe. It is often an obstacle to healthy political education and development. It tends to induce men to subordinate their real convictions for the mere idle purpose of rallying under a traditional party name to carry an election. Rational politics requires that men should stand and vote together for what they think is paramount. Men will reasonably subordinate some of their political desires for the sake of securing others, which they deem of greater importance, or for the sake of preventing the country from pursuing what may be considered a dangerous course. But to go with a party which the voter thinks is fundamentally wrong or is headed entirely in the wrong direction, merely because the other party is worse, is not calculated to make for wholesome politics or for the ultimate benefit of the country. Third parties do a great service in enabling voters to stand up for their opinions.

Our sketch of parties has treated of those minor parties whose influence has been most pronounced in determining the course of party history. A few others of temporary interest and influence may be briefly described.

[1] Under the present conditions in American politics but little reason can be given for the attempt to "reorganize" and "harmonize" in one party men of radically different characters and purposes,—except from the standpoint of the party politicians who want to carry elections and elect a President merely "to have and to hold" the offices and to dispense patronage. Radicalism and Conservatism pull apart; they cannot be yoked together. The conservative National Democratic party of 1896 should have continued to stand for its principles, as the Populists did, and it would not have been looked upon as a mere factious and temporary scheme of politicians to hoodwink some of the rank and file of the regular Democrats, or to punish the majority leaders as a means of subsequently controlling the party. See the article, "Failure of the Two-Party System," by Albert Watkins, *Forum*, August, 1901.

The *Quids* were the first third party in our national history. They arose under Jefferson's administration, 1804–1808, and were led by John Randolph of Roanoke. Randolph and the Quids became dissatisfied with Jefferson's administration on two accounts. It had violated true Republican principles (which required strict adherence to States' rights) in going too far toward the promotion of national power, as in the acquisition of Louisiana and in the government of that Territory and in its embargo and commercial policies. In the second place, Randolph was displeased with Jefferson's policy toward West Florida. Jefferson publicly asserted our rightful claim to that territory, and intimated that force would be employed against Spain to maintain our rights, while privately he was applying to Congress for money with which to induce France to put such pressure on Spain as would induce the latter country to concede our claim. Randolph denounced this policy as deceitful chicanery, and he refused to support the Administration. He sought to elect Monroe over Madison in 1808, holding that the Administration had gone far toward Roman imperialism and corruption. His faction became a *tertium quid*, belonging neither to the Administration nor to the opposition forces. They had, of course, no organization nor machinery such as we recognize in parties to-day.

The Quids.

The *Blue-Light Federalists* was the name applied to the Federalist opponents of the War of 1812. In 1813 Commodore Decatur claimed that he was prevented, on certain dark nights, from getting to sea with his frigates from the blockaded port of New London, by blue-light signals, set to warn the British. The Federalists opposed to the war were charged with giving these signals, and all opponents of the war in New England were called "Blue-Light Federalists."

The Blue-Light Federalists.

The *Anti-Masonic* party was before the public in the

years from 1828 to 1832. It grew out of opposition to the Masonic fraternity, which was accused of responsibility for the murder of William Morgan in 1826. Morgan had prepared a book revealing the secrets of Free Masonry, and for this violation of his oath he was kidnapped, and it is supposed that he was drowned in the Niagara River. The Masons were accused of systematically thwarting all investigation, of placing their secret obligations above the obligations of citizenship, and thus shielding the kidnappers from prosecution and baffling justice. Great excitement and indignation were aroused against the Masons, and in western New York, the scene of the Morgan abduction, this sentiment was represented in a State political party, which polled 33,000 votes for Governor in 1828. The Anti-Masonic party increased this vote in New York in 1829 to 70,000, and in 1830 to 128,000, displacing in that State the National Republican party. William H. Seward, Millard Fillmore, and Thurlow Weed, afterwards distinguished Whig leaders, first entered politics as young men in New York in the ranks of the Anti-Masons. The agitation spread to the neighboring States, and the Anti-Masons organized as a national party as one wing of the opposition to President Jackson's administration. In Pennsylvania and Vermont it was the controlling anti-Democratic organization. Their first National Convention, which was the first National Convention of any party, was held at Philadelphia in September, 1830. Ten States were represented by ninety-six delegates. It was voted to hold a second National Convention at Baltimore in September, 1831, to be composed of as many delegates from each State as there were representatives in both Houses of Congress. These delegates were to be chosen by those who were opposed to secret societies, and were to meet for the purpose of nominating candidates for President and Vice-President. With this party, there-

The Anti-Masonic Party.

fore, originated the party-convention system of the present day. Their Convention in 1831 nominated William Wirt of Maryland for President and Amos Ellmaker of New York for Vice-President. In the election of 1832 these candidates carried only the electoral vote of Vermont. The Anti-Masons were afterwards absorbed by the Whigs, except in Pennsylvania, where they retained their separate identity for some years, electing a Governor in 1835. Within the Whig party the Anti-Masons were strong enough to secure the nomination of Harrison as against Clay in 1836 and 1840. The party has the "unique distinction of being the only party in American political history not based on some theory of constitutional construction or on some governmental policy."[1]

The Loco-Focos.

The *Loco-Focos* were a radical faction of the Democratic party in New York State in 1835–1837. Under Federalist control in that State the method of issuing bank charters and controlling banks was charged by the opposition with favoritism and corruption. After the removal of the United States deposits from the Second United States Bank and Jackson's veto of the Bank Bill the number of State banks greatly increased and the exemptions and special privileges of their charters became quite a scandal. An "Equal Rights" party was formed, within the regular Democratic party, opposed to granting special privileges. At a meeting in Tammany Hall, October 29, 1835, the regular Tammany Democrats tried to gain control. They were outnumbered; but they proposed to win their point by a *coup d'état*. Their chairman left his seat, and the lights were extinguished with the purpose of breaking up the meeting. But the "Equal Rights" men produced candles and *loco-foco* matches and continued the meeting. The next day the *Courier and Enquirer* dubbed the Equal Rights men *Loco-*

[1] McMaster, vol. v., pp. 114–120; Stanwood, pp. 155–157; Lalor's *Cyc. Pol. Sci.*

Focos. The name clung to them and came to be applied to the whole National Democratic party by their opponents, as this wing became dominant in the party. It was they who announced the platform of 1836 in New York which was generally accepted by the party.[1] The lucifer match was then comparatively new. The word *loco-foco* was ignorantly made after the model of the word "locomotive," which had then recently come into use. "Locomotive" was supposed to mean self-moving, and "loco-foco" was supposed to mean self-lighting.[2]

The *North Americans* were those who seceded from the American Convention that nominated Fillmore in 1856. They were *Anti-Nebraska* men who had been associated with the Knownothing, or American, party. They were resolved that the American party should nominate for President and Vice-President only such men as were in favor of congressional prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30′. Upon the failure of the party so to declare, the delegates representing constituencies of this way of thinking withdrew from the Convention. They afterwards nominated Frémont, the Republican candidate, though they rejected Dayton, Frémont's running mate, taking up Johnston of Pennsylvania instead. As an indication of the factious tendency of those times it may be stated that *conservative North Americans*, not satisfied with the nomination of Fremont, caused still another secession, and nominated Commodore Stockton for President. The North Americans.

In this year (1856) the *Political Abolitionists* nominated Gerrit Smith for President and Frederick Douglass for Vice-President.

The *Liberal Republicans* of 1872 were organized as a protest against corruption in the administration of the National Government, and to secure civil-service reform

[1] See p. 46.

[2] See *Century Dictionary.*

and tariff reform on free-trade lines. They had for their leaders some of the most distinguished men of the nation, —Hon. David A. Wells, ex-Governor Hoadley of Ohio, E. L. Godkin, editor of the *Nation;* Chauncey M. Depew, Horace Greeley, Charles Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, Murat Halstead, editor of the Cincinnati *Commercial;* Whitelaw Reid, of the New York *Tribune;* Horace White, of the Chicago *Tribune;* Edward Atkinson of Boston, Hon. Carl Schurz, Lyman Trumbull, John M. Palmer, and David Davis, the last three from Illinois. President Grant's scheme for the annexation of Santo Domingo to the United States had especially aroused the opposition of Greeley and Sumner; the control of State patronage and, consequently, of the party machinery by certain Senators favored in appointments by President Grant excited opposition and the consequent demand for civil-service reform. It was charged that these "senatorial bosses" were manipulating the offices for private purposes. The Liberal Republicans, therefore, stood for "reform," and "anything to beat Grant." They denounced Grant for using the powers of his office for personal ends, for keeping corrupt and unworthy men in power, for rewarding men with offices in return for personal presents, and for building up by means of patronage a tyrannical party machine that was attempting to stifle public opinion. The party pledged itself to equality before the law, to the union of the States, and the war amendments; to the removal of all Southern political disabilities, and universal amnesty; to local self-government with impartial suffrage; to a thorough reform of the civil service, to the end that "honesty, capacity, and fidelity should constitute the only valid claims to public employment, and as a means to this end" no President should be a candidate for re-election; the maintenance of the public credit; a speedy return to specie payments; oppo-

Liberal Republicans, 1872.

sition to further railroad grants. Recognizing a difference within the party on free trade and protection, the party declared for "a system of Federal taxation which shall not unnecessarily interfere with the industry of the people," and "we remit the discussion of the subject to the people in their congressional districts and the decision of Congress thereon, wholly free from executive interference or dictation." The party nominated Horace Greeley of New York for President, and B. Gratz Brown of Missouri for Vice-President. The Democrats, as a means of combining all the opposition to the Republicans, endorsed both the platform and the nominations of the Liberal Republicans, but the rank and file of the Democratic party did not entirely unite in their support. A convention of "Straight Democrats" met in Louisville in September and nominated Charles O'Conor of New York for President, and John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts for Vice-President. Though these Straight Democratic nominees drew but few votes, Greeley and Brown were overwhelmingly defeated, and Grant was triumphantly re-elected. Many of the Liberal Republicans remained permanently with the Democratic party, many returned to the Republicans, while others became professional independents, the forerunners of the Mugwumps.

"Straight Democrats" of 1872.

The *Mugwumps* appeared in 1884, as bolting Republicans and Independents in opposition to Mr. Blaine, the presidential nominee of the Republican party. The New York *Evening Post* in 1884 complained that the Blaine organs constantly referred to the independent Republicans as "Pharisees, hypocrites, mugwumps, transcendentalists, or something of that sort." In American political history the Mugwumps may, then, be defined originally as one of the independent members of the Republican party who in 1884 refused to support the nominee of that party for the presidency, and either

Mugwumps.

voted for the Democratic or the Prohibitionist candidate or abstained from voting. The term has come to include all independents who act on the principle of going from one party to the other according as they like or dislike the candidate put forward, or in response to their convictions on some political cause which they deem of paramount importance. George William Curtis was the most prominent of the Mugwumps, and civil-service reform is the cause to which they have been chiefly attached. The word "mugwump," like many political nicknames, first given in derision, came to be accepted as an honorable title.[1]

The *Prohibitionists* came into the field in 1872, and they have regularly nominated candidates for President and Vice-President since that time. The main principle of the party has been the legislative prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, except for religious, medicinal, and scientific purposes. James Black of Pennsylvania was the party's first candidate for President, and he polled 5608 votes. In 1876 General Green Clay Smith of Kentucky was nominated and he received 10,000 of the 8,000,000 votes cast. In 1880 General Neal Dow of Maine, the Nestor of Prohibition, stood as the candidate of this party, and he received a slightly increased vote over that of 1876. In 1884 John P. St. John, ex-Governor of Kansas, polled 150,000 votes for this party, drawing many dissatisfied Republicans of Mugwump proclivities who would not vote for Cleveland. In this year the Prohibitionists cast 25,000 votes in the State of New York, and as Cleveland was elected by the vote of that State on a plurality of only 1100 the defeat of Blaine was attributed to the defection among Republican Prohibitionists, and the election of 1884 in New York was, on this account, compared

The Prohibitionists.

[1] See Senator George F. Hoar's article defending the Republican partisan as against the Mugwump, in the *International Review* for October, 1900.

to that of 1844, when the Whig Abolitionists caused Clay's defeat by voting for Birney.[1]

Since 1884 the Prohibitionists have not materially increased their voting strength, though they have stood faithfully and persistently for their cause. The party is distinguished as being the longest-lived and most persistent third party in our history. It is composed of conscientious men of earnest convictions, especially on moral questions, and their influence, with that of their allies, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, has been very forcible and positive in many States in restraining the old parties from permitting too lax a policy toward the liquor evil. Many voters in both the Democratic and Republican parties have Prohibition leanings, and the fear that these may leave their parties for the Prohibitionists makes the third-party weapon an effective instrument of education and restraint. In recent years the Prohibition voters have had a tendency toward radicalism on financial and industrial issues, and in 1896, like the other parties in that eventful year, it suffered a schism in its ranks, the conservatives contending that no public expression be put forth except on the liquor traffic, and the radicals going in for free silver, government control and issue of money, woman suffrage, national control of railroads and telegraphs, and other reforms. It is largely the increased public interest in the social and industrial issues and the intensity of party contests over these that have prevented the growth of the Prohibition vote.

Of late years several Socialist parties have appeared with presidential candidates. The most important of these is the *Social Democratic* party, which is now generally known as merely the *Socialist* party. This was formed at Chicago in June, 1898. It grew out of a heterogeneous organization formed by Eugene V. Debs in 1897. It stands for

Social Democratic Party.

[1] See p. 62.

socialism and democracy. It declares its object to be "the establishment of a system of co-operative production and distribution through the restoration to the people of all the means of production and distribution, to be administered by organized society in the interest of the whole people, and the complete emancipation of society from the domination of capitalism." In principles and purpose the Social Democratic party is almost identical with the Socialist Labor party, and its formation was really a protest against conditions existing in that party. Eugene V. Debs is the national organizer of the Social Democratic party and to his efforts largely its growth has been due. The party has elected mayors in Haverhill and Brockton, Massachusetts, and has met with other local successes in that State. Mayor Jones, of Toledo, independent Socialist candidate for Governor of Ohio in 1899, represents, in general, the same tendency. His vote of 130,000 for the Ohio governorship indicates that there has been rapid growth of Socialist opinions, and the Social Democratic party is an effort to give this body of opinion a material organization in permanent party shape. The Social Democratic movement is chiefly a working-class movement.

Socialist Labor and Other Socialistic Parties.

Besides the Social Democrats there are three distinct bodies of Socialists in America, all aiming at the overthrow of the existing economic and social order and the substitution therefor of radically different forms. These are the *Socialist Labor* party, the *International Working People's Association*, and the *International Workingmen's Association*. The two latter bodies favor violent methods, while the Socialist Labor party condemns violent methods and seeks its end by peaceful education and agitation and through present political institutions. In the various disputes in the several early Socialist conventions in America the moderate party separated from the extremists. The

moderates formed the Socialist Labor party. They are not anarchists, for they do not oppose government and the state; nor do they wish the state to be merely a voluntary association, as the anarchist desires. But the Socialist Labor party would have a socialistic state, a people's co-operative commonwealth. Socialism is the opposite of anarchy. Anarchy teaches that government should control in nothing, not even to protect life and property,—"the perfect unfettered self-government of the individual and, consequently, the absence of any kind of external government."[1] Socialism, on the other hand, teaches that government shall control in everything. It affirms that the state should own and control all the tools and plants of industry and should direct all occupations, requiring of each according to his strength and speed, and giving unto each according to his weakness and need. The Socialist believes in the trust; not the trust for private benefit, but he would have the nation organized into one great trust and allow all the people to come in for dividends. The government should prevent overproduction in some lines and under-production in others. Anarchy leaves all to the individual; in Socialism the individual is merged in the social community, the state. Anarchism would have no state control, except by the voluntary assent of every individual. Socialism would have no individualism except in subordination to and complete subjection by the constituted authorities of the state.

Socialism and Anarchy Contrasted.

The Socialist parties are generally in favor of reduction of hours of labor; government issue of money; that inventions should be free to all; progressive inheritance and income taxes; public employment of the unemployed; the imperative mandate and the referendum; the abolition of the executive veto; and that all public officers should be

[1] E. V. Zenker, *Anarchism*.

subject to recall. It will thus be seen that their movement stands for extreme democracy.

The "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists, or the Anti-Fusion voters of that party, represent Socialist tendencies, and favor radical democratic policies. They stand for an enlargement of direct popular control over government and social and industrial agencies, especially through the operation of the initiative and the referendum, and they refuse to be turned from the "middle of the road" for fusion or combination with other parties for immediate interests or elections. They cast 50,000 votes for Wharton Barker for President in 1900.

Of these minor parties it will be seen that some of them have been radical and some conservative, as the same difference characterizes periods and movements in the life of the larger parties. So party history ends as it begins with this fundamental distinction between parties.

Radicalism vs. Conservatism in Parties.

A great philosophical historian, in speaking of a "real natural history of parties," finds the division to correspond roughly to "certain broad distinctions of mind and character that never can be effaced." They are the distinctions that most historians of parties have made between conservatism and radicalism.

"The distinctions between content and hope, between caution and confidence, between the imagination that throws a halo of reverent association around the past and that which opens out brilliant vistas of improvement in the future, between the mind that perceives most clearly the advantages of existing institutions and the possible dangers of change and that which sees most keenly the defects of existing institutions and the vast additions that may be made to human well-being, form in all classes of men opposite biases which find their expression in party divisions. The one side rests chiefly on the great truth that one of the first conditions of good government is essential stability, and on the extreme danger of a nation's

cutting itself off from the traditions of its past, denuding its government of all moral support, and perpetually tampering with the main pillars of the state. The other side rests chiefly on the no less certain truths that Government is an organic thing, that it must be capable of growing, expanding, and adapting itself to new conditions of thought or of society; that it is subject to grave diseases, which can only be arrested by a constant vigilance, and that its attributes and functions are susceptible of almost an infinite variety and extension with the new and various developments of national life. The one side represents the statical, the other the dynamical element in politics. Each can claim for itself a natural affinity to some of the highest qualities of mind and character, and each, perhaps, owes quite as much of its strength to mental and moral disease. Stupidity is naturally conservative. The large classes, who are blindly wedded to routine and are simply incapable of understanding or appreciating new ideas, or the exigencies of changed circumstances, or the conditions of a reformed society, find their natural place in the conservative ranks. Folly, on the other hand, is naturally radical. To this side belongs the cast of mind which, having no sense of the infinite complexity and interdependence of political problems, of the part which habit, association, and tradition play in every healthy political organism, and of the multifarious remote and indirect consequences of every institution, is prepared with a light heart and a reckless hand to recast the whole framework of the Constitution in the interest of speculation or experiment. The colossal weight of national selfishness gravitates naturally to conservatism. That party rallies round its banner the great multitude who, having made their position, desire merely to keep things as they are; who are prepared to subordinate their whole policy to the maintenance of class privileges; who look with cold hearts and apathetic minds on the vast mass of remediable misery and injustice around them, who have never made a serious effort, or perhaps conceived a serious desire, to leave the world in any respect a better place than they found it. . . . Conservatism is usually less efficient than its rival, because its leaders are paralyzed by the

atmosphere of selfishness pervading their ranks, and because most of the reforming and energetic intellects are ranged among their opponents. On the other hand the acrid humors and more turbulent passions of society flow strongly in the radical direction. Envy, which hates every privilege or dignity it does not share, is intensely democratic, and disordered ambitions and dishonest adventurers find their natural place in the party of progress and change." [1]

[1] W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i., pp., 513–515. I have substituted the terms radical and conservative for Mr. Lecky's terms Liberal and Tory in this extract.

PART II

AMERICAN PARTY MACHINERY AND HOW IT WORKS



CHAPTER X

THE COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE party machine is the party organization. This consists of the national, State, and local party committees, and the conventions which are called and provided for by these committees. The organization, or machine, may be considered under two heads:

1. The Permanent Part,—the continuing committees which are always in existence ready for party service, though their membership may change from year to year.

2. The Temporary Part,—consisting of the conventions of the party which meet at appointed times to formulate party platforms and policies, nominate candidates, renew the committees,—in brief, to legislate for the party and to appoint or reappoint its executive agents, the committeemen.

The Permanent and Temporary Parts of the Party Machine.

The permanent party machine, or organization, is now in working order for the manufacture of the next President. Its permanency will be partly understood when we say that this party machine or organization has been in continuous existence for the Democratic party since 1836, and for the Republican party since 1856. The composition and processes of this permanent machine and of the temporary conventions held under its direction, what they are and how they operate, may best be understood

from a description of their work during a presidential year. From the first act to the last in the process of making a President we have to note what various party organs are concerned, what they do, and how and why they do it. The purpose of this part of the volume is to study the party machinery in actual operation.

The various steps in the process of President-making by our party and electoral machinery may be summarized as follows:

1. The meeting of the National Committee, on call of the chairman, for the purpose of naming the time and place of the next National Convention.
2. The Committee publishes a *call* for the Convention.
3. State and District Conventions appoint Delegates.
4. The National Convention nominates candidates for President and Vice-President.
5. The State Conventions nominate presidential electors.
6. The conduct of the campaign.
7. The presidential election in November.
8. The meeting of the Electoral College, on the first Monday in January.
9. The transmission of the vote.
10. The counting of the electoral vote in the joint session of the two Houses of Congress on the second Wednesday in February.
11. Declaring the result.
12. The inauguration.

In following this process we shall be brought to the discussion of important political organs and their uses.

As the first act in the campaign the chairman of the National Committee, of his party, calls the Committee to meet for the purpose of appointing a time and place for holding the National Convention.

The National Committee will usually meet in Washington, D. C. Washington is the political capital of the

country, the political headquarters, especially while Congress is in session. Many members of the National Committee are members of Congress, and the national capital is, therefore, the most convenient place for the Committee to meet. The Democratic Committee usually meets on the 22d of February of a presidential year, the Republican Committee in January or December. While the Republicans have no fixed time for the meeting of their Committee, custom has made it at least six months before the date to be set for the convention.

1. Meeting of the National Committee.

The chief purpose of this meeting is to issue the *call* for the National Nominating Convention. The following is from the official call for the Republican National Convention for 1900:

2. Call for the National Convention.

"HEADQUARTERS REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 20, 1900.

"*To the Republican voters of the United States:*

"In accordance with established custom and in obedience to instructions of the National Convention of 1896, the National Republican Committee directs that a National Convention of delegated representatives of the Republican party be held at the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of nominating candidates for President and Vice-President, to be voted for at the presidential election, Tuesday, November 6, 1900, and for the transaction of such other business as may properly come before it, and that said convention shall assemble at 12 o'clock noon on Tuesday, the 19th day of June, 1900.

"The Republican electors of the several States, the District of Columbia and the Territories, and all other electors, without regard to past political affiliations, who believe in the principles of the Republican party and indorse its policies, are cordially invited to unite under this call in the selection of candidates for President and Vice-President."

The call then goes on to state the number of delegates to the National Convention and how these shall be elected; that "all delegates shall be elected not less than thirty days before the meeting of the Convention"; and usually the call invites all citizens of the United States, irrespective of past political associations and differences, to unite with the party in nominating and electing the President,—to secure a good, honest, and economical administration, and to prevent the government from being turned over to its enemies.

Naming the Convention City.

A matter of temporary importance, and the one which excites the greatest public interest and attention at this meeting of the Committee, is the choice of a convention city. Delegations from rival cities appear before the Committee. In the early years of the century Baltimore had the distinction of being known as the "Convention City." It was easy of access, half-way between the North and the South, and it was supposed not to be decisively permeated with either Northern or Southern influence. In later years Chicago has more frequently than any other city entertained the National Conventions. In its location and from its railroad facilities Chicago is more easily and fairly accessible from all parts of the country. The size of the city, its large auditoriums, and its hotel accommodations enable it to entertain the immense crowds of delegates and visitors that assemble at these quadrennial conventions. It is quite desirable, if not almost essential, that the convention city should be a city of the first class, affording these conveniences and facilities. But it is not always from these considerations that the National Committee chooses the place for the Convention. It may be deemed good politics, as a means of influencing the political opinion of a community, to have the Convention meet in a particular section of the country; it may be claimed that to choose Indianapolis would be to secure for the party the

electoral vote of Indiana, or to choose Kansas City would make sure of the votes of Kansas and Nebraska. It is not evident that the Convention carries with it such influence in the election. The friends of a particular candidate in control of the Committee may deem it inadvisable in the interest of their candidate to have the Convention held, for instance, in New York, or Philadelphia, where, presumably, the influence locally of the press and party would be adverse; and, again, a responsible commercial delegation from a city may offer to the Committee a money donation to the campaign fund of the party, and offer to pay all the expenses of the Convention in exchange for the choice of their city. A committee of fifty or sixty business men from a city seeking the Convention make a trip to Washington, and these, combined with the Senators and Representatives of that section of the country, importune the National Committee and present the "claims" of their city. This is generally done to bring visitors and money to the city, and the effort to "land" the Convention is made by local business men and hotel interests regardless of politics. In 1900, Philadelphia promised to the Republican National Committee a donation of $100,000 to bring the Convention to that city, and Kansas City offered $50,000 and the expenses of the Convention to the Democratic Committee. The money offer is often a decisive factor in the choice of the Committee.

Considerations Determining the Choice of the Convention City.

After the National Committee has appointed the time and place for the National Nominating Convention, the next act in the work of the party machine is the appointment of delegates to the Convention. This is done by State and district conventions.

3. Appointment of Delegates by State and District Conventions.

The number of delegates from the States to the National Convention is as follows: *Four delegates-at-large*

from each State,—that is, double the number of United States Senators to which the State is entitled. If the State has a Congressman-at-large in the Lower House, two more delegates-at-large are added.

Number of Delegates.

Two delegates are allotted to each congressional district of the State. Thus each State has twice as many delegates as it has Senators and Representatives in Congress, or twice as many as its electoral vote. Delaware has three electoral votes, one for each of its Senators and one for its Representative in Congress. New York has thirty-six electoral votes, two for its Senators and thirty-four for its Representatives. In the National Conventions Delaware has six delegates and New York seventy-two. Before 1852 the numbers in the National Conventions were the same as in the Electoral College, one delegate for each elector. For twenty years after 1852, in the Democratic Convention, the numbers were increased to two delegates for each elector, but each delegate had only half a vote. In 1872 the Democratic Convention gave each delegate a whole vote, while the number of delegates remained double that of the electors. The Republicans adopted this rule of membership in 1860, and it has been the rule of both parties since 1872.[1] In addition to the State delegates, two delegates have usually been allotted to each of the Territories. This helps to develop party feeling and party strength in the Territories in anticipation of their coming into the Union as States. In the Democratic Convention of 1896, in accordance with a report of the Committee on Credentials, the Territorial representation was increased from two to six delegates for each Territory, and the official call of the National Republican Committee in 1900 recommended a similar increase from the Territories for that party. In the Republican Convention the Territorial delegates vote as other delegates,

Territorial Representation in the National Convention.

[1] Professor Macy, Chicago *Record*, Monday, March 13, 1900.

but in the Democratic Convention the Territorial delegates have no votes,—a fact which again indicates the disposition of the Democratic party to govern, or to choose its rulers and its candidates, by the action of States. The Republican Committee in its call recommended that the Territories of Arizona, Indian Territory, New Mexico, and Oklahoma (prospective States), each elect six delegates and that Alaska elect four delegates, leaving the District of Columbia still only two, and the admission of these additional delegates was recommended to the Convention. The Convention of 1900 acted on the recommendation and admitted six delegates each from Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Indian Territory, and two each from Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii. With this increase the National Republican Convention consists of 894 State delegates (twice 447, the vote of the Electoral College) and thirty Territorial delegates, making a Convention membership of 924 in all. In addition to the delegates an equal number of alternates are elected to act in case of the absence of the delegates. The alternates are elected at the same time and in the same manner as the delegates; they sit in the Convention immediately behind the delegates.

Size of the Conventions.

Alternate Delegates.

The delegates-at-large, seldom more than four for each State, are always elected by the State convention of the party. The congressional district delegates are selected by conventions in the districts called by the congressional committee of each district, in the manner of nominating a Congressman from that district. Often the congressional candidate and the national delegates are named at the same district convention. The Democratic practice is usually to select the national delegates by the delegations from each congressional district to the State convention. The State convention then ratifies the selection of the district delegations

How Delegates are Elected.

at the same time that it makes the choice of the delegates-at-large from the State. The delegation is then more distinctly recognized as a State delegation and is thereby subject to State instructions, although named, in the first instance, in separate assemblies of district delegates. This is consistent with the democratic tendency of looking to the State as the unit in party action. The Whigs very early favored the choosing of delegates by congressional districts "as being most democratic and best calculated to bring out the real sentiments of the people."[1] In 1892 the Republican Convention passed a rule obliging every State to elect its delegates by districts.[2] If in any congressional district there is no congressional committee, the State committee of the party either calls the district convention, appointing the time and place of meeting and apportioning delegates to the different counties; or the State committee appoints from among the party adherents resident in that district a committee for the purpose of calling a district convention to elect delegates to represent the district. This is more especially true of the Republican practice.[3] The Territorial delegates are appointed by conventions under the supervision of committees appointed by the National Committee, in the manner of nominating Territorial delegates for Congress.

Statehood Recognized in the Democratic Practice in Selecting Delegates.

If the election of any of the delegates is contested, all notices of contest must be submitted in writing, accompanied by a printed statement setting forth the ground of contest to be filed with the secretary of the National Committee twenty days prior to the meeting of the National Convention. These papers relating to contested delegations are then presented to the Committee on Credentials appointed by the Convention, and are passed upon in the order in which they were filed.

Contested Seats in the Convention.

[1] See Niles's *Register*, vol. 57, p. 210. Nov. 30, 1839.

[2] Macy, Chicago *Record*, March 12, 1900.

[3] For the Democratic practice, see p. 159.

The district plan of electing the delegates is comparatively recent. Formerly, in both parties, the delegates for the whole State were appointed by the general State convention, and in some parts of the country, especially in New York and the Eastern States, this is still the custom in the Democratic party. State appointment recognizes the delegation as representing the State, and it gives greater power and prestige to the State as such, enables it to act as a unit, and this may account for the greater favor with which it is met in the Democratic party, as that is the party which tends more to advocate and defend the powers and rights of the States. But it is less popular than the district plan. It enables a shrewd politician in control of the party machinery of his State, and who is thereby able to manipulate the State convention of his party, to gain larger influence and power. A "snap judgment" may be more easily taken as against the wishes of the masses of the party. These have a better chance to exert their influence in smaller district conventions.

Rise of the District Plan of Election. It is More Democratic.

The delegates to the National Conventions are usually active party men, politicians in their respective districts who give a good deal of time and attention to politics. They are frequently able and astute managers, not office-seekers always, though often so, but men whose services to the party entitle them to some distinction and recognition. The delegates-at-large are usually men of State or national reputation, the party leaders of the State, the United States Senators, or men whose renown or power as speakers and managers will give the delegation weight and influence in the Convention.

Character of the Delegates.

Of recent years much criticism has arisen on account of the presence in the National Convention of the party of the Administration, of Federal office-holders. It is alleged that these Federal officers exercise an undue influence in controlling polit-

Office-Holders as Delegates to National Conventions.

ical action and in thus retaining in power their party chieftain, the dispenser of their salaries and patronage. This is an obvious impropriety which public sentiment condemns. The party managers, in conformity with this sentiment, now discourage the appointment of Federal office-holders by the local conventions. Prior to the Republican National Convention of 1900, Hon. Charles Dick, secretary of the Republican National Committee, received a letter from the chairman of the Republican State Committee of Texas, inquiring whether it were true that Federal office-holders were not wanted as national delegates. Mr. Dick replied as follows:

"While the National Committee does not assume to interfere in the selection of delegates, yet in order to avoid adverse criticism, it is deemed advisable that so far as practicable delegations to the coming National Convention should be composed of men not holding Federal appointments. There are, of course, justifiable exceptions to this rule, but public sentiment dictates that Federal officials shall not be too prominently identified with the management of political conventions."[1]

Politicians keep their hand on the public pulse and they know how the public feel.

Ought Representation in the National Conventions to Be According to Party Strength? Is the Present Representation Equitable?

The question has been raised in late years, and it is especially urged upon the Republican organization, whether representation in a National Convention ought not to be in proportion to party strength within a State. At present the States are represented in the National Convention as they are represented in the National Congress, —in proportion to population. In a Republican National Convention a hopelessly Democratic State has the same voting strength as a safe Republican State of the same population. Georgia

[1] Hon. Charles Dick, Secretary Republican National Committee, letter to E. H. R. Greene, Feb., 1900, Chicago *Record*, Feb. 17, 1900.

casts the same vote in nominating the Republican candidates as Iowa, though Iowa is quite sure to contribute to the election of the party candidate and Georgia is equally sure not to do so. The Republicans of Iowa cast, in 1900, 307,000 votes, while the Republicans of Georgia cast only 35,000 votes. For the party candidate in 1900 the Republicans of Ohio cast 543,000 votes, while the Republicans of South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana together cast 23,565 votes. In a National Republican Convention, Ohio Republicans may cast only forty-six votes, while the Republicans from these three Southern States may cast fifty-two. Why should not the voters of the party who are to be relied upon to elect the candidate be allowed to determine the party candidate and the party policy? Or, why should they not have weight in doing this in proportion to their party numbers, in proportion to the votes which they cast for the party candidates? Party conventions within the States recognize the democratic representative principle. The different counties of the State are represented in the State conventions of the party in proportion to party numbers. Party vote in the counties, not population, is everywhere recognized as the true basis of representation. A county is allotted one delegate, say, for every two hundred votes (or major fraction thereof) cast for the party candidate at the head of the ticket at the last preceding election. No one questions the fairness of this representation. The late Populist party, with no traditions to bind it, recognized the new popular basis of representation in National Conventions. It allowed that each State should appoint two delegates-at-large, and then one for every two thousand votes cast in the State for the Populist electors in 1892. Thus in the Populist Convention of 1896, Texas, entitled in the old party conventions to thirty votes, had one hundred and three votes, while New York had but thirty-

Populist Delegations were National, Not Federal.

six votes. Kansas had ninety-two votes, Connecticut but six. From States where the Populist party was strong the delegation was large. This would tend to secure a nomination and a platform not by States but by the mass of the voters of the party. By this plan the party, not the States, makes the platform and the candidates.

Why should the same system not apply to the National Conventions of the old parties? This matter came up in the National Republican Committee in 1883, when the committee met to plan for the National Convention of 1884. It was proposed so to change the basis of representation as to increase the influence of States giving Republican majorities. Two propositions were made, to:

1. Allow each State (1) four delegates-at-large; (2) one delegate for each congressional district; (3) one delegate for each twelve thousand votes cast in the State in 1880 for the Republican electoral ticket.

Proposals for an Equitable Basis of Representation.

2. Allow each State (1) four delegates-at-large; (2) one delegate-at-large for each Republican Senator representing the State; (3) one delegate for each congressional district; (4) one additional delegate for each district represented in Congress by a Republican.[1]

Both these propositions were rejected. The change was again urged, this time by Senator Quay of Pennsylvania, upon the National Convention of 1900. Mr. Quay moved to amend the rules of the Convention (when the Committee on Rules had brought in its report) by providing

"that hereafter each State shall be entitled to four delegates-at-large and one additional delegate for each ten thousand votes or majority fraction thereof cast at the last preceding presidential election for Republican electors, six from each Territory and District of Columbia; and that the method for

[1] Stanwood, p. 421.

the election of such delegates shall be provided for by the National Committee."[1]

Senator Quay submited a statement showing the number of delegates from the respective States on the present basis as compared with the number on the basis proposed. A few items will illustrate the character of the change[2]:

State	Republican Vote in 1896.	Delegates on Present Representation.	Delegates on Basis 1 for each 10,000 Votes, with four Delegates-at-large for each State.
New York	819,838	72	86
Pennsylvania	728,300	64	77
Ohio	525,991	46	57
Indiana	323,754	30	36
Illinois	607,130	48	65
Iowa	289,293	26	33
	3,294,306	286	354
Florida	11,288	8	5
Georgia	60,091	26	10
South Carolina	9,281	18	5
Alabama	54,737	22	9
Mississippi	5,130	18	5
Louisiana	22,037	16	6
	162,564	108	40

In the first group of six Northern States the aggregate Republican vote is 3,294,306. These States under the present representation have a voting strength in the National Convention of 286; under the new plan they would have 354. In the second group of Southern States the aggregate Republican vote is 162,564. This group now has 108 delegates in the National Convention; under the new representation they would have but 40. The

[1] Official Proceedings Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, June 19–20, 1900.

[2] Official Proceedings, National Republican Convention, 1900, p. 97.

two groups, instead of wielding power in the party councils in the proportion of 108 to 286, would have power in proportion of 40 to 354.

The proposal of Senator Quay was not pressed, and nothing was done. The party managers are reluctant to make the change, owing to the seeming importance of maintaining the party organization in the Southern States. It is urged that the change would be a betrayal of faithful party adherents who have been making a long and losing fight against odds; that it would tend to encourage the party where it is strong, where it needs no special encouragement, and to discourage it where it is weak, where it most needs encouragement; that the Southern delegates represent not only those who vote but those whose votes are suppressed by fraud and violence or under the forms of law. The fact is, the parties are not organized on *national* lines. They still recognize, in their organization and management, the interests and rights of the States as such and their early customs and traditions, under which certain "rights" or expectations have grown up, are hard to change. Parties in their form or constitution are like the Government,—they are partly federal and partly national, and in their early organization they took on features corresponding to the Federal system. But this disparity of influence may not long continue in the Republican party.

CHAPTER XI

THE RISE OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM

AFTER the National Committee has appointed the time and place for the National Convention and issued the call, and the State and district committees have called conventions, and these have appointed delegates, the next step in the process of President-making is in the action of the National Convention.

The National Convention.

In approaching the study of this most important historic institution of American parties it may be well to note how customs have changed in making party nominations. We must trace the evolution of the presidential convention.[1]

The origin of any institution is always remote. The beginnings of the nominating caucus and convention in America have been traced from colonial records as far back as 1640.[2] In early American society there was a ruling class, especially in New England and in Virginia,—that is to say, groups of men who, owing to their character, their wealth, and their social position, commanded the confidence of their fellow-citizens.[3] This was a class something like a landed

In Colonial Times Nominations were Made by a Gentry.

[1] See M. Ostrogorski's "The Rise and Fall of the Nominating Caucus, Legislative and Congressional," *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1900.

[2] See Professor Howard's *Local Constitutional History of the United States*.

[3] Ostrogorski.

gentry. Their leadership was accepted without question. Nominations were made by a coterie or clique of these leading citizens. These "parlor caucuses," as they were called, put forward candidates for the town or colony, and their candidates were accepted by the people. The Livingstons, Schuylers, and Clintons governed New York; a few rich merchants, according to John Adams, could carry any election in Massachusetts; the Virginia gentlemen, the rich plantation-owners, governed that Colony.[1] The formal nominations were made in town meetings or county meetings, but these gatherings usually merely ratified selections already made by a caucus of the leading citizens to whom the mass-meeting deferred. The suffrage was then much more restricted than now, and it was not possible for all the citizenship to take part in political action. "To nominate candidates for elective offices which went beyond the limits of the county, the views of the inhabitants of the various counties were often ascertained by means of a very extensive correspondence. Circulars were sent out, replies received, and lists of candidates were made up from these replies. These consultations were led by a few public-spirited men with a taste for election work, who made themselves into a committee of correspondence for this purpose.[2] These practices continued for some time after the adoption of the Constitution. During this period, then, there were two ways by which candidates were brought out:

1. They were named by this self-selected caucus, or junto, of leading men, whose nominations were generally accepted.

2. A candidate might announce himself and appeal for support on the ground of the principles and policies which he advocated, or of his fitness for the office.

[1] See Ford's *Rise and Growth of American Politics*, p. 10, citing John Adams's *Works*, vol. vi., p. 506.

[2] Ostrogorski.

Occasionally certain delegate bodies named a ticket, but these bodies were irregular and without authority.

The next step in the development of the nominating system is to be seen in the *Congressional and Legislative Caucus.* In the election of Jefferson, in 1800, party lines were for the first time distinctly drawn. The Congressional Caucus.

"As the democratic spirit grew," says Mr. Bryce, "the people would no longer acquiesce in self-appointed chiefs." Party members of State legislatures began to be recognized as the proper persons to make nominations for the State offices, and party members of Congress to nominate the national candidates. Each party held a congressional caucus to nominate candidates of that party for the presidency and vice-presidency, and each party in the State legislature held a caucus to name the party candidates for governor and other State offices. This congressional and legislative caucus was a perfectly natural development, an outgrowth of the sentiment and conditions of the times. For a territory so large as a State it was not easy to secure a general meeting which would be representative of all the different localities. A journey to the State capital was a formidable undertaking, and it was difficult to find men of leisure willing to leave their homes and make a hard journey merely for the sake of a temporary duty. Party representatives as members of the legislature were already at the capital. These would know better than any one else who were best qualified for the offices and what candidates could command the most votes. Therefore, the members of both Houses belonging to the same party met semi-officially, generally in the legislative building itself, made their selections, and communicated them to the voters by means of a proclamation, which they signed individually. Sometimes other signatures of well-known citizens who happened to be in the capital at the time were added, to give

more weight to the recommendation of the legislators.[1] John Jay was proposed in this way as the Federalist candidate for governor of New York. After 1796, it appears to be the settled practice in all the States.

As in the States the legislative caucus arose to nominate the governor, lieutenant-governor, and the presidential electors (where these were chosen by popular vote), so in the national arena, the congressional caucus arose to nominate to the presidency and the vice-presidency. In the first two presidential elections, of 1789 and 1792, the choice of candidates was by general consent. In 1796, in spite of some intrigue against him, John Adams was elected by the free and independent choice of the presidential electors, without a previous nomination. In the election of 1800, the first party contest, the party members of Congress who had previously caucused—that is, conferred—on policies and measures, now reached out to effect the presidential nominations, and thus to control the choice of the voters. Jefferson was accepted by the Republican caucus as a matter of course. The Federalist caucus was the first of the two, and it was held in secret for the purpose of circumventing Jefferson's election, and thus preventing the triumph of Democratic radicalism. The Republicans denounced this as a "Jacobinical conclave," though they also held their caucus in secret. In 1804, the caucus reappeared among the Republicans, but it was no longer held in secret.

Working of the Congressional Nominating Caucus.

"The Federalists, who were almost annihilated as a party by Jefferson's victory in 1800, gave up holding caucuses altogether. Henceforth there met only a Republican congressional caucus which appeared on the scene every four years at the approach of the presidential election. To strengthen itself in the country it provided itself (in 1812), with a special organ in the form

[1] Ostrogorski, *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1900, p. 257.

of a corresponding committee, in which each State was represented by a member and which saw that the decisions of the caucus were respected. Sometimes the State caucuses intervened in the nominations of candidates for the presidency; they proposed names, but in any event the congressional caucus always had the last word. Thus in 1808, with two powerful competitors for the succession to Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, both put forward in the influential caucus of Virginia, the congressional caucus pronounced for Madison while taking the formal precaution to declare that the persons present made this recommendation in their 'private capacity as citizens.' Several members of Congress who did not favor Madison appealed to the country, protesting not only against the regularity of the procedure of the caucus, but against the institution of the caucus itself. The caucus, none the less, won the day, the whole party in the country accepted its decision, and Madison was elected." [1]

From this time on the congressional caucus grew into disfavor, though it continued to make presidential nominations until 1824. In the latter year, however, its candidate, William H. Crawford of Georgia, was not accepted by the rank and file, and he came out third in the list of candidates. The revolt against the caucus became quite positive as early as 1812, when the New York Legislature brought out DeWitt Clinton, a Jeffersonian Republican, against Madison, the regular candidate, with a protest against the working of the caucus. It was urged against the caucus that the Constitution-makers were very careful to provide that Congress should not elect the President; now a party majority of Congressmen were doing so, and they had gone so far as to do so in a secret caucus. The *people* were to elect the President, not as they elect their representatives, nor through these representatives, but by the States in their separate, sovereign capacity. A coterie of

Ground of Unpopularity of the Congressional Caucus.

[1] Ostrogorski, *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1900, pp. 261, 262.

Congressmen had usurped a function belonging to the people of the States.

In 1816, when the caucus met again, Clay proposed a motion declaring that a caucus nomination was inexpedient. The motion was rejected. When Monroe was nominated Clay moved to make the nomination unanimous.[1] The caucus fell into further disfavor this year from the fact that Crawford, whom the people had never thought of for the presidency, came very near to securing the caucus nomination. Monroe was nominated by only eleven votes. The caucus candidates had always been the recognized leaders of the party and had represented fairly well the political sense of the people. But when it was suggested that a political manipulator like Crawford, whom the rank and file did not look upon as a fit man for the presidency, might become the caucus nominee, opposition to the caucus was still further increased. The caucus candidate was looked upon as the "regular" party candidate, and the caucus influence tended to urge upon the people the idea that its decision was binding in honor upon all the adherents of the party. Democratic doctrines had come in with Jefferson, and it was now urged by the opponents of the caucus that Democratic practices and customs should come in too. A member of Congress expressed the public feeling as follows in 1814:

"The members of the two Houses meet in caucus and there ballot for President and Vice-President. This modest recommendation then comes before the legislatures of the States. These may elect the electors, or make out a list for the people to elect. So the Chief Magistrate of the nation owes his office principally to aristocratic intrigue, cabal, and management. Pre-existing bodies of men, not the people, make the appointment. These bodies are naturally directed by a few leaders

[1] Niles's *Register*, vol. x., p. 59.

whose talents, boldness, or activity give them ascendancy over their associates. These leaders are accessible to corruption." [1]

The Democratic West Fosters Opposition to the Caucus.

This Democratic opposition to the aristocratic caucus found its most complete development in the new West. The West had no past, no traditions. It was permeated with the spirit of equality. Its pioneer home-hunters were all alike, in antecedents, habits, and conditions. These people had been taught that they were the sovereigns, the rulers, in America; they should know no superiors. The sovereign people were not in need of the intelligence of a superior class,—there was no such class. So-called leading citizens, whether in official or in private life, should no longer dictate to the people the choice of their representatives or their candidates for President. Jackson as a candidate, the idol and champion of the people, was the embodiment of this feeling. Jackson "was brought forward by the masses," as Benton expressed it. With the official caucus, with the leaders who presumed to determine the people's choice, Jackson would have no chance; but the people would elect him of their own accord. Jackson's influence, therefore, and the Western Democracy behind him, urged on the opposition to the caucus. Niles said in 1824:

"I would rather that the sovereignty of the States should be re-transferred to England than that the people should be bound to submit to the dictates of such an assemblage. But the people will not succumb to office hunters. . . . The great mass of the American people feel that they are able to judge for themselves; they do not want a master to direct them how they shall vote." [2]

The caucus was made to appear not only as an encroach-

[1] Speech of Gaston, *Annals of Congress*, Jan., 1814, cited by Ostrogorski.

[2] Niles, vol. xxi., p. 338, January 26, 1822.

ment on the sovereignty of the people, but as especially alarming in that its functions were exercised in the atmosphere of executive patronage. "Make me President," a candidate might say, "and I 'll make you Secretary, or provide you a good berth." Thus the President and Congress, who were intended by the wise framers of the Constitution to act as checks upon one another, act in collusion against the spirit of the Constitution.[1] Before the election of 1824 came on, presidential candidates were brought out by the various States. Nominations were made by resolutions of State legislatures. In as many as twelve States, by 1824, the action of the congressional caucus had been anticipated in this way. The friends of all the candidates except those of Crawford resolved to take no part in the caucus. If they attended they would be bound, according to the unwritten law of the caucus, to abide by its decision and support its candidate. Two thirds of the Republican members of Congress refused to meet in caucus. But Crawford's partisans persisted in having one. It was held February 14, 1824, in the hall of Congress. Out of two hundred and sixteen members summoned, sixty-six responded to the call. Crawford was unanimously nominated, but instead of strengthening him this endorsement probably weakened him before the people. With Crawford's defeat "King Caucus was dethroned," and no effort was ever made to restore this king to favor and power after 1824.

Before leaving this subject we must note what is known as the "mixed" caucus. It happened in the legislative caucus, which was composed of the party members of the legislature, that the districts in which the party was in a minority were left unrepresented; yet decisions were made which bound the party in the whole State. This was a serious defect. Those districts in the State which sent Federalist representatives to the

The Mixed Caucus.

[1] King's attack on the caucus. See Ostrogorski.

assembly were wholly unrepresented in the Republican caucus, while Republican districts were unrepresented in the Federalist caucus. Consequently the custom grew up, to some extent, of admitting to the caucus delegates elected by the members of the party in the districts which had no representatives of the party in the legislature. Thus a popular element was introduced into the caucus, not from the feeling that it was usurping popular rights, but because it did not provide for fair and complete representation. These general conventions were held as early as 1807.[1] The mixed caucus was destined to give way to the pure convention.

Period of Transition from the Caucus to the Convention.

The period from 1824 to 1832 was a period of transition from the congressional caucus to the National Nominating Convention. In this period nominations were made in a variety of ways,—by State legislatures, by mass-meetings, by newspaper announcements, and by a general concurrence of party meetings and agencies. A nomination made in one State would be seconded in another, and if named in different parts of the country and in a sufficient number of places, the nominee would be regarded as one of the leading candidates. The Anti-Masonic Convention of 1830 was the first delegate National Convention and the first to arrange for a convention in which representation should be based on the representation of the respective States in the National Congress. From that day to this, while the National Convention has changed in many minor ways, in the number of delegates, in the manner of electing these, in its rules of procedure, the fundamental principle on which it is based has remained the same, namely, the

The First National Nominating Convention.

[1] "Pennsylvania Politics Early in this Century," W. M. Meigs, *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, vol. xvii., 1894, cited by Ostrogorski; also "The Development of the Nominating Convention in Rhode Island," by Neil Andrews.

democratic representation of the party constituency. The old congressional caucus was tinged with aristocratism. The parties demanded an organization wherein each voter should have "an equal share in determining his party candidate and his party platform."[1] This organization was completed for the Democratic party about 1835; for the Whigs only a few years later. This is one of the results of the democratization of the country under Jackson.[2] All parties since have organized and developed on the same lines.

"The essential feature of this convention system is that it is from top to bottom strictly representative. This is because it has power, and power can flow only from the people. The permanent part of the party organization, the committee system that exists for the purpose of conducting the campaign and carrying the election and calling the next convention, has no power. Its object is to manage party business, such as is left to voluntary agencies. These committees undertake to create and stimulate opinion. But when a party policy or a party candidate is to be chosen and the party is to command a course of action which the members of the party are expected to obey,—such action must be taken by a representative body."[3]

Whether or not the Convention is actually representative depends upon the activity of the party members in their local primaries. A clique of politicians in the several districts and States may manipulate the local conventions and thus in the source of the appointing power the National Convention may not be representative of the voting constituency, but the delegates so appointed may reflect for the sake of success in the election the public sentiment and desire of the party, and in this sense the Convention may be representative.

[1] Bryce, vol. ii., p. 80.
[2] See the Author's *The American Republic and Its Government*, p. 131.
[3] Bryce, vol. ii., p. 80.

CHAPTER XII

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF TO-DAY

WE come now to consider the Convention as we find it to-day. The National Convention is peculiar to America. No other country in the world offers a parallel to it. It is the outgrowth of the effort of a democratic society to attain to a complete representative scheme for a popular choice of its ruler.

The Convention as it is To-Day.

"No other country provides in its party life for any gatherings comparable in size, interest, and representative character with our quadrennial National Conventions. The meetings of the National Liberal Federations in England alone approach the Republican and Democratic Conventions of the United States. But the English gatherings are not nearly so large and popular, nor do they possess any of the dramatic interest that grows out of the rivalry of leaders and candidates. . . . Train-loads of the most energetic members of the parties come from every direction. Large contingents from New England mingle with enthusiastic hundreds from the Pacific Coast. Scores of thousands of visitors, actually drawn from every State, Territory, and congressional district in the Union, make the convention city for the time the political centre and capital of the nation. The greatness and homogeneity of the country,—this is the object-lesson. Here is the real representative body of the nation,—seven or eight million voting citizens assembled in

The National Convention an Historic Spectacle.

a representative folkmote. The perfect acquiescence of these great conventions in the will of the majority exemplifies the strength of popular government. The conventions have come to be one of the finest and most valuable parts of our working political machinery. . . . It is not strange that the old party war-horses, scenting the battle from afar, cannot stay away from National Conventions. The student of history who finds himself a spectator in one of these mighty throngs,—so demonstrative and impetuous, yet so good-humored and so well-disciplined in the school of democracy, can but think back along the course of Anglo-Saxon development, past the assemblage at Runnymede to the earlier days of folkmotes in the forests of our race's primitive home. Thus confidence in free government is strengthened, and faith in the saving sense of our English-speaking masses is revived." [1]

Mr. Bryce says of the Convention:

"A European is astonished to see nine hundred men prepare to transact the two most difficult pieces of business which an assembly can undertake,—the solemn consideration of their principles and the selection of the person they wish to place at the head of the nation, in the sight and hearing of twelve thousand other men and women." [2]

American politics does not offer the student and observer a more interesting and exciting spectacle than may be witnessed in the National Conventions. They have been the scenes of many dramatic and historic events, and their proceedings are well worthy of the student and the historian of politics. The Conventions of 1860 were especially notable. The fierceness of the party contest, the extreme tension of political feeling on the burning question of slavery in the Territories, the irreconcilable differences between the Northern and Southern wings of the Democratic party, and the probability that the

[1] American *Review of Reviews*, July, 1892. [2] Vol. ii., p. 193.

threatened schism in the Democratic party on the slavery question could not be averted, and that the new Republican party, by the division of its opponents, might be able to secure control of the National Government,—this situation gave intense interest to the conventions of that year. At the Charleston Convention, where the Democracy of the nation were assembled in the persons of their representative delegates, a heated and passionate debate was had on the proposed platform of principles. This was a time when the platform, not the candidate, was the chief subject of controversy and division, except as the candidacy of Mr. Douglas embodied the platform. This is true also of the Democratic Convention of 1896. Such a situation generally indicates a lack of unity and harmony in the party, and may not give fair promise of party success; but it is usually indicative of a sound and healthy state of politics, because the party struggles for the approval of principles are indicative of deep and stirring political convictions among the people.

The National Convention. The Preliminaries.

The preliminary arrangements for the Convention are entrusted to an executive committee of the National Committee. This committee of arrangements elects a sergeant-at-arms of the Convention, and to him is entrusted the duty of superintending the printing of tickets, the organization of a force to act as assistants, ushers, and pages to seat the people and to maintain order during the sessions of the Convention.

Call to Order.

The National Convention is called to order by the Chairman of the National Committee. The proceedings are opened with prayer. The National Chairman then asks the Secretary of the Committee to read the call of the National Committee by which the assembly is convened. The Committee Chairman then immediately announces to the Convention the name of the temporary presiding officer, previously chosen by

the National Committee. This nomination is usually accepted by the Convention without contest or division.

Choice of Temporary Chairman.

If there is opposition, however, any delegate is entitled to place another name before the Convention and call for a vote; or some one may do so as the representative of the minority of the National Committee. In the Democratic Convention at Chicago in 1896 the majority of the National Committee, being Gold men, nominated Senator David B. Hill of New York for temporary chairman. The majority of the delegates were opposed to this nomination, and it was desired by the Silver men, who were in the majority, to control the Convention from the outset. Consequently it was moved that the name of Senator Daniel of Virginia be substituted for that of Senator Hill, and the substitute motion was carried by a large majority. The Silver men were not willing to concede the temporary presiding officer to the Gold Democrats, not because that officer was important or might be influential in defeating the ultimate purpose of the majority of the Convention, but his selection would have had a moral influence in the country at large and would have indicated a willingness to yield and compromise on the issue. The Convention, it was held, must be in the hands of the undoubted friends of the cause.

After the temporary chairman is selected he addresses the Convention in a formal speech on public measures and on the political situation. Following his speech other prominent men are likely to be called out for brief speeches. These calls are informal and are not a part of the regular order of procedure. The chairman then announces that until a permanent organization is effected the Convention will be governed by the rules of the preceding Convention. After the speeches of the temporary chairman and others, some delegate may offer a resolution like the following:

"Resolved, That the roll-call of States and Territories be now called and that the chairman of each delegation announce the names of the persons selected to serve on the several committees as follows: Appointment of Committees.

"Permanent Organization.

"Rules and Order of Business.

"Credentials.

"Resolutions."

These committees, on a roll-call of States, are then named, not by the Chairman, but by the respective State delegations, one member from each State and Territory going on each committee. With the appointment of these committees the first session of the Convention is at an end.

During the recess of the Convention the committees are at work. The Committee on Credentials is hearing the evidence and pleas in the cases of contested seats, for this committee must report, at the next session if possible, as to what delegates are entitled to sit and vote in the Convention. Few conventions meet in which difficult contests do not come up for decision,—cases in which "politics" and sharp practice play important parts. The Committee on Resolutions has long and late sessions, perfecting the platform to be reported to the Convention. The Committee on Permanent Organization must report a list of permanent officers for the Convention, and the Committee on Rules a set of rules to guide the assembly. Recess of the Convention.

At the second session of the Convention the first business in regular order is the report of the Committee on Credentials. If this committee is not ready to report it will probably ask for leave to sit continuously until it completes its labors. The Convention cannot proceed with its business until it is decided who has a right to take part in its proceedings, and after the permanent organization is effected the Convention may Second Session.

have to adjourn from time to time to await the conclusion of the Credentials Committee. But the delay of this committee in reporting does not postpone the permanent organization. This may be effected under the presidency of the temporary chairman, with the understanding that those may vote on questions relating to permanent organization who hold the certificates of membership in the Convention issued by the Secretary of the National Committee. Whether some of these are subsequently displaced by the report of the Credentials Committee may be determined later, but it must, however, be before the more important business of the Convention is transacted. If it be found necessary to grant the Credentials Committee more time the temporary chairman calls for the report of the Committee on Permanent Organization. This committee reports the name of a permanent chairman, a corps of secretaries, and a list of vice-presidents, one from each State. If these nominations are accepted by the Convention the permanent chairman is escorted to the platform and, on taking the chair, he also makes a speech to the Convention, congratulating the party, urging harmony and wisdom in the party councils, reviewing and defining the issues, in brief, sounding a keynote for the approaching campaign. If, however, the Committee on Credentials be ready to report before the permanent organization is effected, the Convention proceeds to act upon the report to determine its own membership. The Convention usually accepts the majority report of its Committee on Credentials, but sometimes it substitutes a minority report instead.

Permanent Chairman.

Sometimes, as between contesting delegations from a State, the Convention decides to seat both delegations, giving each delegate a half-vote. When this was done by the Democratic Convention in Baltimore in 1848, admitting both the Barnburners and the Hunkers, allowing each faction to cast half the vote to

Contested Seats.

which the State was entitled, the Barnburners withdrew and the Hunkers also refused to take part in the proceedings.[1] In 1860, at Charleston, the "Hards" from New York, who had been elected by districts, were favorable to the Southern program; the "Softs," elected by the State Convention, were favorable to the Northern Democracy and to the candidacy of Senator Douglas. The Convention seated the "Softs" after a hard contest.

Platform.

Having been permanently organized and having fixed the membership of the Convention, the assembly then proceeds to consider the "platform" reported by the Committee on Resolutions. The platform is an address to the people, consisting sometimes of various "planks," or a series of resolutions, sometimes of an address without division into numbered sections, containing the principles and program of the party. It arraigns the opposing party for its errors, criticises it for its course, joins issue with it on prominent policies before the public, and gives promise as to what the party will do if it is elected to or retained in power. In the platform the managers usually try to conciliate every section of conflicting party opinion, and they frequently produce a document which treats with "prudent ambiguity" the questions on which there is division within the party. In 1856, the Democratic platform as to slavery in the Territories was ambiguous enough to hold together the Northern and Southern wings of the party; but in 1860, when men's convictions and purposes had become more pronounced and positive on that subject, no such platform could be made. The refusal to make a positive declaration on the subject caused a split in the party, and a positive declaration for either faction would also have caused a split. The same was true of the Democratic party on the money question in 1892 and 1896, and like

[1] Stanwood, p. 233.

conditions caused like results,—another schism. In 1892, the first paragraph in the "money" plank of the Democratic platform placated the Silver men, while the next paragraph reassured the Gold men. One part of the declaration was to do service in the West, the other in the East. But by 1896, when the money question had become the dominant controlling issue in the minds of an uncompromising majority of the party, it was not possible to reassert such an ambiguous and uncertain plank. When honest men with a strong purpose at heart are in control, the platform will not look both ways on a divisive issue.

Early Party Platforms.

The platform came along with the Convention system. The Democratic declarations of 1840 may be said to be the first that involved the three essential factors of a modern platform,—a statement of fundamental party principles, policies to be pursued under the pending circumstances, and pledges that these principles and policies will be carried out. Before this there were addresses adopted at public meetings, resolutions approved by ratification meetings, criticisms or defences of the Administration published by party leaders, which were generally accepted as the basis of party action; but these were not platforms in our modern sense. In a general way only, not in the modern party sense, as an expression adopted by elected representatives of the party, may the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 be called the platform upon which Jefferson and his party appealed to the country in opposition to the Federalist Administration of that day.

Two-Thirds Rule and Unit Rule.

The National Conventions of the two parties are very similar to one another. But there are a few differences that are important, differences which are regarded as "fundamental and as revealing the underlying tendencies and principles of the two parties. These differences may be summed up in

what are known as the two-thirds rule and the unit rule.[1]" The two-thirds rule provides that no candidate shall be declared nominated unless he shall have received two thirds of all the votes cast. This rule prevails only in the Democratic Convention. The two-thirds rule was adopted by the first Democratic Convention of 1832, a Convention called by the supporters of President Jackson for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the vice-presidency. It was used in 1836, but not in 1840, and it was revived in 1844 in order to defeat the nomination of Van Buren, and it has since been used by the Democratic party.

Connection between the Unit Rule and the Two-Thirds Rule.

There is a connection between the two-thirds rule and the unit rule. If the two-thirds rule be abrogated while the unit rule prevails, a few of the large States, though their delegations may be nearly evenly divided, may, by enforcing the unit rule, secure a majority of the Convention for a candidate whom only a minority of the delegates really favor. The two-thirds rule lessens the probability of this. These two rules have, therefore, been called "two parts of a single system, and that system the casting of State votes as a unit."[2]

Unit Rule.

The unit rule "is one which allows (but does not compel) the majority of a State delegation to cast the entire vote of a State." The whole vote of the State must be cast as the majority of the delegation decide. Like the two-thirds rule, this applies only in the Democratic Convention. The Republicans do not use it. It is a rule that has been made by the practice of the State delegations, and the National Democratic Conven-

[1] Carl Becker, "The Unit Rule in National Nominating Conventions," *American Historical Review*, Oct., 1899. See also Stanwood, "Election of 1844," and Niles, vol. lxvi., p. 211*ff.*, cited in Mr. Becker's article.

[2] Becker, *American Historical Review*, Oct., 1899. See also Dallinger, "Nominations for Elective Office in United States," *Harvard Historical Studies*, 1897.

tion has never seen fit to interfere with this method of casting the State ballot. The National Convention merely permits this manner of voting.

The rule approved by the Democratic Convention of 1860 asserted:

"That in any State which has not provided or directed by its State Convention how its vote may be given, the Convention will recognize the right of each delegate to cast his individual vote." If the States had instructed or requested the delegation to vote as a unit, the Convention ruled that it must do so, and the majority should decide. The authority of the State convention is recognized. The State delegation may decide to vote as a unit, but this may not be enforced by the Convention. But, if the State convention has so directed, the rule is enforced. "This recognizes the State convention as supreme; its instructions must be followed. If no instructions are given, the National Convention assumes authority and allows each individual delegate to cast his own vote."[1]

The Unit Rule Recognizes the Supremacy of the State Convention.

In 1872, it was decided that in voting for candidates for President and Vice-President "the chairman of each delegation shall rise in his place and name how the delegation votes, and his statement shall be considered the vote of such State." This left to the Convention no means of discovering whether a delegation which votes as a unit is doing so under State instruction, or whether the majority, in the absence of instruction, may not be forcing a unit vote through its control of the chairman. Until 1896, the statements of the chairman have been more or less arbitrarily received and all objections have been ruled out of order, and that, too, on all questions on which a State vote has been called for."[1]

There was resistance to the unit rule in 1884, in order to defeat Mr. Cleveland by preventing the whole vote of

[1] Becker.

New York from being cast for him. It was held that if "unit instructions were ever advisable it would be when they were made with reference to a specific policy or a particular candidate. It was the practice of broadly instructing delegations to vote as a unit *on all questions* as the majority dictated, which was especially objectionable." But to sustain the unit rule it was urged that it was the right of the State to say how its will should be expressed. "To deny the States this right is to strike a blow at their sovereignty. The Republican party may stand for centralized power, but the Democratic party should stand for the rights of the States."[1] The rule thus attacked out of hostility to Mr. Cleveland was sustained by a large vote in the Convention.

In 1896, the precedent was established of according a member of a State the right of challenging the vote as announced by the chairman of the delegation. The following from the proceedings of the Democratic Convention of 1896 will illustrate the latest practice in this rule. A vote was being taken on substituting the name of J. W. Daniel for that of David B. Hill for temporary chairman. This was the first issue joined between the Gold and Silver factions of the Convention. Iowa under the unit instruction from the State convention voted 26 yea. Mr. Stackhouse objected.

Present Proceedings under the Unit Rule.

The Chair: "The Secretary will call the roll of delegates from the State of Iowa."

Mr. Stone of Missouri: "I understand the Democrats of the State of Iowa adopted the unit rule, and I desire to know whether the majority of the delegation cannot cast the entire vote of the State?"

The Chair: "The Chair holds that the proposition as stated by the gentleman from Missouri is entirely correct. The Chair further holds that if a delegate from any given State challenges

[1] Becker, *American Historical Review*, October, 1899, p. 70.

the accuracy or integrity of the vote of a State as announced, then the list of delegates from that State shall be called for the purpose of verifying the vote as reported."

Meanwhile the polling of the Iowa delegation had resulted in a vote of 19 to 7 for substituting Mr. Daniel for Mr. Hill.

The Chair: "The Iowa delegation having been instructed to vote as a unit, the vote of that State will be recorded as 26 votes yea" for Mr. Daniel. Seven delegates who wished to vote for Hill were made to vote for Daniel.[1]

This seems to place the unit rule on the following footing: When the States are called to vote, the announcement of the chairman of a delegation is accepted as the correct vote of the delegation unless challenged by some member of it, in which case the delegation is polled in open convention. If the delegation is under unit instructions the vote of the State is then cast as a unit with the majority; if not, the vote stands as polled.[2]

The *unit rule* had no particular time for its origin. It is a growth in practice. Republican Conventions allow each individual delegate to cast his vote as he chooses. The Democratic custom as to the unit rule has never been introduced into the Republican Conventions. The attempt was made to do so in 1876, but it was not successful. The Pennsylvania State Convention instructed its fifty-eight delegates, "upon all questions to be brought before or arising in the Convention, to cast the vote as a unit as a majority of the delegation may dictate." The fifty-eight votes were cast for Hartranft of Pennsylvania for President; but two of the delegates desired to vote for Mr. Blaine, and on their appeal their votes were so recorded,

The Republican Convention Rejects the Unit Rule.

[1] Official Proceedings, 1896, cited in Mr. Becker's article—see preceding footnote.

[2] Becker.

the Chair deciding that it was the right of "any and every member equally to vote his sentiments in this Convention." The decision of the Chair was sustained by the Convention. Pennsylvania, and other State delegations which had been instructed to vote with the majority as a unit, divided in the voting. Another effort to introduce unit voting into the Republican Convention was made in 1880. This was done, not because the rule was desirable, but because its use would serve the purposes of certain political leaders. Senator Conkling of New York, Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania, and Senator Logan of Illinois were leading the wing of the Republican party that proposed to nominate General Grant for a third term. These leaders set themselves to give their candidate an undivided vote from these large States. The seventy-two votes from New York, fifty-eight from Pennsylvania, and forty-four from Illinois, making one hundred and seventy-four votes in all, would win great prestige to their cause. In addition to these States Arkansas, Alabama, and Texas were instructed to vote as a unit for General Grant. It was thought that such a nucleus would draw sufficient support from all other sources to win over the wavering ones who are always anxious to "get on the band-wagon" or "stand in" with the winner. There was grave danger, as politics goes, of this scheme's succeeding. Early State conventions were held in these large States and State instructions were given. Shrewd management and sharp practice were resorted to. In Illinois at the State convention the time-honored custom of allowing the delegation from each congressional district to name the delegate was abandoned, and a solid Grant delegation was appointed by a committee of the State convention under the control of the Grant leaders. Senator Cameron was Chairman of the National Committee. The bold plan was conceived by these leaders that,

Attempt to Renominate Grant by the Application of the Unit Rule.

when Mr. Cameron called the Convention to order, he was to present a name for temporary chairman. If this were a Grant man he was to rule that all delegations under State instructions to vote as a unit must abide by their instructions. But if the temporary chairman named by the Committee were an anti-Grant man (as was likely to be the case, since a majority of the National Committee were opposed to Grant), then some one was to move to substitute the name of a Grant man in his stead, and in the ballot on that motion Senator Cameron was to enforce the unit rule on all the instructed States. In this way the Grant forces would secure the temporary presiding officer, who would enforce the unit rule in more important motions in the election of the permanent presiding officer and finally, through the latter, in the balloting for President. But there was a revolt within the party and the issue over the unit rule was fought out in the National Committee before it had a chance to appear in the Convention. The anti-Grant men, who were in a majority in the Committee, in order to block the scheme of Cameron and the Grant leaders, offered in the Committee a resolution as expressing the sense of the Committee and as a recommendation to the Convention to govern the temporary presiding officer, that each delegate should vote his own sentiments even against any unit rule or other instructions passed by a State convention. This right, it was asserted, had been "conceded without dissent in 1860 and 1868, and after full debate confirmed by the Convention of 1876. It has thus become a part of the law of the Republican party, and until reversed by a Convention itself must remain a governing principle."[1] Senator Cameron, in the sessions of the Committee, with unprecedented boldness and a flagrant disregard of the rights of the majority, refused to entertain and put this motion to the Committee, and he declared all out of order who ap-

[1] *American Historical Review*, October, 1899, p. 78.

pealed from his decision. His opponents then proceeded to take steps to displace him from the chairmanship. Cameron then yielded. A compromise was arranged. The unit rule was not enforced in the temporary organization of the Convention and Senator Cameron was allowed to retain the chairmanship. The Convention adopted a rule reported by General Garfield, chairman of the Committee on Rules, providing that in case any delegate objects to the announcement made by the chairman of his delegation, "the president of the Convention shall direct the roll of members of such delegation to be called and the result recorded in accordance with the votes individually given." Individual voting was the result, and the instructed States, large and small, divided on the various ballots. The constant policy of the Republican party to allow each delegate to cast his vote as he pleases, not only as against unit voting, but even as against the instructions of his district convention, was again illustrated in 1888. The Indiana delegates, in both the State and district conventions, had been instructed to vote for General Harrison for President, but two of the delegates disregarded these instructions and cast their votes for General Gresham, without protest on the part of any. Neither the State nor the State delegation can enforce the unit rule against the uniform practice of the Convention. Thus we note the difference between the two *types of Convention*. The National Convention of the Democratic party has always allowed States to use the unit rule; the National Convention of the Republican party has never allowed them to use it.[1]

One Convention defers to the State as a final authority; it recognizes an authority higher than itself. The other overrules the authority of the State; it stands as a national body and does not recognize an authority higher than itself. This is the difference between States' rights and

[1] Becker, *American Historical Review*, Oct., 1899, p. 80.

Democratic Convention is Federal.

"I bid you consider long
Fellowes of New York, in t
vention of 1884, "before y
sovereign power of our State expresse
will of its delegates."

"I know," said Mr. Doolittle of Wi
Convention, "that in the Republican p
believes that Congress and the Federal Gc
power which is not expressly denied, and
hardly any rights left which the Federal C
to respect—they can adopt in their Conve
State does not control its own delegation i
tion. Not so in the Convention of the gre
We stand, Mr. President, for the rights o
"The principle which is involved in thi
Mr. Atkins of Kansas, in the Republican
"is whether the State of Pennsylvania sha
Convention; whether this Convention is
make its own laws. We are supreme. W
stand here representing the great Repul
United States, and neither Pennsylvania
any State can come in here and bind us dov
resolutions." [1]

It is said that the Republican party
district to

citizens of the nation. Two delegates are allotted to each district as a convenient geographical division of the country, but each delegate casts his own vote as he pleases, and district instructions cannot bind the two delegates to vote together nor can instructions bind them to vote contrary to their individual judgments. This makes them national representatives, not merely district delegates.[1] It will be noted by those acquainted with American history that these tendencies, toward centralization and decentralization respectively, are in harmony with the history and purposes of the two parties.

Instructions.

As to instructions in a Convention, a delegate will generally feel bound to vote according to the resolutions of the State or district convention appointing him. But he is not bound to do so. Repeatedly in the Republican Conventions delegates have disregarded instructions and have been sustained by the Convention in their right to do so. State and district conventions may instruct their delegates to support the candidacy of a "favorite son" of the State, and such instructions are usually observed, though not always. After the delegates have been chosen and instructed, something may come to light concerning the proposed nominee, or policy, which may make a violation of instructions desirable, if not necessary. Van Buren's letter in opposition to Texas annexation on April 27, 1844, caused a meeting in Virginia to change instructions; other delegates assumed that their constituents would not regard the instructions as binding; others resigned rather than carry out such instructions. Under such circumstances it may be the duty of delegates to disobey their instructions. In the same Democratic Convention of 1844 the delegates from New York were instructed for Van Buren who were not at

Party instructions in 1844.

[1] Case of Judge Field, Indiana, 1888; Proceedings of National Republican Convention.

heart for him. They voted for a two-thirds rule, which was sure to secure his defeat, and then nominally carried out their instructions by voting for Van Buren on the first ballot. You cannot bind men that have no heart for the cause, men that are untrustworthy and untrue, and it is useless to bind men that are. However, for disregarding his instructions, which, presumably, would be the voice of his constituents, the delegate should show good reasons. He would be condemned, perhaps politically ostracized, as for violating a trust, if he misrepresented and betrayed the people whom he stands for.

The Ironclad Pledge.

The ironclad pledge was applied to the members of the National Republican Convention in 1880 by a resolution which asserted that every member of the Convention was "in honor bound to support its nominee, whoever that nominee may be, and that no man should hold his seat here who is not ready so to agree." This was an attempt to bind the action of the delegates after the Convention, or to prevent men of independent minds from participating in the party action. Such a pledge will not bind the unscrupulous, and men of honor do not need it.

After the Convention has adopted rules and has determined its membership by accepting the report of its Committee on Credentials, and after it has adopted a platform, it proceeds to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President. Interest centres in the presidential nomination. So much is this true, except when a party President is to be renominated, that the vice-presidency receives but little consideration. Geographical considerations may influence the choice of the Vice-President, or the victorious wing of the party may confer the nomination on a leader of their defeated opponents as a means of soothing disappointments and conciliating and uniting all elements for the support of the presidential nominee. It often happens that entirely

The Vice-Presidency is but Little Considered.

unknown men are named for Vice-President.[1] Of course, this is a dangerous custom, for the Vice-President should be a man as well equipped for the first place as the one who heads the ticket.

In the contest for the presidential nomination certain classes of candidates are recognized. The "favorite" is one of the prominent, leading candidates, who has been before the public for some time, for whom great preliminary efforts have been made, who, as the first choice of a large number from all parts of the country, and the second choice of many others, has such support as to lead to the expectation that he may be nominated. The "favorite son" is a leader of prominence and influence in his State, who, however, has not been a figure of national prominence in politics. His support comes chiefly from his home State, not generally from the country at large. His State delegates are probably instructed for him and are working for his nomination. The hope of his nomination is based partly on his recognized fitness, partly on his geographical location, largely on the inability of the Convention to agree upon one of the "favorites," or on the probability that the "favorites" will kill one another off. The strife, the personal rivalries, the bitterness and rancor in the Convention are likely to arise among the "favorites"; the "favorite sons," or their managers, seek to avoid exciting personal antagonisms and animosities.

The "Favorite." The "Favorite Son."

The "dark horse" is the candidate who comes into the running after the Convention has pretty well spent its energies in attempting to choose between the "favorites" and the "favorite sons." The candidacy of the "dark horse" may have been thoroughly planned, the runner may be well groomed by astute managers before his name is mentioned in the Convention, or before he is seriously voted for there. The

The "Dark Horse."

[1] See the Author's *The American Republic and Its Government*, p. 137 *sqq.*

nomination of a "dark horse" is not likely to be the result of a spontaneous movement in the Convention, without pre-convention work or plan, though it may be so. A man who is recognized as a fit candidate, but who has not been in the fight for the nomination, whom the Convention and the country are not thinking of as the probable nominee, who has not been identified with either contending faction in the party, who is colorless and unobjectionable,—such a man is an eligible "dark horse." A "dark horse" may be mentioned as such publicly, but it is understood that he is not a candidate, and if there are managers who intend to bring in his name at the opportune time, any intention of a candidacy on his part will be likely to be denied. The struggle in the Convention is not only to nominate a man,—it is equally for the purpose of defeating a certain man, and it often occurs that the struggle resolves itself into "the field against the 'favorite.'" If an objectionable "favorite" cannot be defeated by another "favorite," as Grant could not be beaten by Blaine in the Republican Convention of 1880, the field might be united in opposition to the leading "favorite" by the candidacy of a "dark horse," as was done in the nomination of Garfield in that year.

Method of Voting in Convention.

The candidates' names are placed before the Convention on a roll-call of the States. A candidate from one State may have his name placed before the Convention by another State, and this may be seconded by several States in succession. The Convention votes by States, alphabetically, and if the vote as announced by the chairman of the delegation is challenged, the delegation is polled in open Convention.

The "Break."

When there are several candidates before the Convention and the supporters of the various candidates are determined and well organized, the balloting may continue for a number of days. When the weaker factions begin to change their votes for one of the

stronger candidates, the "break" comes. Instructions and pledges are assumed to have been fulfilled, and the delegates break away from candidates they have so far supported. Decisive balloting is likely to result. Delegates, as a rule, have a fondness for the "band-wagon," —that is, they wish to stand in favor with the successful candidate and his managers, and to be identified with the vanguard of victory. Consequently, at a "break" in the balloting, if a leading candidate seems destined to win there may be a rush of delegates to his support, and we have the "stampede."

"The defeat becomes a rout. Battalion after battalion goes over to the victors, while the vanquished, ashamed of their candidate, try to conceal themselves by throwing away their colors and joining in the cheers that acclaim the conqueror. To stampede a convention is the steadily contemplated aim of every manager who knows he cannot win on the first ballot. He enjoys it as the most dramatic form of victory, he values it because it evokes an enthusiasm whose echo reverberates all over the Union."[1]

The "Stampede."

Adjournment is the only means of resisting a stampede, and if that fails, the managers of the field against the favorite see that the battle is lost, and the successful candidate goes in with votes to spare and "with a hurricane of cheering." A motion is offered to make the nomination unanimous, and this is supported by the defeated factions with as much grace as possible, and all pledge loyalty and support to the chosen chieftain. The Convention, perhaps after recess, proceeds after the same fashion to nominate a candidate for Vice-President, and the work is done. After appointing the Convention chairman and a committee officially to inform the candidates of their nomination the Convention adjourns *sine die*.

Another piece of party work for the machine is the

[1] Bryce, vol. ii., p. 199.

nomination by the State Conventions of the respective party candidates for presidential electors. These nominations may be made either before or after the National Convention. One elector is nominated for each congressional district in the State and two for the State-at-large. It is not required that they be residents of the districts for which they are named. Electors are State officers, and they are usually nominated by the State convention, though a separate district convention, or the delegates from the district to the State convention, may choose the district elector.[1]

5. Nomination of Presidential Electors by State Conventions.

[1] For the character of the electors, the methods of their election, and their qualifications, see *The American Republic and Its Government* p. 116 *sqq.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

WHEN the Convention has adjourned *sine die*, it goes out of existence and the temporary part of the party machinery has done its work. The committee machinery, the permanent part of the organization, then proceeds to conduct the campaign. The "campaign" is the term applied to the party struggle for supremacy during the few months immediately preceding the presidential election in November. In a way, the campaign has been conducted with more or less energy during the whole of the preceding four years. The party in power has been making a record for itself by its administration, while the congressional committee — a member from each State — is almost constantly distributing campaign literature. This congressional material, sent out under the frank of the members of Congress, serves to keep the voters informed on the issues, and these speeches are often delivered in Congress for no other purpose than for popular distribution — for the voters in "Buncombe." But in the regular campaign, which generally occupies three months before the election, a great network of committees is set into operation. Besides the National Committee and its executive committee, which is known as the "campaign committee," there is a State committee in every State, a

The Campaign.

Congressional Campaign Literature.

The Network of Committees.

committee in every county, city, township, ward, and precinct. Each committee attends to its own bailiwick, but as they all wish to work in harmony and not at cross-purposes they must work under some general directing head. This is the executive committee of the National Committee, which has general charge of the campaign. This committee is made up after consultation with the candidates for President and Vice-President and with other interested and wise leaders of the party. At the head of this committee is the Chairman of the National Committee, who in politics has become an important national figure, like Senator Hanna of Ohio for the Republicans and Senator Jones of Arkansas for the Democrats. The Chairman is the campaign manager; he raises the party funds, or provides agencies for doing so, helps to direct the appointment of delegates, and makes certain party pledges, and if his party candidate be successful he may be, to an extent, the dispenser of party patronage. The national Chairman is likely to become a confidential adviser and a close counsellor with the President, especially on matters where party interests are involved. He is therefore likely to be much sought after by those who may be seeking appointments after the election; these look to him as the dispenser of party patronage. During the campaign he is made the target of opposition and abuse by his opponents, in press and speech, before the public. The national Chairman is the captain of the forces, the commander-in-chief, the head master of the machine, and he is expected to be a political manager of the first class, energetic and forceful, skilful and astute. To be the general head and director of the campaign, the Chairman must understand the political situation in all parts of the country, must be in close touch with popular feeling, and he must have a faculty for detail and a capacity for unlimited work. His executive committee—his lieutenants

The Executive Committee.

The Chairman of the National Committee.

or staff officers—are also astute politicians. These men are put in charge and made responsible for certain divisions of the work. The Secretary of the Committee, while he is subordinate in determining the policy of the committee, is one of the most effective factors in the campaign. The Chairman may visit different parts of the country, and may make campaign speeches; but the Secretary is the constant executive worker and director at headquarters, and no man in the country is more familiar with the details of actual campaign work than he. He is an able business manager, he occupies a position of first-rate importance, and he probably knows more of the actual forces in practical politics than any other man in the country.

The Secretary of the Committee.

The National Committee is composed of our national party rulers and its importance should be appreciated.

In 1848, the Democratic Convention at Baltimore "directed the appointment of a central committee of one member from each State to take general charge of the canvass and of the party's interests. This was the first National Committee ever organized."[1] At present the Committee of each party consists of fifty-one members,—one from each State and Territory and one from the District of Columbia. The Chairman and Secretary of the National Committee need not be members of the committee. The committeemen are appointed at the preceding National Convention, having been previously selected by the State delegations to that Convention. Just before nominating candidates in the National Convention the roll of the Convention is called by States for the nomination of committeemen from each State and Territory. As the roll is called, the chairman of each State or Territorial delegation arises in turn and names the committeeman from his State, the

Origin and Organization of the National Committee.

How the National Committee is Constituted.

[1] Stanwood's *History of the Presidency*, p. 232.

delegation, or a majority of it, having previously agreed upon a man. The term of office is four years, a member of the Committee, unless removed for cause, continuing to serve until the rising of the next National Convention.

In certain contingencies the State Convention or State Committee of the party may select the National Committeeman from that State, subject to the approval of the National Committee.

The Committee chooses its Chairman, who, as the official head of the party, is, as we have said, one of the most important political factors in the nation. It is not always that a National Committee Chairman stands so close to the President as Mr. Hanna did to Mr. McKinley, or that he so largely controls presidential patronage as did Mr. Hanna, but this tendency in party politics is noticeable. The Chairman of the defeated party is also deferred to as the representative and spokesman of his party; what he does, says, or is, the party is more or less held responsible for, and party policies are always submitted to his judgment. Altogether the party Committee and its Chairman are prominent, perhaps dominant, figures in national politics.[1]

Political Importance of the Chairman.

Although the Federal system and the doctrine of States' rights are recognized in these party organizations, especially by the Democratic party, yet the National Committees are given important central supervising powers. The Committee in the final resort must be the judge of its own membership. It is not likely to override the action of the State delegation or State convention, by refusing to seat a member selected by these agencies; yet the National Committee must have the power to protect the party from enemies within its councils, otherwise local conditions might

Powers of the National Committee.

[1] See "The New Powers of the National Committee," Rollo Ogden, *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1902.

cause men to be seated in the executive councils who were traitors to the platforms and candidates approved by the party. Cases arose in 1896 testing this. Certain members of the National Democratic Committee were betraying the interests of the party, not wishing to have the Bryan Democracy successful in the campaign. The National Committee declared their places vacant; the facts were placed before the Democratic authorities of the States involved and they were asked to name "loyal Democrats" to fill the vacancies. In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Mr. Cochrane and Mr. Harrity, who were out of sympathy with the purposes of the party in that campaign, were displaced by subsequent State conventions within their States. Mr. J. M. Guffey for Pennsylvania and Mr. George Fred Williams from Massachusetts were recommended by the State conventions to the National Committee. Before the National Committee Mr. Harrity contested the right and power of the State convention to remove him. A ballot was taken on this question and the National Committee upheld the right of the State convention to declare the membership on the National Committee for that State vacant, and to recommend a successor. In this case Mr. Guffey was seated.[1] This does not mean that the State convention or the State committee is recognized as having the right to fill any vacancy that may occur in the National Committee. The recommendation of the Pennsylvania Democrats was approved in this instance, and, except for good cause, all such recommendations are likely to be approved; but the National Committee reserves the final right of deciding in such cases,—of accepting or rejecting nominations.

It should be understood, of course, that there is no written constitution for the parties regulating these mat-

[1] Letter to the Author from C. A. Walsh, Secretary of the Democratic National Committee, March 3, 1900.

ters. Tradition, custom, precedent, are all-powerful in guiding the action of the party authorities. A century of politics has brought certain observances and political traditions. These are unwritten laws as firmly fixed as if they were a part of the Constitution. They exist by the consent of the governed.

Every experienced political manager knows that the first essential to the successful conduct of a campaign is *organization*. The next important essential, it has been said, is *organization*; a third, is *organization*. The organization must be thorough and complete. The National Committee, the State committees, the county committees, the township committees, and the appointed party agents and workers in the city precincts and wards, must all be in close articulation and co-operation with one another.

Importance of Organization.

For working purposes during the campaign the National Committee is subdivided. Its most important subdivisions are the executive committee and the finance committee. It has also:

Subdivisions of the National Committee.

(1) A Committee in charge of the Bureau of Speakers.

(2) A Committee in charge of Literary and Press Matters.

(3) A Committee in charge of Distribution of Public Documents.

Another party National Committee deserves notice in this connection. This is the Congressional Campaign Committee. This committee is independent of the National Committee and of the National Convention, though it always works in co-operation with these. It is appointed by the congressional caucus of the party,—the party members of Congress. While the National Committee and the local committees are attending to the business of carrying the States necessary to elect the President, the Congressional Committee gives its special attention to seeing that the party carry a majority

Congressional Committee.

of the next Congress; that particular attention is given to certain doubtful districts, and that money and speakers are sent to the strategic points. This committee is an adjunct to the regular party organization.

In connection with the National, State, and congressional committees notice should be taken of the many local committees, all of which go to make up the permanent part of the party organization. There are the congressional district committee and the county central committee. There is no uniform system for constituting these committees throughout the States, but the congressional district committee may be composed of the chairmen of the county central committees of the several counties within the district, and the chairmen of the district committees may in their turn be *ex-officio* members of the State central committees. When two or more counties are joined together for the purpose of electing a State Senator or Representative to the State legislature, there may be a joint committee for these counties. The respective county chairmen may serve as such a committee. In some States there may be committees, or committeemen, for each township, school district, ward, or voting precinct. Party agents, or committeemen, in the smaller districts report to and cooperate with committees acting for larger areas. Within the State central committee, as in the National Committee, a smaller executive committee wields most of the power and does most of the actual work during a party campaign. These committees have charge of the party business. They are expected to raise money, employ speakers, distribute literature, call caucuses and meetings of party workers, organize and direct public meetings, see that their party voters are instructed as to their legal resident requirements, look after the naturalization of immigrants and the registration of voters, call the regular local nominating conventions, or primary

Local Party Committees.

Committee Work.

elections, and arrange for these; keep in correspondence with and carry out the instructions of the superior committees; arrange for the election by appointing their party representatives as clerks and judges of elections; and to attend to whatever else may arise in the conduct of the campaign.

All this indicates the extent and completeness of the party organization. The organization is so complete and certain that the National Committee and its bureau of information may be in direct touch and communication with any city ward, or with any rural district of the remotest township in any county of any State in the Union.

The part played by the candidate in the campaign is important. His letter of acceptance and his speech made in response to the official notification of his nomination may be the opening notes of the campaign. The notification speech has been made in late years the occasion of a great party rally and demonstration. The formal letter will follow some weeks after the speech at notification. These two contributions of the candidate are important party documents for the campaign. In his letter he formally accepts the nomination, endorses the principles of the platform, and endeavors to put his party's position in as strong a light as possible before the voters. The candidate seldom ventures to dissent from the party platform; but he may, in his speech or letter, emphasize one of the issues and endeavor to make it "paramount" in his candidacy; and by his record and opinions on public questions he may, in a measure, be something more or less than his party. Mr. Cleveland, unlike his party platform in 1892, represented no uncertain position on the silver question, while Mr. Bryan was in thorough accord with his platform in 1896. In a measure, Mr. Cleveland, in his candidacy and in his letter of acceptance, virtually modified the platform of his

The Candidate in the Campaign. Letter of Acceptance and Notification Speech.

party. This practice would tend to reduce the importance of the platform and to give the candidate's personal record and his letter of acceptance an equal or greater weight with the voters in their judgment of the party's intentions. The platform—the official creed of the party—has come to be looked upon as a mere play at politics, as a declaration "to get in on, not to stand on."[1] Normally the country should expect the candidate and the platform to be in harmony, but they are not always so. Sometimes, when a candidate is "stronger than his party," he may force a declaration in harmony with his views from convention managers who would otherwise dodge or straddle. Douglas declared that he would refuse a nomination on a platform acquiescing in Southern demands on slavery in 1860, and Mr. Bryan's views determined his party platform in 1896. In 1852, the Whigs endorsed the Fugitive Slave Law and at the same time nominated a military hero thought to be acceptable to anti-slavery Whigs. Some of the Northern Whigs said that they "would vote for the candidate but spit on the platform." The candidate and the platform should not leave the voter "in a strait betwixt two," but in case he is so left, the voter will be inclined to accept the candidate and disregard the platform. The voters will be fooled who trust to platforms and not to men. However, no worthy candidate will seek to get in on a platform intended to mislead and deceive.

All this thorough organization and the vast amount of work the committees do will indicate what is involved in a campaign of education. It may not all be education in the right direction, but it involves reaching by some influence the heart and will of the whole nation. The campaign is a vast school of instruction, and people heed instruction from platform and press

Campaign of Education.

[1] See Ford's *Rise of American Politics*, chap. xvi., and Bradford's *Popular Government*, chapter on "The Spirit of Party," p. 507.

who take but little interest in public discussion at other times. It would not be difficult to show that the benefits of such a campaign outweigh its evils.

The aims of this permanent working organization have been named as follows[1]:

1. *Union.*—The organization strives to keep the party together to prevent schism and dissension. The organizing managers, therefore, will strive to suppress discussion within the party on a divisive question, to urge the duty of party loyalty, and to hold in line the traditional supporters of the party. The National Committee, through its agents, often intervenes within a State to allay strife and dissension; and the State committees may bring similar party pressure to bear within a county where factions are rending the party and endangering success. And many party voters who have protested vigorously, during the early months of the campaign, that they "would never, no, never," support the party again under the course it is pursuing, have been "whipped into line" by the various tactics of the campaign managers.

2. *Recruiting.*—To bring in new voters, to look after the immigrants, the first voters, and the newcomers in a community. It is expected that the party attitude of every voter in every precinct shall be reported to general headquarters.

3. *Enthusiasm.*—To quicken the indifferent, to combat general apathy, to arouse the voters to sympathy and action. Sometimes the managers pursue the policy of a "still hunt," or conduct a "gum-shoe" campaign. That is, they quietly and privately interview as many voters as possible personally, distributing party speeches and influencing the voters by quiet tactics. Voting precincts are generally so subdivided that there will be a limited number of voters to a precinct, not to exceed, say, two hundred and fifty. The party faith and

The "Still Hunt."

[1] Bryce, *American Commonwealth.*

loyalty of the majority of these will be well known. They need no attention from the party workers. From their ranks the party workers are drawn. Probably thirty or forty voters of the precinct are to be worked upon. Some can be bought; some need literature, or persuasion, or a friendly interview with the right man. If there are "floaters" they are probably "divided into blocks of five," and each block placed in charge of some "trusty man." The party committeeman from the precinct secures a private meeting of eight or ten reliable party workers, the doubtful voters are canvassed, and each party worker is given a list of names of four or five voters, and he is made responsible for bringing every available effective influence upon his men to see that they vote right. Of course, all this is done without any suggestion of it to the community. This kind of party work is carried on in any kind of campaign whether it be a "still-hunt" campaign or one of excitement and noise. The party managers know that the quiet, personal work is the most effective. The "still-hunt" policy is apt to be pursued in a community by the party in the minority with the design of preventing the party lines from being closely drawn, or party passions and prejudices being greatly aroused and inflamed. By this method voters of the majority party in the community are induced to vote for candidates of the minority party for local offices, and it is hoped that many indifferent voters of the majority will not be sufficiently aroused to go to the polls to vote.

The "Hurrah" Campaign.

On the other hand, the other method of campaign, called the "whoopla" or "hurrah" campaign, has for its purpose the arousing of the rank and file from their indifference and lethargy, the stirring of their party spirit, and the drawing of party lines. The managers seek to arouse the party enthusiasm by means of meetings, speeches, bands, parades, rallies, barbecues, and grand demonstrations, all designed to excite the voter

to shout with party loyalty and to vote with his party crowd.

4. *Instruction.*—This is a fourth aim of the party organization. Voters must be instructed in the knowledge of the political issues; they must be given information about their leaders, and about the wrongs of their opponents.

All of these things require a vast amount of campaign work. The various sub-committees appointed by the National Executive Committee all have their allotted work.

The Committee in charge of the bureau of speakers will appoint men to speak in different parts of the country, usually directing men of national reputation to speak in those States which are considered most doubtful.

The committee in charge of literary and press matter and the committee on distribution and documents determine upon the character of the documents that are to be distributed among the voters. The preparation of party literature is carried on throughout the campaign. Thousands of leaflets, pamphlets, and documents are compiled, setting forth facts, figures, and arguments for the party. A "Campaign Text-Book" is distributed, an arsenal of facts and arguments especially for the use of party speakers,—the "spell-binders," as they are called in the campaign slang. This literature is not mailed directly to individuals from the literary bureau, though it may be had on application, but it is shipped in bulk by the carloads, to the chairmen of the State and local committees, who attend to its distribution among those with whom it will do the most good. In 1896, the cost of this part of the work for one of the parties was estimated at over $700,000, while in 1900 it reached the million-dollar mark.

Campaign Literature.

In addition to public speaking and the dissemination of documents, the party committees have come in later years

to make a larger use of the party press, by the insertion of news articles and editorials in the weekly and daily papers of the country. This is the most effective form of campaigning, and the machinery for it is elaborate and ingenious. Good campaign articles are made up for the newspapers. Stereotyped matter is sent to thousands of papers, "patent insides" are furnished to the country press, while to metropolitan papers proof-slips are sent to be used at the editors' discretion.

"All loyal party papers, especially the papers seeking the party patronage and the local country printing, print this matter. Many country papers have no other political discussion than that furnished from political headquarters. Nearly one thousand papers print these furnished articles regularly. No matter what the subject of the article, the net result is the earnest exhortation to vote the party ticket. The press bureaus of the parties furnish Independent papers articles for a 'Daily Debate,' contributed by able advocates on either side. This demand on the party managers is new to politics and has made necessary an increase in the literary force. But both parties welcome this means of putting the party creed before the voters whose minds are not fully made up." [1] **The Party Press.**

In this instruction of voters by literature, sectional, race, and religious prejudices are always considered. Different matter will be sent to Colorado, Wyoming, and California than that sent to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston. There are special messages for negroes, for Germans, for the Irish, and the Scandinavians; and the religious papers are supplied with sermons turning on political questions. Cartoons and large placards are published and sent broadcast throughout the land.

[1] Willis J. Abbott, American *Review of Reviews*, Nov., 1900, "The Management of the Democratic Campaign."

Public speaking is an important means employed for instruction and enthusiasm. Before the campaign opens a complete list is made up of the best available party speakers. Many of these are paid salaries as well as their expenses. Among these are the ordinary "schoolhouse, or cart-tail spell-binder," as well as the great oratorical stars, the distinguished United States Senators, or the party candidates, like Mr. Bryan or Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900. In 1900, over six hundred party orators were managed from the Chicago headquarters of the Democratic party. The Committee managers must lay out the route for these speakers, avoid conflicts, and seek in every way to use the men where they will do the most good. Speakers to city audiences are sent forth in all languages. In the ten days immediately preceding the election of 1900 it is estimated that as many as seven thousand Republican speeches were made every week-day night. Accompanying these are parades and rallies, bands and barbecues, to arouse public excitement and party spirit. With all this "arousement" of the party forces, the shrewd managers provide for calling the tried and true party workers together for a conference, for a "heart to heart" talk. It is in these conferences that the smooth and unseen hand of the manager lays out campaign work for the "boys" that cannot well endure the light of day.

Campaign Speaking.

During all this campaign work the party chairman or manager must decide important party matters. He must review the reports from the field and decide what States may be considered as safe and what States need more effort and energy. The National Campaign Committee receives almost daily reports from the State committees. In every State local committees are at work so that not an inch of ground is left uncovered. Local committees report to the State committees, which in turn report to the campaign committee, so that the chairman, the com-

mander-in-chief, is kept constantly in touch with the conditions all over the country from week to week. In the doubtful States—the real fighting-ground—a systematic, virtually house-to-house canvass is made, so that in such a State as Indiana, for instance, every voter will have a chance to hear the party argument and feel the party influence, and the campaign committee may be able to tell within a very few thousand votes how the State will throw its more than six hundred thousand votes.

The detailed and laborious work of the campaign, and the thoroughness with which the network of committees operates, may be seen from a few items taken from the careful instructions sent out by a State committee of one of the parties. The party agents throughout the State were instructed as follows:

1. Ascertain the general condition of the organization.
2. Ascertain if a poll of the county has been secured.
3. If not, how soon will a poll be completed?
4. If partially completed, cause of failure to complete.
5. Ascertain the townships that have not been completed.
6. Ascertain if the chairman has visited the precinct committeeman and urged him to complete the work.
7. Ascertain if the poll is made by calling on each voter, or is written up from general knowledge of each voter's politics.
8. If the poll is made without calling on each voter and finding out how he will vote, how can they expect to have a reliable poll?
9. Ascertain if they are looking after voters classified as doubtful, and how.
10. Ascertain if they are looking after voters classified as "People's party" where they have heretofore acted and worked with us, and how they expect to reclaim them.
11. The chairman should furnish the name and address to the State committee of those who are now in line with the People's party, so they can be supplied with literature.

12. Ascertain how many party clubs have been organized. and urge the organization of clubs in each township at once,

13. Ascertain if the county committee furnishes their local paper to our party voters.

14. Ascertain if any other papers are furnished.

15. If not, urge the committee in our counties to subscribe and to furnish two hundred to five hundred copies of their local party papers to voters that are not taking the paper, also to subscribe for one hundred to two hundred party organs.

16. If a committee has secured a perfect poll, organized clubs in each township, supplied our party voters with newspapers, they will then be in a position to receive prompt attention from the committee.

17. Ascertain if there is any local trouble, the cause of the same, and what the State committee can do to harmonize the same.

18. Have the chairman make out lists of names and addresses of German Lutheran voters, and mail the same to the State committee.

Campaign Expenses.

The expenses of such a campaign are beyond calculation. No one knows save those connected with the National Committee how enormous are the expenditures required. The purely legitimate expenses are very large. The printing and distribution of one important speech has amounted to as much as $5000.[1] Senator Hanna estimated the Republican bill for printing alone in 1900 at $200,000. At headquarters, in New York and Chicago, occupying rooms that call for high rents, there are from forty to one hundred employees. When one thinks of the halls, special trains, bands and banners, printing bills, speakers' pay and expenses, and the "pools" contributed just before the election by party advocates and candidates (to say nothing of the candidates' personal expenses), it will be seen that what a campaign costs in money is indeed beyond estimate. It

[1] W. J. Abbott, *Review of Reviews.*

is safe to say that in a single State $250,000 would not cover the expenditure of one party, distributed through State and local committees.

Speaking of the closing days of an American presidential campaign an English writer says:

"I can never forget the last day of October, 1896, when, as the climax to a passionate campaign, New York closed up its stores and workshops, and threw its whole strength into a triumphant demonstration of faith. One hundred and twenty thousand men—merchants, lawyers, publishers, railroad potentates, the heads of every trade and profession—tramped between a million spectators over five miles of Broadway pavements to testify their belief in their party cause. In the line I was permitted to join were the chiefs of one of the largest publishing firms in the country, the editors of two famous journals, an ex-Cabinet Minister, and an author and artist of international fame — all bearing the Stars and Stripes, and decorated with horrifying 'gold bugs,' and fantastic badges, ribbons, and flowers of the same inspiring hue. Campaign of 1896.

"Of the many thousands who must have watched that procession without sympathizing with its purpose, not one ventured by so much as a jeer to interrupt its march. It summed up in itself all the characteristics, good and bad, of American electioneering; and outside the States I do not suppose that anything like it would be possible. In England, at any rate, it would be simply unimaginable. It might begin in a parade, but it would certainly end in a riot. One could not help wondering whether the result obtained was worth all the time, money, and effort spent in producing it. But Americans beyond question are without rivals in the art of directing campaigns, and one must be satisfied with thinking that they know quite well what they are about when they select 'booming' as their favorite weapon of offence."[1]

The single fateful day for which all this extensive organization exists and for which this expensive preparation

[1] Sydney Brooks on "English and American Elections," *Harper's Monthly*, August, 1900.

is made is "the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November" of the election year. From this point the election process is constitutional, under forms and requirements established by the Constitution and the law, rather than by party agencies. But the parties guard the proceedings at all stages.[1] The State supplies the ballot, but the party officials certify to the electoral candidates, making sure that all the names of the loyal party candidates are in place. In the actual conduct of the election the party organizations are the chief factors. The inspector of the election board will be a township trustee, or some other public officer appointed or elected by party influence and party process, and the judges and clerks are appointed by party committeemen or at the behest of party interests. The election boards are constituted, unfortunately, not for the purpose of guarding the public interests by seeing that there is an honest and fair election, but for the purpose of promoting and safeguarding party interests. The agents of the two large parties are there to keep one another in check. Third parties are not represented, though in some States they are allowed watchers at the count. Unless the election is unusually close the result of the balloting throughout the nation will be known on the morning following the election. A nation with an aggregate of more than fifteen million voters under the operation of party government will have chosen its chief Executive.

The Election.

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PART III

ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN PARTY POLITICS



CHAPTER XIV

OUR POLITICAL MORALITY

IN another volume, in discussing the "principles of the fathers," we had to do chiefly with the rights of the citizen.[1] In the present chapter we consider his duties. It is well to do as our fathers did, to "know our rights and dare maintain them." But duties are co-ordinate with rights. Men will not fight for their civic rights who have no sense of their civic duties. Rights cannot be maintained if duties are neglected. They go together, and in our political life of to-day it is essential that emphasis be laid upon our duties rather than upon our rights. When a man, for instance, looks upon voting as a "right" instead of a duty, he is apt to regard his vote as his property, to be used as something of his own, to do with as he chooses, without public responsibility. A man's vote is not his own; it is his country's,—a sovereign weapon entrusted to him, not merely for the protection of his own rights, but to be used for the defence of his country's interests. He is in duty bound to use it for the defence of the weak and for the protection of the highest public welfare. It is so with all his rights; they all involve corresponding duties to the state.

Political Duties and Political Rights.

In a democratic state political rights cannot be secure unless they have their foundations in the righteousness

[1] *The American Republic and Its Government*, chapter i.

of political life. In a republic under universal suffrage —under "government by the people,"—there are certain requirements essential and fundamental to the continued safety of the national life. If the people are to rule the state, they should understand the conditions on which alone this can be done.

Fundamental Conditions in Popular Government.

1. Intelligence.

1. The people must be intelligent. "If a people expect to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never can be," says Jefferson. Jefferson, "the founder of the University of Virginia," sought, for the American democracy that he gave his life to establish, an education as universal as the liberty which he held to be the heritage of all men. The people may be ignorant and depraved under a despotism where they have no power or responsibility, but a democratic state with universal suffrage must provide for universal education. "Popular government without popular education is but a prologue to a farce, or to a tragedy, or to both," says Madison. If the designs of the false leader and the pleas of the wily demagogue are to be recognized and exposed, it must be by educated intelligence. Every true citizen will, therefore, do all he can to promote the general intelligence of his community. It is for this reason that the state provides schools and colleges and universities. It must do so in its own defence, that its citizens, its sovereign rulers may be intelligent.

2. Political Virtue.

2. The people must be virtuous. Moral character is the foundation of the state. If the people's political rectitude and integrity are sapped and undermined, the foundation is gone. No government can live when the sources of its power have become corrupted. As long as the hearts of the people are right the nation is safe. But when the springs of our national life are poisoned, the inevitable result is decay and dissolution, and the outcome is the man on horseback with the

iron hand of despotism, or a plutocracy where the people cringe and fawn at the behest of those who have money, or places, or favors to bestow. "When virtue dies the man is dead." It is so with the nation.

It is not the abundance of material wealth, but the courage of the national conscience that, in the last resort, must be relied upon to save the national life. It is in moral character that the citizen becomes a shield of defence to the state. It is this that gives him devotion and sacrifice for war, courage in battle, insight and boldness in leadership, and the manly independence to enable him to withstand the wiles and seductions of the corruptionist.

3. The people must be *free*. They must not be restrained by power, they must not be too much bound by party; they must not be bought by favor. This involves free speech, free press, free assembly, free petition, a free ballot. Without these there can be no free thought,—and without freedom to think there can be no freedom in government.

3. Freedom.

> "This is true liberty, when free-born men,
> Having to advise the public, may speak free."

Every citizen will seek to preserve this liberty at all hazards. Liberty of speech and of the press may be abused, but we hold it safer to run the risk of this abuse, holding every man responsible for the effect of his words, rather than suffer the denial of freedom. The time was when great thinkers and leaders of the people could publish their thoughts only by the consent of the royal licenser. If the people are to be intelligent, if they are to understand questions of government and public policies, there must be free discussion; there must be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for "opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making." "Give me the liberty," says Milton, "to know, to utter, and to

argue freely according to conscience above all liberties." Milton, the defender for all time of free speech and free teaching, refers to his visit to the famous Galileo, grown old in the service of science, "a prisoner to the Inquisition for thinking in astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licenser thought," and as he contemplated the servile condition of thought and learning in other lands Milton made his immortal plea for a larger freedom:

Milton on Freedom of Thought and Freedom of Teaching.

"No man can teach with authority, which is the life of teaching, if what he teaches must exist only at the discretion of a licenser. It is a reproach to the people, undervaluing and vilifying the whole nation, for it treats them as if in such a weak and sick state of faith and discretion as to be able to take nothing down except through the pipe of a licenser. Nothing can then be written but flattery and fustian. . . . Liberty is the nurse of all great wits, that which rarefies and enlightens our spirits, like the influence of heaven; it enfranchises, enlarges, and lifts up our apprehensions degrees above ourselves. . . . Although all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, if Truth be in the field let us not misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings to make her victorious; give her but room, do not bind her when she sleeps, for then she speaks not true, but then rather she turns herself into all shapes except her own." [1]

This freedom in America is not now in danger from absolute monarchs and despots. But it may be threatened by materialism or commercialism, or party despotism, or the bribery of wealth. Social critics assert that the American plutocracy, representing the great combinations of wealth, now owns and controls the metropolitan press and dominates the public teaching of America; that this

[1] The *Areopagitica*.

tyrannous power has even ventured to lay its hand on our colleges and universities; that college and university and church gifts and endowments from rich men are only a kind of hush-money, and that the professor or minister whose salary is paid from these gifts is a kind of agent whose business is not the investigation and dissemination of truth, but the defence of vested interests and the prevention of social and political changes. To some this criticism will seem to describe present conditions and tendencies; to others it will seem unjust and altogether too dark and pessimistic. In any case all thoughtful men will agree that if liberty is not safe in these, its securest strongholds, the decay of the free institutions of America will be rapid and certain. Our schools and colleges and universities and legislative halls and editorial sanctums and pulpits and voting booths must resist every tyranny that would deny the freedom of thought and speech that has been bequeathed to us.

This freedom involves *economic freedom.* The people must be free from poverty and destitution. A man cannot be a good citizen, he cannot be free and independent and a strength to the state, without a livelihood, without a home, without some property or business or occupation or some interest to give him concern for the welfare and good order of the community.

Economic Freedom.

It is, therefore, the duty of the state to preserve an economic condition that will afford to every honest and willing laborer a fair and equitable living. The man who is always on the ragged edge of subsistence, who is always living from hand to mouth, and who, when hard times come, falls into helplessness and pauperism,—such a man is apt to make a very poor citizen. You cannot appeal with much assurance to the patriotism and public spirit of a man who does not know where his next day's living is to come from, or whether his wife and children are to have a shelter over their heads the coming winter.

Wealth may accumulate without much harm, provided a reasonable amount of it remains with the honest working folk. But if by its concentration the people are impoverished, the state will decay. Every honest and self-respecting citizen should have an opportunity for self-support, and any industrial or economic condition that prevents this is a menace of civil and political disaster. The voter who wishes "the glorious privilege of being independent" must have an honest living. For "an adequate livelihood is the one sure foundation of that honest independence which is not only one of the greatest of virtues, but the fruitful mother of virtues,—of courage, tenacity, endurance, self-reliance, thrift, cheerfulness, hope."[1] The man who by honest work maintains himself and those dependent upon him in an adequate livelihood has realized no small part of the substance of citizenship.

Economic Independence.

This economic livelihood involves economic independence. The laborer supporting himself by his daily wage must be as free to follow his own judgment and conviction as his rich employer. The citizen cannot be free if he is dependent on another for "the privilege of earning a living." The Duke of Newcastle, in England, less than a century ago, turned five hundred of his tenants out of the houses and lands they occupied because they refused to vote as he directed. He justified his conduct by his right to do what he would with his own. But our political ethics to-day and our common sense of justice repudiate such a right. If a landlord or proprietor or capitalist or manufacturer should attempt such coercion now, he would at least find it necessary to conceal his action. Public sentiment would righteously denounce him. Such a man would be marked as a mean tyrant, and he would be condemned by his fellows. Every influence and protection should be used to fortify

[1] Maccunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 75. The student of political ethics should consult this thoughtful and valuable work.

the laborer in his right to follow his independent interests and convictions. Moral influence, compliance and deference of the ignorant to those who are better informed, voluntarily following trusted advisers and leaders,—all these are legitimate and are to be expected. But the laborer in humble station should suffer no penalty and receive no reward from his wealthier neighbor for his political conduct. The laborer's political opinions are not hired. To control the political conduct of another, whether by reward or punishment, comes under the general head of bribery or coercion. It is a denial of the citizen's independence and freedom. Personal independence is a vital and essential part of the freedom that must be preserved to the people.

4. The people must be patriotic. Patriotism is love of country. It is public spirit,—the spirit that leads one to devote himself to the service of the community. It does not involve seeking and holding public office, though one may be able to perform great patriotic services in office. It does not always involve going to war, merely to defend one's country against external enemies; though on the field of battle one may perform the last and highest act of patriotism,—he may pay "the last full measure" of the patriot's devotion. It does not involve merely devotion to one's Government. The Government may be utterly wrong, subverting by its policy the country's best interest, and it may be the patriot's duty to use his best endeavors to change his Government's policy, or even to subvert the Government itself and thus secure for his country an opportunity to pursue its highest welfare. Tolstoy in Russia may be a better patriot than the Czar; Pitt and Burke and Barré and Charles James Fox were better patriots than George III., though by their bold speech, in opposition to their Government, they gave moral aid and comfort to the American Revolution in arms.

4. Patriotism.

Patriotism requires not only physical courage that will lead one to fight and, if need be, to die in the service of one's country, but the higher, nobler moral courage that will lead him, if need be, to oppose his country's Government in a wrongful and immoral course. It has been said of Charles James Fox that whenever he differed from the policy of his Government, "he never appeared to have the smallest leaning or bias in favor of his country." [1] It is not necessary that the patriot should be so indifferent. He ought to have a leaning in favor of his own country, at least until the peaceful federation of the nations, when it may be said that his "country is the world, his countrymen are all mankind." But as he may love his family more than himself, his village more than his neighborhood, his State more than his village, his country more than his State,—as a higher love may demand his allegiance against a lower,—so he may love God and all mankind more than his country. It is a noble love that leads one to die for his country, not that his country may be saved from bodily harm or to promote its material aggrandizement, but to save the nation as a noble organ of service for God and humanity. Loyalty to country may not override this higher loyalty. As the patriot must love God supremely, he will acknowledge the supreme law of love and righteousness, and he will, therefore, stand out stoutly and to the end against his country's pursuing a wrongful and unjust course. We are sometimes taught that if our country does good we should defend and protect her; if she does evil we should still defend and protect her, while striving to have the wrong made right. At all hazards the patriot will strive to have the wrong made right; for the truest defence a citizen can offer his country is to prevent her pursuit of an unrighteous course. It is not material prosperity, nor physical strength, nor wealth, nor arms, but righteousness that exalts a nation.

[1] Lecky, *American Revolution*, p. 332.

It is such patriotism that will lead us to cultivate peace, justice, brotherhood, and international fairness. Such patriotism will demand honesty in the public service; it will denounce as traitorous the man who cheats the nation or robs the public treasury; or who by trickery and bribery and knavery secures legislation for selfish ends against the public interest; or the able-bodied "old soldier" who secures a pension by perjury and accepts pay many times over for services once rendered, and which, it was supposed, he had unselfishly offered to the call of his country. The man who, as a judge or an executive, takes an oath to execute just laws, then betrays his trust and his country by going into alliance with criminals from whom he takes bribes for immunity, is a *traitor*. There is no higher form of treason than this, and the man who does it deserves to take his place in public estimation with men like Benedict Arnold, who are willing to sell their country for gold.

Patriotism was once denounced as the "last refuge of a scoundrel." No doubt it is used by unscrupulous men as a cloak for evil practices and designs. The men who do these things cannot be patriots, no matter how much they profess to honor the flag or how conspicuous they may be on the memorial holidays of the nation. Patriotism loves righteousness and hates iniquity; it bears burdens; it does not seek special favors; it casts out fear and selfishness, and seeks the welfare of all,—that public welfare which is the highest law.

The primary and fundamental habits of civic patriotism have been summarized as follows[1]:

"1. To strive to know what is best for one's country as a whole. The patriot will not be content to be ignorant of his country's welfare. He will seek to know something of the institutions of his country and their workings; of the needs of the

[1] Mr. Bryce, in *Forum*, vol. xv.

community and its management; of the laws and their requirements; of public officers and their duties; of the history of his country and its great men and of the principles and services for which they have stood.

"2. To place one's country's interest, when one knows it, above party, or class, or sectional, or selfish interest.

"3. To be willing to take trouble, personal and even tedious pains, for the well governing of one's country. Whatever the community to which one belongs, be it township, village, city, state, or nation, patriotism involves the willingness of service and sacrifice for the common good."

Patriotism does not stop with obedience to the laws and the payment of taxes. It is no evidence of a man's patriotic citizenship that he keeps out of jail and out of the police courts. Patriotism is not passive,—a mere abstaining from evil. It is not merely an abstract definition, or a feeling. It requires expression, not merely in words, but in action, in deeds. A man's patriotism is shown by his life, not only in private, as "the just man who lives honestly, injures none, and gives every man his due," but also in his relation to his public duties,—in speech, in vote, in his political activity. The patriot is "the one who serves." He may serve the community in attending political conventions and caucuses and using his wits and manly courage in detecting, exposing, and defeating evil designs calculated to injure the state.

"No class of disputes needs more a judgment undisturbed by passion than international ones. Large numbers of people think it unpatriotic to decide, or at least to say, that their own country is wrong in a dispute with another. Patriotism has nothing to do with that matter; it is consistent with either view. *Patriotism* is a virtue which leads a man to sacrifice himself for the good of his country. It is *not patriotism* to flatter one's own countrymen, or to assure them that they are right in what they are doing. That is merely swimming with

the stream, one of the most alluring forms of indolence. A man is not a patriot because he desires that the community to which he belongs shall be aggrandized at the expense of other communities to which he does not belong. To desire the success of a cause because it is his own, and not because it is right, is a form of selfishness in man. 'My country right or wrong' is no more patriotic than 'Myself right or wrong' is noble and unselfish. The maxim is essentially selfish and would make any settlement between nations impossible, except by war. The *man who will take pains to find where lies the right and wrong*, or, it may be, the wise or the unwise course; the man who, being convinced that the existing rulers of his country are wrong or unwise, has the courage to stand up and say so, who confronts rulers, and penalties, legal or social, and frowns and sneers and howling multitudes;—that man is the *patriot*, is he who sacrifices himself for his country's good."[1]

5. In addition to intelligence, virtue, freedom, and patriotism, and in order to maintain these, a people must have *religion*. Not an established church, nor a religion imposed and sustained by law; but a free Church in a free State, with religion and the essentials of religious unity in the hearts of the people. Religion is defined as "the life of God in the soul of man." The life of God must be in the soul of the nation. The nation has a soul; it is not only material, it is spiritual. The foundations of its morality and virtue, and therefore of its spiritual life, are in its religion. Morality and religion are inseparable forces. It is in the immovable foundations of morality and religion that a nation finds its oneness, its permanence, its common life. There has been no greater saving force in the life of the American nation than pure religion,—faith in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, sympathy for the poor, and unspottedness

5. Religion.

[1] Lord Hobhouse, New York *Independent*, Aug. 26, 1900. See also an article on "Patriotism" by Professor Goldwin Smith in the *Independent*, July 3, 1902, and an oration of George William Curtis. *Orations and Addresses*, vol. i.

from the world, justice and integrity with their foundations laid in eternal and immutable laws. Its influence has tended to give the people unity of moral ideals; to prevent social separateness and class strife; to promote brotherhood and equality of opportunities; to bring the capitalist and the laborer, the rich and the poor, into mutual helpfulness and sympathy; to prevent anarchy and the lawlessness of mobs; to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, and insure the blessings of liberty" to ourselves and our posterity.

Government began in America "In the name of God, Amen!" Such was the immortal beginning of the compact on the *Mayflower*. In Virginia, also, it was recognized by its earliest charters that those who were to inhabit its precincts were "to determine to live together in the Fear and Worship of Almighty God." And in the first written constitution of America, being also the first in the history of the world, it was expressly recognized that "to mayntayne the peace and union of a people there should be an orderly and decent government established according to God."[1] "Unless the Lord build the house they labor in vain who build it," were the words of Holy Writ, quoted by Dr. Franklin in the great convention that made our Constitution in 1787, as he suggested divine guidance in the deliberations of the convention.

If the religious life of a people decays, if the religious motives no longer restrain the passions, desires, and ambitions of a nation, the people sink into materialism and selfishness, incapable of service or of sacrifice or devotion. A State will arise where the law prevails that "Might makes right."

It is well said that of all forms of government democracy is most dependent on religion. What will do more than the religious spirit to promote the sense of personal

[1] Fundamental Orders of Connecticut.

responsibility in the exercise of political rights? To vote in the fear of God is a fine restraint. If a man is to resist the tyranny of the king, or the tyranny of wealth, or the tyranny of the majority, he must *believe*,—he must believe that his conduct will be counted unto him for righteousness and that "there is a *Power to which he can ally himself and be invincible*" [1]; that his duties, if not his rights, are divinely appointed; that God reigns; that right will prevail; that by justice a nation shall flourish, and that by injustice will it faint and fail.

It is this faith that will help the people to see that they cannot separate their politics from their ethics, nor their ethics from their religion; that man's life is one and indivisible; that from this oneness of the divine life in man springs the moral law, a law that applies alike to a man's business, to his religion, and to his politics. To reveal that law and to teach men to live by it is one of the functions of religion and of the religious teacher and prophet; and by nothing is the decay of a nation's life more surely wrought than by the decay and corruption of its religion and by the worldliness and apostasy of its religious teachers.

These fundamental moral qualities in a democratic state will produce in the people a *love of order* and a *reverence for law*.

Political Morality Involves Love of Order,

Law and order are essential parts of true constitutional freedom. The will of the people, like the will of the king, has no right to resist or to be set above the law. *Government by law* is paramount to every interest, for upon this all other interests depend. There can be no freedom without it. The long struggle of our fathers for constitutional liberty has been a struggle to secure government by laws rather than government by men. The voice of the people *right* is the voice of God, not otherwise. Intelligence, virtue,

[1] Maccunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 84.

patriotism, love of liberty, religion, are the moral bulwarks for the state because they all unite to restrain the people from lawlessness and anarchy and the violence of mobs. To any great and fundamental change in law and government the people must proceed by the processes and under the restraints of constitutional order and law. It is when government by law is endangered that the rights and liberties of the people are most seriously threatened. To undermine the defences of law is to lead inevitably to the despotism of the military dictator or to the despotism of anarchy and the mob,—the most abhorrent to freemen of all forms of social disease. Sometimes in the irrepressible struggle for liberty the people have had to defend or recover their rights by arms against the violence and lawlessness of the governing classes, and no doubt the people have many times suffered wrong under the restrictions of conventional law. But in a free and intelligent state, rights are to be won and great changes made, not by bloodshed and revolution, but by means of public discussion and the processes of public law.

And Changes in the State by Process of Law.

This reverence for law will cultivate in the majority a righteous respect for the rights of the minority; it will make life and all just rights of property more sacred; and in times of social progress and change it will make the people radical only when they are sure they are right and wisely conservative from fear of injustice and wrong.

And Respect for the Rights of the Minority.

The same qualities will bring *leadership* to the people. Without safe leadership popular government is impossible. The masses cannot act except under direction. A multitude of counsellors may lead to safety, but without wise guidance the people fall. If the people cannot find capable leaders, of courage, of educated intelligence, of rectitude, and of unswerving devotion to the people's interests, they will be

Necessity of Leadership in a Democracy.

helpless before the classes that represent cunning and power and that would exploit and oppress the people for selfish ends. There is no form of government in which rectitude in leadership and office is more vital than in a democracy. The people may mean well and would do right, but they must have great thinkers for the solution of their problems and bold and devoted leaders for the execution of these solutions. Political agitators and demagogues often proclaim themselves for a popular cause and declaim on the people's wrongs, but as soon as they get power and place the rich and powerful classes buy them from their allegiance and induce them to betray their trust. Having climbed to power by popular support, they kick away the ladder by which they have ascended. Being betrayed by their leaders and made to feel that law is controlled by power or bought by wealth, the people lose faith in law and government. Thus are begotten distrust, suspicion, and the spirit of revolution and anarchy.

It is for this reason that the moral virtues in a democracy are so vital, and it is for this cause that schools, and colleges, and all the agencies of education exist, that young men may be trained for competent and faithful leadership in the state. The safety of the republic depends not upon forms of government nor upon the agencies and machinery of parties, but upon the constancy and faithfulness with which these great moral principles are exemplified in the political life and leadership of the people.

[1] See Lyman Abbott's *Rights of Man*, Maccunn's *Ethics of Citizenship*, "Nations and the Decalogue," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1900; "A Hidden Weakness in Our Democracy," and "Democracy and Education," by Vida D. Scudder, *Atlantic Monthly*, May and June, 1902.

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resides in a house or tenement that will rent for £10 a year, or who owns land worth £5 a year, or who is a mere tenant at will on land worth £12 a year. Residence in a district is not required for voting. A man may vote in every county where he holds land, except in the county where he votes because of his residence. Men who are neither householders, nor £10 tenants, nor owners of land, have no votes. More than 1,500,000 men are shut out by these property qualifications,—sons of families living at home, men living in cheap lodgings, and workmen living with employers. This is a very wide suffrage for England compared with the aristocratic conditions prevailing less than one hundred years ago, when Jeffersonian democracy was striking down all barriers to universal suffrage in America. Under these property qualifications the old English idea, or practice, is preserved of regarding political power as attaching to property, not to men.[1] Democratic America, though at first following this practice, has now definitely abandoned it; it has committed itself to the principle of manhood suffrage,—one man, one vote. Americans are more disposed to assert the rights of men; and the tendency of democracy is to look upon the suffrage as a personal right as well as a political privilege. Americans proclaim, in theory at least, that the privilege of voting pertains to the personality, not to the property, of men. Both by the theory and practice of democracy the privilege of voting has come to be regarded as a right of representation. Representation in America is the representation of persons. The right to representation, if such a right may be claimed at all, is the right of a member of the nation who is a *person*. The fundamental quality of the act of

Suffrage Qualifications in England.

Basis of the Suffrage in England and in America Compared.

[1] The property of women does not carry the privilege of the suffrage, a typical English inconsistency. Their laws are based on custom, not on general principles.

voting is *personality*, the capacity to exercise a free will in helping to determine the course of the government and the state'; that is, a *person* is one who has a free will,—one whose action is free and self-determined. Children, the dependent, the demented, the insane, the idiotic, the intoxicated, convicted criminals, are not allowed to vote, since they have not the will, the conscious self-determination and freedom of a person. Aliens are usually excluded, because voting is an act of membership in the State. Political power and allegiance go together. Unless the State may demand the one it is in no sense required to confer the other. However, in some of our States alien residents are allowed to vote. All these classes, together with the voters who are bribed and coerced in elections, are not free; their wills are subjected to the wills of others.

The Ethical Basis for Manhood Suffrage.

There is no other test for the suffrage so wide and fundamental. Intelligence and property qualifications must themselves rest upon this. Blackstone says:

"The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation *that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely, then every member of the community should have a vote.* This can hardly be expected of those in abject poverty, or of such as are under the immediate dominion of others; therefore all popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications whereby some who are suspected to have no will of their own are excluded from voting. . . . Only such are entirely excluded as have no will of their own."

It is upon this ground that we are justified in imposing an intelligence, if not an educational, qualification for the

[1] This argument is based on Mulford's *The Nation*, p. 211.

suffrage; for ignorance also goes very far toward depriving a man of an independent will and self-direction, and it seems unreasonable to allow ignorance equal political power with knowledge.

The ethical argument for a wide suffrage—as wide as personality and manhood—is that voting is involved in the right of self-government; that it promotes patriotism and leads to an interest in public affairs; that it tends to remove discontent and promote a feeling of partnership and responsibility; that civil and religious liberty depends upon power, and that the community or body of men who have no political power have no security for their political liberty; that the suffrage is an enlightening and an educational agency, and that only by active citizenship can the political virtues be developed.

"It is the old truth that one learns to do by doing. There is no other way. Here is seen the unreason of the contention, that no man is entitled to the enjoyment of political rights till he is proved fit to exercise them. It is an impossible requirement. Before he has political rights no man's fitness for them can be proved. There may be certain tests, educational or economic, which may be accepted as securities; but there is only one proof of fitness,—the experimental proof which shows how men use their rights after they have them." [1]

The advocates of democracy believe that the experiment has justified the assertion of the American principle, —the principle of equality at the ballot-box. While they recognize that the state must define the qualifications of the elector and lay down the conditions on which the electorate should be enlarged, yet they insist that this should be done, not arbitrarily nor by accident, but on the recognized democratic principle of *personal equality*.

"If every ordinary unskilled laborer," says John Stuart Mill, "ought to have one vote, a skilled laborer ought to have *two*;

[1] Maccunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 103.

a farmer, manufacturer, or trader should have three or four, lawyer, physician, surgeon, a clergyman, a literary man, artist, ought to have five or six."

This is a rational principle,—that political power shou conform to relative capacity or importance. But it is principle to which that of manhood suffrage is opposed, namely, that all freemen, with power of self-direction a control, shall be equally members of the State, with equal right to representation in the body determining t policy and conduct of the Government.[1]

A Free Ballot the "Right Preservative of All Rights."

The political privilege and power that are involved the ballot have come to the people through trial a struggle. A free ballot is wisely called "t right preservative of all rights." If this rig cannot be preserved all rights may be lost. deprive the voter of his free will by bribery intimidation is to rob him of the manhood on which right of suffrage depends and by which alone he c peacefully defend his rights of person and property. prevent the freedom of elections by bribery or force is strike at the very root of free popular government.

There is no more vital concern to American politic life than the preservation of a pure ballot. If the peop cannot be protected from venality, if elections are to determined by bribery and the use of money, there is possible way by which the people can defend their righ and interests against the designs of unscrupulous weal and power. To drive voters from the polls by bayone is to deprive freemen of their liberty; to buy voters

[1] In reference to suffrage for women, it is obvious that Americans are inconsistent in the application of their political principle as are the Engli in their political practice. Whether suffrage be based on property, perso or capacity, no rational ground appears for the exclusion of women property who wish to have their judgments count in controlling the co duct of the Government. This merely illustrates the common observati that Americans, like their English cousins, are governed not by theory, *a priori* principles, but by experience and custom.

the polls with money is no less a perversion of freedom. While popular elections are controlled by corruption, the people are only nominally free, as under such conditions their so-called freedom becomes merely the instrument of their own enslavement.

Herein is the great danger of a plutocracy. It sets itself to corrupt the morals in order to undermine the freedom of the people, that the government and the laws may be controlled by special and moneyed interests. Between anarchy on the one hand and a corrupt plutocracy maintaining its power by money and bribery on the other, there is but little to choose, and there is but a short distance between them. In England, before the reform of 1832, fifteen thousand persons elected a majority in the House of Commons. A wealthy few bought the seats, or owned them. This plutocracy of landholders dictated the laws. History tells of the degradation and suffering of the common people of England in that period.[1] It brought England to the verge of revolution. But this oppression by property occurred under the forms of law. If in America, in defiance of law, corrupt wealth, using place-seeking politicians as its tools, is to corrupt the voters and buy the laws, submission to such a Government will be, of course, a mere matter of expediency and not of duty. The laws that such a Government makes are not morally binding on the people. All respect for law and authority is destroyed, and the very foundations of society are undermined. If it be understood that the rich may buy the poor it will be believed that the poor may loot the rich, and this is anarchy.[2]

Plutocracy and a Free Ballot.

The extent of venal voting in some of the States and the remedies proposed present too large a theme for ade-

[1] See *The American Republic and Its Government*, p. 41.

[2] Unless the evil of vote-buying is checked by reform the result will be either restoration of free government through suffering and revolution, or

quate consideration here. In some places the evil is mo
alarming and is almost enough to discourage the adv
Extent of Venal Voting.
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close States, which, because of their being the special ba
tle-grounds of party managers, have been made t
victims of corrupt politics. The political corruption
large cities like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphi
and in States like Pennsylvania and Delaware, is prove
bial. Money controls the pivotal States, and the pivot
States control the election.

The *Australian system* of voting, by which the Sta
furnishes the official ballot and the voter is isolated in t
The Australian Ballot and Evasions of the Law.
privacy of a booth in which he may mark h
ballot freely, has done much good. But t
provisions of the Australian ballot law a
evaded. The "assistance clause" permits t
party workers in some States to go into the booth a
mark the ballots of illiterate and venal voters. Clerks
election perjure themselves, violate their oath, and wo
in collusion with the corrupted voter in employing d
vices for giving information to the bribers on the outsid
There are well-authenticated instances in which par
workers have marked in one case 112 and in another 1

the people will be overawed by the military arm, and a corrupt Gove
ment will seek to satisfy their demands by lavish expenditure and t
splendor of imperial power; as splendid monarchies have always thou
to conciliate the proletariat with bread and circuses, with pageantry a
parade, and with the charity of an occasional royal dinner to the poor.

ballots at one election. This enables the buyer to know that the vote is delivered as promised. It is reported that in one county in Pennsylvania the superintendent of a coal-mine marked the ballots of 320 of his Italian employees at a single election. The "assistance clause" should be abolished and every possible safeguard should be erected to protect the State against the corruption of the ballot. The vote-buyer commits a wrong not only against the individual whom he corrupts, but against every individual in the State. His rule is the will of the wicked, and under it the upright and the venal all suffer together. Every lover of his country, every friend and agency of good government, should be enlisted to resist the growth of this threatening evil.

REFERENCES

To readers and students who wish to look into the nature and extent of this evil the following references on the subject may be of use:

1. "Money in Politics," J. W. JENKS, *Century*, vol. xxii., p. 94, October, 1892.
2. "Bribery in Elections," *Nation*, vol. xliii., p. 386.
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5. "Reform of Present Political Corruption," A. T. RICE, *North American Review*, vol. cxlviii., p. 82.
6. "Money and Political Machines," J. B. BISHOP, *Nation*, vol. xliv., p. 222.
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CHAPTER XVI

RINGS AND BOSSES

MR. BRYCE has called attention to the condition and influences in America which have produced large political class, a class of men who give a large par of their time to party work and who make their livin from this work, or from the offices which the obtain through means of party service. H mentions the immense size of the country; the decen tralization of our politics; the frequency of elections, al fought on party lines; the lack of a wealthy leisured clas willing to give their time to party and public service; an he might have mentioned the great commercial oppor tunities and pecuniary rewards open to those who wis to wield political power for selfish ends. Elections i America are fought on party lines, from members o Congress to the constable in a township or to the cler of a village. Consequently a great deal of party work i necessary.

Professional Politicians.

" Lists of voters must be made, by a house to house canvass new voters must be enrolled; bills and posters must be printed meetings must be held, halls rented, runners and workers em ployed. One election is hardly over before another approaches and the result is that this election work requires the employ ment of a large class of men. There is a great deal of hard dull election and political work to be done. Nobody is abl

or willing to do it in addition to his regular business or profession. What motive is there to lead men to do all this work of organizing and electioneering? What inducement has the public to offer men for doing this public party work? There must be some inducement or men will not do the work. 'What is everybody's business is nobody's business.'"[1]

These conditions have produced a class of party managers called "politicians," who devote themselves to party service, sometimes from public spirit, but generally from love of intrigue and power, or from gainful motives.

The Politician and the Statesman.

A *politician* may be defined as one devoted to politics. Originally and rightfully, the politician is one versed or experienced in the science of government. In this sense, all citizens should seek to become politicians. In this sense *politician* is synonymous with *statesman*,—one who understands the principles and art of government, who gives thought and attention to public questions, one who is eminent for political ability, and who brings to public questions such foresight and wisdom and patriotism as will enable him to offer satisfactory solutions to these questions. Jefferson, Hamilton, Clay, Webster, Seward, and Lincoln, Chase, and Sumner were politicians in this sense. They were capable of guiding the nation in the solution of national problems. But at present the term *politician* has come to mean something quite different from this, and there generally attaches to the term, unfortunately, an element of reproach. A *politician* has come to mean one devoted not to the science and art of government, but to the success of a political party; a party worker who devotes himself to the art of making nominations and carrying elections; one who manages caucuses, committees, and conventions, by which the party business and the party machinery are carried on. It is because the people have consented to turn over their parties and their party government to this self-

[1] Bryce, Vol. II., p. 58.

constituted class of party managers that they have come under the control of rings and bosses.

Rings and Bosses.

A Ring is a set, or combination, of men who stand by one another, under the direction of a leader, in carrying out their common political projects. They support one another for nominations and public places or for other political rewards. A number of public places are at stake within every community every few years, and these afford salaries, public patronage, contracts, and other pecuniary opportunities. Office-holders, or those who are frequently running for office, or the class of professional politicians who live by politics, are apt to form a ring to support one another, to pass the offices around among themselves, and to perpetuate their power. Men may work with a ring from love of politics or because they think the course pursued is the best for the public, and sometimes what is denounced as the work of a ring is nothing more than reasonable and natural co-operation for public ends. There is much public opposition to, and jealousy of, combines and rings, as the people like their political processes to be open and aboveboard, without wire-pulling and political chicanery. It happens for this reason that men are oftentimes disposed to denounce whatever they are opposed to as "ring politics" in order to bring their opponents into disrepute. While in this way injustice may be done to some men who are constantly active in politics, yet the members of the professional ring are generally in politics for personal gain, and they are usually unscrupulous in their methods.

The leader of the ring is the *Boss*. A *Boss* in American politics is understood to be a professional politician who uses the machinery of a party for the advantage of a ring, or for private ends, and who is obeyed by a large body of followers. The Boss is the one who controls the professional forces. He cannot be said to be a political leader, though a political leader may sometimes descend

to the functions of a boss by controlling his followers, like sub-bosses or feudal underlings, by means of places and other indirect forms of bribery. A political *leader* is a statesman; he has opinions on public questions; he has political intelligence and a public purpose, and he seeks to instruct and direct public opinion on great public questions. The real leader is apt to be, though he is not always, a successful politician, one who resorts to the tactful art of political management, as Jefferson and Lincoln and most of the great popular leaders have done.[1] But the leader's purposes are public ones, and he appeals to the public reason for the support of opinions and policies, and his methods as a politician are but means to an end. If these methods are corrupt the leader is disconnected from them; the actual working of and personal contact with such methods are turned over to others. The statesman who stands for the suffrages of the people will not be identified with, and he usually has no disposition toward, outright political corruption. If a leader is suspected of responsibility for corrupt methods he is injured with the people. The corrupt boss, on the other hand, usually does not stand for popular election. If he seeks office it is by appointment or by indirect election,—by legislature or city council, through men whom he controls. Usually, however, the boss does not hold office, but controls the offices from the outside by back-stair influence, and without responsibility, though he occasionally decides to have himself elected to the United States Senate, or some other office of power and influence.

The Boss is Not a Political Leader.

The Boss is not concerned with opinions. He controls men by their interests. His ring, or combination, is formed to carry out personal ends without any regard to the interest of the public. He cares nothing about the

[1] Ex-Speaker Reed is reported to have said, with his usual wit and wisdom, "A statesman is a successful politician who is dead."

principles of his party; it is his business, and that of hi henchmen and heelers—the workers who carry out hi commands—to support the party, no matter for wha policy it declares, unless this should endanger local bos control. It is the Boss's business to carry th election and thus to get power and places. A all hazards he must prevent the incoming of ar honest administration that will apply the public offices fo public uses; and to avoid this the party Boss will support the boss of the opposite party against a reform movement giving promise of success. In such times of signal distress "there is no politics in politics" among Bosses. The Bosses of the opposing parties will come to an understanding and work together to save bossism and its perquisites. In 1901 the Democratic Boss in Philadelphia and his supporters, at the behest of the Republican boss, put out a separate Democratic ticket, without the least hope of its success, in order to defeat the threatened success of an independent movement. The Democratic Boss and his "heelers" no doubt found suitable compensation from the public-tax tills. It is not the party rascals of the opposite party that the zealous party boss wishes to turn out, unless he can turn his own rascals in. The city Boss of the corrupt type, pure and simple, considers his own interest first, then the interest of his kind, then of his party, and then (if ever) of the public. Those who support him have their reward,—the laborer gets his job; the placeman office; the policeman his promotion or his "divvy"[1]; the contractor a chance at the public works; the banker the use of the public money; the gambler and the criminal immunity from prosecution; the honest merchant certain sidewalk privi-

Co-operation of Opposing Bosses.

[1] City policemen are often allowed a share or dividend ("divvy") from the illegitimate collections levied under corrupt boss rule on gambling-places, saloons, houses of ill-repute,—sums that are filched from these places for immunity from prosecution and arrest.

leges; the rich corporations lowered assessments and immunity from equitable taxation. All buy these special favors by support of the Boss's power and policy, and all enjoy the blessings of the Boss's government,—high taxation, maladministration, stolen franchises, robbery of the public treasury, and criminal disorder in the community.

Is the Boss always a bad man? By no means, as the world judges men. He is generally a good fellow, hale and well-met, especially when seen at close range. He has many good qualities. He may be lacking in all sense of political integrity and may feel no responsibility for good government. But he at least displays that type of honor that is proverbial among brigands and bandits. A good boss will often buy the venal, while he himself will not sell: he will keep his word and will seldom betray his own. He is generous and benevolent, helpful and sympathetic. He is energetic and active, and he lives close to and knows the people whom he controls, and he controls them because of this fact. He does not preach at long range. He does not criticise or condemn or attempt to reform. He sees things as they are, accepts them as a *modus operandi*, and works the conditions for what they may be worth for his purposes.

Character and Processes of the Boss.

Miss Jane Addams, of Hull House, Chicago, tells "Why the Ward Boss Rules"[1]:

"If the Boss's friend gets drunk he takes care of him; if he is evicted for rent, arrested for crime, loses wife or child, the Boss stands by him and helps him out. The Boss secures jobs and places, or makes them by city contracts, bails his constituents out of jail, says a good word to the police, uses his 'pull' with the magistrate if they are liable to be fined, or fixes up matters with the State's attor-

"Why the Ward Boss Rules."

[1] See Miss Addams's remarkable article with the above title in the *Outlook* for April 2, 1898. I here condense the substance of a part of this article.

ney. The alderman of the 19th ward, Chicago, had twenty-six hundred people on the public payroll; all were under obligations to the Boss. The Italian laborer wants a job and he will naturally vote for the man who gets him one. The Boss gives presents at weddings and christenings; buys tickets wholesale for benefit entertainments; contributes to prizes for church bazaars, in ways that are apt to be known; provides a helping hand at funerals, furnishing carriages for the poor and a decent burial for the destitute when they are dead, keeping his account with the undertaker, and never allowing a county burial. All the friends and relatives and patrons of these occasions will become the friends of the Boss. The 19th ward alderman distributed six tons of turkeys, four or more tons of ducks and geese at Christmas, each handed out by himself with a 'Merry Christmas.' He is interested in the people."

The people cannot see or feel the demands of strict justice and morality. To waste precious time and energy and opportunity and money—to break an alabaster box of ointment,—in devotion and reverence to mere righteousness and justice and unselfish love,—this is sheer waste. The Boss does not waste his money in that way; he makes every opportunity count. He gives it to the poor. So it will be said of him: "He has a good heart; he is good to the widow and the fatherless; he does more for the poor man than the big guns who are always talking about civil service and reform."

Miss Addams continues, in substance:

"To ask where the money comes from which the Boss uses in this way would be sinister. He gets it from the rich, of course; and so long as he distributes it to the poor, what if he is the leader of the gang of 'gray wolves' in the city council, selling franchises and betraying the most important interests of the city? What if he does make deals with franchise-seeking companies, and guarantees for boodle to steer dubious measures through the council? What if he is, in short, a successful boodler? This is the way political business is run and

it is fortunate that a kind-hearted man so close to the people gets so large a share of the boodle. The people do not follow the moral logic to see that the money comes not from the rich companies or the pockets of its agents, but from higher taxes and lower wages, from the street-car fares of the laboring poor going to and from their work. They would rather pay two cents more each time they ride than give up the moral consciousness that they have a big, warm-hearted friend at court who will stand by them in every emergency. The sense of just dealing and public morality comes later in ethical development than the desire for protection and kindness. So the Boss rules because he is a good friend and neighbor.

"A reform league put up a candidate against a notoriously corrupt alderman. An attempt was made to rally the moral sentiment of the community for common honesty. Orators from the 'better element' came out from other parts of the city to speak. Suddenly it was announced from all sides that while the money and speakers for the reform candidate were coming from the *swells*, the money which was backing the corrupt candidate was also coming from a swell source: the President of a street-car company, for whom the boodler performed constant offices in the city council, was ready to back him to the extent of $50,000; this magnate was a good man and he sat in high places; he had recently given a large sum of money to a great educational institution, and had accordingly been appropriately honored on convocation day, and he was therefore as philanthropic, not to say as good and upright, as any man in town; our corrupt alderman, therefore, had the sanction of the highest authorities, and the reformers who were talking against corruption, the selling and buying of votes and franchises, were only cranks, and not the solid business men who had developed and built up the city.

Moral Responsibility for the Corrupt Boss.

"And thus we see by experience how all parts of the community are bound together in ethical development. If the so-called more enlightened members of the community accept public gifts from the man who buys up the council, and the so-called less enlightened accept individual gifts from the man

who sells out the council, we surely must take our punishment together." [1]

This is a striking revelation from one of our political and social prophets and teachers of the power and processes of the Boss. Political immorality is at the root of the evil, and it is a political immorality for which responsibility lies not at the door of the poor, but at the door of the rich. We may condemn the poor man who sells his vote for a dollar or for a job; but what shall we say of the rich corporation of respectable men which is seeking further enrichment and more special privileges by these processes of public rape and plunder? No punishment can be too severe for the intelligent, the rich, and the powerful who commit such political crimes. We have no right to honor such men, or elect them to office, or yield to their will, while their public bribery and pollution are undermining the very foundations of morality. The rich boodler is the chief source of the Boss's power; and it is his purchase of franchises and legislatures and judicial decisions that is the most dangerous form of anarchy in America to-day.

How is the power of the corrupt Boss to be destroyed? Many remedies have been suggested, which we can but briefly refer to.

Proposed Remedies for Boss Rule.

1. Political education. This must be constant and untiring, and there must be a common standard of political ethics for all classes. All classes must meet on common ground of justice and honorable dealing.

2. Nominate the delegates to our conventions, or our candidates for office, by means of a primary election. The Boss has his power because he can nominate to office or control legislation. It is claimed that if this power to nominate were brought within the power of all the people the Boss's power would be destroyed. [2]

[1] Miss Jane Addams, *Outlook*, April 2, 1898.

[2] See p. 283 *sqq.*

3. Civil Service Reform. As the power of the Boss is in the places and patronage he controls, it is claimed that genuine reform of the civil service, the substitution of business methods, or the merit system, for the spoils system would destroy the Boss's power.[1]

4. Independent voting. It is claimed that if men would not be such slaves to their party, the Boss would be undermined. As it is, the Boss can confidently rely upon ninety per cent. of the voters of his party servilely following his program and voting the ticket that he has arranged. If men would but bolt for independent candidates, relief from boss rule might be obtained.[2]

5. Divorce municipal from national politics. City elections should not be held nor city business conducted on the basis of national issues nor in view of the interest of political parties. If city politics could be divorced from national politics, so that the voters would be encouraged to vote for the best men regardless of party affiliation, the Boss would be deprived of an element of power. But it is very difficult in local activities to disregard the interests and claims of national organizations.

6. Arouse a wider interest and activity, a larger participation in politics. This is a part of education and a very important part. Some of the greatest evils in our political life—the evils of bossism among them—come from political apathy, from neglect of their political duties by so many good citizens.

The Boss is denounced as selfish and venal because he goes into politics for personal gain. But it is no more selfish to go into politics for personal gain than to stay out for personal gain. The man who goes about his business making money, and feathering his own nest, and thinking only of commercial gains, while he is content to leave "the dirty pool of politics" to the "unscrupulous and professional politi-

The Evil of Political Apathy.

[1] See p. 254 *sqq.* [2] See p. 295 *sqq.*

cians" is no more unselfish and patriotic than the man who goes into politics for what he can make out of it. Neither course is patriotic, but the chances are that the Boss is the more unselfish of the two. We do not need that more men should go into politics for private gain, but there is great need that more should go in for public ends. *How shall a larger proportion of citizens be induced to take an interest in politics from purely public motives?* This is the constant problem of the republic. Whatever tends to promote this larger disinterested participation in politics tends to produce good government and a higher public welfare. In a democracy politics are the concern of all citizens and they cannot neglect their civic duties with impunity. If they wish to preserve liberty and self-government and good government they must pay the price for these things. The price is eternal vigilance and constant political watchfulness and activity. They must *care*, for "ten men who care are worth more than a hundred who do not care,"[1] and the political power will be wielded by those who care for it most. The apathy of citizens under a republican government, seen in their failure to do their duty in the endeavor to place the Government in charge of men that are honest and true, is part and parcel of pernicious political life. It may be cheaper in dollars and cents, and personal pains, to let the Government be in the hands of the venal than to labor and suffer to keep it in the hands of the honest and upright. But it is just such ignorant and indifferent citizenship as will consent to leave venality unopposed that is responsible for bad politics and that leads to corrupt government.[2]

"When good men sit at home not knowing that there is anything to be done, nor caring to know; cultivating a feeling that politics are tiresome and dirty, and politicians vulgar bul-

[1] Bryce, vol. i., p. 262.

[2] See Coler's *Municipal Government*.

lies and bravoes; half persuaded that a republic is the contemptible rule of a mob, and secretly longing for a splendid and vigorous despotism,—then remember it is not a government mastered by ignorance, it is a government betrayed by intelligence; it is not the victory of the slums, it is the surrender of the schools; it is not that bad men are brave, but that good men are infidels and cowards." [1]

A writer who has struggled manfully against municipal corruption expresses the faith that when the people are led to see what benefits come to them from good government they will not willingly vote to put vicious and dishonest men in control. The "City Beautiful" with its good schools, public parks, improved streets, lower taxes, economy in the conduct of public business, an honorable enforcement of law and order, protection against injustice, and a fair chance in business,—these precious benefits are all sacrificed by indifference and apathy in politics. The benefits of good government should be made manifest to the people.[2]

[1] Geo. William Curtis, "The Public Duty of Educated Men," *Orations*, vol. i., p. 269.

[2] See Coler's *Municipal Government*.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SPOILS SYSTEM

ONE of the great agencies in building up and maintaining a corrupt system of boss government and machine politics is the spoils system.

There are three divisions in the public service of the United States: the civil, the military, and the naval. By the civil service is meant that which is neither military nor naval, and it comprises all the offices by which the civil administration of government is carried on. The struggle for civil-service reform has been an effort to substitute in the civil service what is known as the "merit system" for what is known as the "spoils system,"—that is, that merit instead of party service should be the basis of appointment to office and retention therein.

Definition of the Spoils System.

The *Spoils System* consists of the practice of using the public offices as party rewards. The system regards the public office first as a party perquisite, only secondarily as a public trust. It involves:

1. Tenure at the pleasure of the appointing power.

2. The appointing power to be influenced primarily by party considerations,—the office to be bestowed from party motives, on a party man, as a reward for party service.

3. No man to retain office longer than his party holds power.

When a new party comes in the old-party rascals must be turned out. "To the victors belong the spoils," and the workers of the incoming party must have the offices as the rewards of victory. Senator Marcy of New York, when Mr. Clay charged the politicians of that State with corrupting methods, defended the New York system in these memorable words:

"When they [the New York politicians] are contending for victory, they avow the intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are defeated they expect to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, as matter of right, the advantages of success. *They see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy.*" [1]

It is a system by which the party worker has the best chance of appointment, and *merit* is subordinated or disregarded.

Evils of the Spoils System.

In discussing this subject we can do no more than to summarize some of the evils of the spoils system.

1. It tends to demoralize the public service.

Under the spoils system, when a party comes into power thousands of office-seekers pour into the national capital clamoring for office. They call for these offices, not because the offices are vacant, nor because they are not well filled, nor upon the ground that the applicants have any special fitness. The qualifications of the applicants are only a secondary consideration, even in the minds of the applicants themselves.

1. Demoralization of the Public Service.

Their claims are based on some personal or party service,—the payment or collection of money for campaign purposes, the making of speeches, or other political work for some Senator or Representative or party committee. No matter how good a public servant a man may be, nor how well and faithfully he may have performed his duties,

[1] Debate in U. S. Senate, 1832.

nor how inoffensive he may be as a partisan, if his party goes out he must go too, to make way for some party worker who wishes to get in. Old and well-tried public servants are put out; new and untried servants are brought in. When this happens in offices requiring expert knowledge, and when time and experience are required to learn the duties of the office, nothing can result but the demoralization of the service.

Tenure by Party Service.

As the official's tenure of office depends upon party zeal and party service, and not on faithfully performing the duties of his office, the temptation is very great to neglect these duties for party work. As his appointment, in the first place, depended upon a political "pull," or influence, with some Senator or Representative, or political overlord, and his retention will depend upon the continued success of his party and his party superiors, his devotion will first be to his party chiefs, and his political work will naturally receive the larger part of his interest and attention. His official duties may be performed, but they are more apt to be neglected, especially if his party interests demand it. The spoils official is the servant of the party first, of the public afterwards.

The merit system reverses this. It applies the simple Jeffersonian test, "Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?" If he is, he will be retained, and he will not need to run to Congressmen or political committeemen for "influence." If a new appointment or a promotion is to be made it is to be given to the man who is best fitted to discharge the duties of the position, and this fitness is to be ascertained, as any sensible business man would ascertain it, by some fair, honest, impartial trial.

2. The spoils system tends toward the corruption of public morals. The people themselves are corrupted by it. The public might endure a deficient public service,

but the people cannot endure the corruption which the spoils system brings with it into their political life. It tends directly to produce the professional class of politicians, and to sustain the corrupt power of the boss. The spoils motive in politics appeals to cupidity, avarice, selfishness, not to patriotism; consequently the selfish, the avaricious, the unscrupulous, will press forward and scramble for place, while those to whom higher motives appeal will tend to retire. It involves all the evils of government by patronage which made the age of Walpole so notable for corruption. "All these men have their price," said Walpole, as the members were filling the benches in the Commons. So the spoils system teaches that men are to be controlled in politics by bribes and patronage and places, and it cultivates appeals to such motives. It directly introduces patronage as a corrupting influence between the President and members of Congress. Senators offer votes for places and the President offers places for votes. One public servant pays another for the betrayal of a trust, and the people are taught to look upon this form of bribery as a legitimate practice.[1]

2. The Corruption of Political Morals.

"So long as the offices were considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the honest, the faithful, and capable, for the common good, and not for the benefit or gain of the incumbent or his party, and so long as it was the practice of the Government to continue in office those who faithfully performed their duties, patronage was but a moderate influence either over the body of the community, or over the office-holders themselves; but when this practice was reversed—when offices instead of being considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the deserving, were regarded as the spoils of victory, to be bestowed as rewards for partisan service—it is easy to see that the certain, direct, and inevitable tendency of such a state of things is to convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and

[1] See the Author's *The American Republic and Its Government*, p. 184 sqq.

supple instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt. Were a premium offered for the best means of extending to the utmost the power of patronage; to destroy the love of country, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man-worship; to encourage vice and discourage virtue, no scheme more perfect could be devised." [1]

In this early condemnation of the spoils system Mr. Calhoun shows a remarkable insight into the evils the system was destined to produce. The spoils idea invariably associates party service with office, party work with pay, party loyalty with official salaries. It holds up as the prize of victory, not the public welfare or a wise public policy, but two hundred thousand offices with millions in salaries. It appeals directly to love of money and place, and stimulates a fierce and selfish party spirit that will stop at no wrong to accomplish its end. It makes high-minded party service and public-spirited candidacy for office impossible. It levies contributions on the salaries of all the offices and expends vast sums in the corruption of the voters. It thus tends to lower the tone not only of our public men, but of the political life of the whole community.

3. The spoils system leads to a perversion of the party idea and is a source of party weakness.

3. Perversion of the True Conception of Party, and Party Debility.

It perverts the fundamental idea of a party. Instead of teaching that a party is a union of citizens for the sake of promoting political principles and policies on which they are agreed, it inculcates the idea that parties and party agencies are combinations of men for the purpose of getting the offices. "What are we here for, if it is n't for the offices?" said Flannagan of Texas in one of the great National Conventions. This is the typical spoilsman's idea of the purpose of a party. It is not only sordid, but it is debilitating.

[1] Mr. Calhoun, speech and report on the Civil Service in 1835.

If it is only the offices the parties are striving for, why should the great body of citizens care which party wins? It matters very little to the voting mass of either party which set of party office-seekers is fed at the public crib. The more the idea is enforced on the people that it is the offices and salaries that men are striving for in party contests the more will politics be sordid and mean, and the more will the great body of voters refrain from party activity. The people will come to view our political contests only in the light of the street,— that "there is nothing in it" for them. And when the party chiefs come to distribute the spoils, there is sure to be disappointment. Ten applicants are disappointed to every one that is gratified. The "knife is up the sleeve" with those who have been given promises that cannot be realized. The Stalwart party braves go on the war-path. Personal feuds and factional strife arise and the harmony of the party is disturbed. The Congressman of the party out of power has not one half the trouble in keeping harmony in his district as have those who have the hateful task of distributing post-offices and revenue collectorships. If the offices are to be distributed by favor they inevitably become a source of weakness to the party.

The management of politics by office-holders and office-seekers, as the spoils system requires, is distasteful to the people. It is sometimes said that the spoils of office are necessary to hold political parties together, to create an interest in public affairs, to get men to work for the party welfare, and to give life and spirit to our political contests. This is a libel. He slanders American patriotism and public spirit who says that it is necessary to hold out the allurement of spoils to inspire the citizens with an interest in public affairs. Such inducements may be necessary to bring into party service the men who have to be "seen," the political grafters and boodlers,—the men who buy votes and expect to recoup themselves in

office from the public treasury. The spoils system does, indeed, bring these into party service, and the result is, as we have said, that better men are crowded out.

Thus, it is obvious that the three sources of party strength referred to in apologies for the spoils system by its friends are manifestly corrupting. (1) Assessment on office-holders, under fear of removal, of large sums of money for campaign expenses. (2) Party service by public officials, under the same penalty,—the performance of party work for which the public pays. (3) Promises of places to others as rewards of party work or party contribution. It were far better to prevent these spoils motives that appeal so strongly to the venal and effectively repel the patriotic.

That the people would not neglect their parties if the spoils motive were removed is shown in the experience of England, where parties are well sustained, yet when one party is overthrown scarcely sixty offices change hands. In this country the most inspiring political contests have been carried on when the spoils were not an element in politics, by patriotic and self-sacrificing devotion. Our political history abundantly shows that the mercenary motive is not necessary to well-organized and well-disciplined parties.

The merit system, on the other hand, would elevate the motives and tone of party contests; it would bring into politics men of higher aspirations and nobler aims; it would eliminate much of the personal element in party strife, and it would relieve our public men of patronage-mongering and allow them to attend to the high duties for which they are elected. It would tend to suppress the boss and to develop the statesman.

4. The spoils system leads to the usurpation by members of Congress of the executive power of appointment, while it prevents the President and his Cabinet from giving due attention to public business. It thus

tends to the perversion of our constitutional system by blending executive and legislative powers.

4. Legislative Interference with Executive Functions Prevention of the Public Service.

In a new administration the new Cabinet ministers who ought to have time and opportunity to study the needs of their respective departments and to give their attention to departmental problems, and who would naturally rely upon experienced subordinates, are pressed hard by applicants for places and the places of even these most reliable subordinates are demanded. The President himself can hardly find time for his important public duties.[1]

The Constitution makes the President responsible for appointments. The spoils system virtually takes this power from him, while it at the same time deprives him of much time and strength needed for the great duties of his office. At the same time it reduces Senators and Representatives to the position of office-brokers who are compelled to give a large share of their time and strength to the distribution of offices in their districts. This is not the business of a legislator. He should be allowed to attend to the business of framing and promoting public policies. The Congressman's business is statesmanship; it is not merely getting pensions and places and public buildings for his district. The spoils system tends to prop up the little men who depend on a machine of office-holders to keep them in place. It restrains statesmanship by discouraging men whose political spirit and ability and conceptions of public measures would fit them for public life.

5. The spoils system is undemocratic. Democracy

[1] It is reported that when one of President Lincoln's Illinois constituents expressed concern at the careworn face of the President during the troubles of the Civil War and expressed the hope that the burdens of the war would not break him down, Mr. Lincoln replied, "Judge, it is n't the rebellion that is killing me, it is your confounded Pepperton post-office."

rests on equal rights. It opposes privilege and favoritism. But the spoils system rests on privilege and favoritism, —the privilege of influential politicians to dispose of the public offices in favor of their party workers. The offices belong to all the people. They are not party property. All who are fit should have an equal chance to occupy these offices and all should have an equal chance to become fit. The spoils system does not encourage fitness and does not give an equal chance to all. Only a few can gain the favor and influence of the political boss. Influence wins as against merit. A young man who has rich and powerful friends may get a place if he is of the right party. The poor boy, unknown at court, has little chance. The "classified service" under the merit system, on the other hand, is made up of those who by some kind of test have proven their fitness for the duties to be performed. It may be, in the first place, by a competitive examination and then by a period of probation before final appointment. An appointee's character is vouched for, but, in any case, his appointment does not depend on the personal influence that he can bring to bear, nor on his party activity, nor on his religious or political creed. All have the same chance, the sons of the poor with the sons of the rich, the protégé of a Senator with the young man who has nothing to offer but his merit. And when it is known that the officer's security, and promotion, depend upon his merit and his efficiency and faithfulness, this inspires his work and encourages him to excel.

5. Democracy and the Merit System.

The spoils system is destined to disappear. During the last twenty years it has been rapidly giving way to the merit system. It came in as an innovation and a usurpation. Our fathers never imagined for a moment that it would come into our politics. Washington declared that in every nomination he had "endeavored to make fitness of character his primary

Rise and Decline of the Spoils System.

object." In the first thirty-nine years of the history of the Government, up to 1829, the six men who in this period occupied the presidency made but 112 removals, and all for reasonable cause. None of these great men supposed that party service should be considered a reason for public appointment. The spoils system came into full operation with Jackson in 1829. The foundation for its introduction and triumph was undesignedly laid in 1789 by the decision of the First Congress that the sole power of removal was vested in the President,—a decision which placed almost every position of the civil service unconditionally at the President's pleasure. Madison favored this decision. Fifty years later Webster opposed his opinion to that of Madison. In 1820 the Four-Year Law was passed under the influence of Secretary Crawford, of the Treasury Department. This law was another decisive triumph for the spoils system. Under it the terms of office were limited to four years. The act was passed, as Thomas H. Benton and John Quincy Adams testify, that Crawford might have the benefit of the office-holders' influence in his race for the presidency. "The decision of 1789, which gave the sole power of removal to the President, required positive executive action to effect removal; but this law of 1820 vacated all the chief financial offices, with all the places dependent on them, during the term of every President, who, without an order of removal, could fill them all at his pleasure."[1] The spoils system prevailed uninterruptedly, though not without protest, for more than thirty years. Agitation for reform began in 1867, led in Congress by Hon. Thomas A. Jenckes, a member from Rhode Island. George William Curtis became President of a Civil Service Commission under President Grant and he wrote a notable report on the subject in 1871, calling public attention

The Four-Year Law, 1820.

Beginning of Civil Service Reform.

[1] George Wm. Curtis on "The Spoils System," Sept. 8, 1881, *Orations*.

forcibly to the need of reform. Congress was apathetic and indifferent and failed to make appropriations to sustain the Civil Service Commission, though Presidents Grant and Hayes both favored the reformed system, and Mr. Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior under President Hayes, made notable application of the reform in his department. Unseemly party quarrels in New York in 1881 between "Stalwarts" and "Half-Breeds" over patronage, and the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed place-seeker, aroused public sentiment in favor of the reform, and in 1883 the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Bill was passed. This law provides for open competitive examinations for admission to the public service; for the appointment of a Civil Service Commission of three members, no more than two of whom shall be of the same political party; and for the apportionment of appointments according to the population of the States. Provision was made for a period of probation before permanent appointment should be made, and no recommendations from a Senator or member of Congress, except as to character or residence of the applicant, should be received or considered by any person making an appointment or examination. The law prohibits political assessments.

The Pendleton Act, 1883.

Since the Pendleton Act became a law, Civil Service Reform has steadily advanced under each successive Administration, though all the Presidents since that time have made removals and appointments for which they have been criticised by the ardent friends of the reform. The classified service has been steadily extended, the reform has come into greater popular favor, and it is safe to say it will suffer no defeat nor detriment during the term of office of President Roosevelt, who has been one of the foremost and most formidable opponents the spoils system has ever encountered. In the struggle against the spoils system the National Civil Service Reform

League, under the presidency of George William Curtis and Carl Schurz, has been a powerful factor in exposing and combating spoils politics.

REFERENCES

The literature on the Spoils System and Civil Service Reform is quite extensive. For the many magazine articles the student should consult Poole's *Index to Periodical Literature.* Of the extensive material on the subject the following may be mentioned:

1. Annual Reports of the National Civil Service Reform League and the other publications of this society.
2. *Orations and Addresses of George William Curtis*, vol. ii.
3. JOHNSTON'S *American Orations*, vol. iv.
4. BRYCE, *American Commonwealth*, vol. ii., chap. on "The Spoils."
5. MACY, *Political Parties in the United States*, chap. on "The Spoils System."
6. GEORGE S. BERNARD, *Civil Service Reform vs. The Spoils System.*
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8. Senator H. C. LODGE, "Why Patronage in Office is Un-American," *Century Magazine*, October, 1890.
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10. Files of the *Civil Service Chronicle* (Indianapolis, Lucius B. Swift, Editor).
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13. See the Periodical Indexes for magazine articles.

CHAPTER XVIII

PARTY ASSESSMENTS

THE spoils system in national, State, and city politics has called public attention to the evils growing out of party assessments.

Under party government the necessity of supporting the party must be recognized. To this end the party must have an organization,—a body of men acting together under some directing head, who, like the organs in the body, perform the functions expected of them. This is the machine,—the managing, working force of the party. No party can exist, no political work can be done, no cause can be promoted by, or within, a party without a machine. Without machine organization the democracy is helpless. If you want to nominate a good man for office, or get a good law passed, you must organize a machine; that is, the agents for getting the thing done must work together, and some men must be leaders to direct while others must be subordinates to obey. Political machinery is the means by which people act together in politics, under common direction for a common purpose.

Necessity of Party Organization and Support.

Many people have come to think of the party machine as an evil in itself. It is not an evil, not even a necessary evil. It is a necessary benefit. But to maintain the organization and to enable it to do for the party what is necessary, requires a great deal of money and a vast

amount of hard party work.[1] In campaign times a number of men, many of whom must be men of large ability, capable of acting as the captains of the forces, as the managers and directors of an army of helpers, must give their entire time to the party work. It is right that these men should be paid and paid well for their time and labor. It would be noble and unselfish for them to donate their time and their talents; and the men engaged in politics probably do this as much as any set of men give themselves to any cause. But the men of the party who go about their business, making and saving money, have no right to expect such a sacrifice. Patriotism does not demand it, for we are all equally interested in the party triumph, or in the good government, which, it is supposed, the party is working for.

Party Service Should Receive Party Pay.

It does not follow, however, that the party agents should be paid by their election to public offices. They should be paid out of the party treasury, not out of the public treasury. The disposition to nominate a man for office because of his party service is apt to lead to a disregard of the qualifications necessary for that office. Because a man has rendered a party service is no reason for electing him to any office for which he may be disposed to announce himself. He should be paid, when paid at all, by the citizens who believe in the party cause, not by those who oppose that cause. To take public money to reward a party service is an injustice to men of other parties;—it would be like taking public money to support a religious teacher or organizer. It is a maxim with Americans that those who believe in a religious cause should pay for its support; men of another religion, or of no religion, should not be taxed to pay. Likewise, let those who believe in the party cause pay for its support, but men of the opposite party should not be taxed

[1] See p. 242.

to pay. If in this respect we were as bad in our religion as we are in our politics it would be quite startling to the average American. But to tax Republicans—that is, to use the salary of an office—to reward a Democrat for party service, would be the same in principle. No one objects to party workers having pecuniary rewards; they should have pay in proportion to what their time and service may be worth, if they do not wish to contribute their time and service voluntarily. It is the source and methods of these rewards, not the rewards themselves, that are objectionable.

Sources of Party Revenue. The usual sources of party revenue are familiar:

1. Public subscriptions among members of the party. This is legitimate and public spirited, and it should be encouraged.

2. Private contributions of rich men and corporations who are interested in securing the passage of special legislation through the success of the party. Such contributions may be innocent, but they are often questionable, and if the legislation sought is for selfish instead of public ends, they are very corrupting in their results.

3. The agents of the party in power secretly appropriate public funds,—of the city, county, or State. This is manifestly a corrupt source. It is a direct robbery of the public treasury and a palpable means of political bribery.

4. The party managers levy an assessment upon the office-holders belonging to the party, or upon the candidates seeking office through the party.

5. The outright sale of nominations, or of the offices themselves.

Most of these are corrupt processes. They are so palpably evil and offensive as to need no word of exposure or comment. They are universally condemned by public sentiment, although not uniformly punished by execution of public law.

Public sentiment, however, has been more tolerant toward the practice of levying party assessments on office-holders and candidates. The practice has been so generally accepted and applied in party usage, that it has become an evil of great proportions.

This practice is sustained very largely, as we have said, from a false view of public office. The office is looked to as a party resource for party use. Underlying the party assessment is the idea, also, that the party office-holder and the candidate are the ones for whom the office exists and the election is held. "The candidates are seeking the office for their own profit; they are the ones who enjoy the fruits of victory; it is the candidates, if elected, who obtain the salaries and the emoluments of office; therefore from their pockets should come the funds necessary to enable the party managers to carry on the campaign." This is a very common view and it has led to the party managers' establishing an extensive and refined system of party assessments. The practice rests upon the idea that the officer is to have the benefit of a good place instead of the place having the benefit of a good officer. A doubtful candidate who will pay for the place is, therefore, preferred by the party managers to a better candidate who will earn his salary and refuse to pay for a place on the ticket.

Party Assessments Based on a Perverted Idea of Public Office.

The evils of the system are obvious.

1. Offices are graded for what they are worth, and they are to be paid for by the candidates on the basis of the salaries expected. It is like putting up the offices for public sale, with a list price.

Evils of Assessments.

2. It promotes the candidacy of rich men. Only the man with a "barrel" can stand the growing assessments. On the other hand, poor men more capable and men of moderate means are excluded. The State or the community may be deprived of the service of its best men. In a typical State of the Middle West a man of political

spirit and great ability, capable of high service, is constrained to refuse to become a candidate for Governor,—because he "cannot afford the necessary expense." He would have first to be assessed, say, $2500 by the State committee. He would have to meet the personal expenses of an extensive campaign, giving his time and using his own money, while "heelers" and "strikers" of high and low degree attack him for contributions on all sides. If he comes to election day on less than $10,000 he may be considered fortunate. This is a stupendous public wrong, yet it is illustrative of a condition quite prevalent in our politics. It directly discourages the good and encourages the bad elements in our public life.

3. Thus, the system of assessments promotes the candidacy of the venal and corrupt. The corrupt politician who submits to the extortion of party assessments does so with the fixed purpose of recovering the money by corrupt means or using his place for corrupt ends after he is elected. This is a part of the calculation of the corrupt candidate. There will be city jobbery, connivance with criminals, treasury defalcations, fraudulent franchises, for in some way the heavy assessments must be recovered. Mr. Bryce refers to the defence by a New York boss of the large salaries paid to aldermen on the ground that heavy demands were made on them by their parties. So, after all, the public treasury pays the election expenses of office-seekers. The system tends directly to political temptation and the ruin of character. The man who stays in politics and submits to these exactions suffers severely in moral tone unless he is a notable exception to the rest of mankind. On the other hand, the public-spirited, the conscientious, the upright, who object to corrupt methods, cannot afford to stand for public office. No practice tends more directly toward the debasement of our political morals and the degeneracy in the character of the public service. Assessments upon

candidates should not only not be imposed, but they should be prohibited.

4. Assessments are directly and inevitably connected with electoral bribery and corruption. Usually the end in view in a party assessment is the party corruption fund. But for the well-known fact that such funds, or "pools," are always raised by these assessments, plenty of legitimate money would be forthcoming from the free and voluntary contributions of party members. Thus healthy party activity and support are restrained.

5. The system increases the expense of elections and thus encourages corruption.

6. The assessment funds are placed in irresponsible hands without account. This also encourages the unscrupulous and corrupt use of money. The assessments paid are often used by corrupt boodlers not for party ends at all, but for selfish ends. It is kept in their own pockets. No accounting can be demanded. The assessments are paid for corrupt purposes and complaints are estopped, though suits have been known by candidates to recover corruption money diverted by boodlers to their own use.

The abuse of assessments has gone so far that in many places a man is not allowed to become a candidate, his name is not allowed to go before the party convention, until he pays an assessment to help defray the party expenses. So the people, instead of being allowed to choose their own officers, may only vote for those who, in a sense, consent to pay for their places.

In the face of the expensive campaigns which this system promotes a public candidacy means to most men either moral ruin or financial bankruptcy, or both. Very few men can withstand its temptations and its financial drain.

The nature of this evil, though by no means its full extent, may be indicated by the following quotation used by Mr. Bryce:

"A judgeship in New York costs about $1500; the district attorneyship the same; for a nomination to Congress the price is about $4000, though this is variable; an aldermanic nomination is worth $1500, and that for the Assembly from $600 to $1500. In 1887 the City Chamberlain of New York estimated the average minimum assessment on a candidate for Mayor at $20,000; for Comptroller at $10,000, for District Attorney at $5000. In 1887 the Democratic rings of New York City demanded $25,000 for the nomination to the Comptrollership, and $5000 for that to a State Senatorship. The salary of the Comptroller is $10,000 for three years; that of Senator $1500 for two years. That is, the Senatorial candidate was expected to pay $2000 more than the total salary,—a fact suggestive of expectations of gains from some other source. In Massachusetts Congressmen have paid $12,000."

Conditions under Assessments.

The same practice has come to prevail in Western rural districts. It is safe to say that in counties of moderate size the nominees for county offices are assessed by the party committee from $200 to $500, or more. The total campaign expenses of the candidate for one of the best offices often reaches as high as $1800 or $2000. This applies to a four-year office, the salary of which may be about $2500. It seems the salary is altogether too high if men are willing to pay so much to get the place. The result of the system is to exclude from the county offices men of first-class qualifications. Usually the claim is not made for the candidate that he is qualified for the work of the office.[1]

[1] It is related that when it was proposed in a certain county to make a man deputy auditor, objection was made that he was "not competent to be deputy auditor; he was not even competent to be auditor." The candidate for auditor must be a man who is popular with the voters and who is willing and able to spend enough money to be elected. A deputy, who is required to be competent to take care of the office, can be appointed at a lower salary,—unless the auditor has bargained away the deputyship for the nomination or for support in the election.

It is not surprising, in the face of these woful conditions, which we have by no means adequately portrayed, that it is increasingly difficult to induce good men to stand for the local public offices; that there are waste and extravagance in public administration; that the law cannot be enforced against criminals because officers of the law have themselves secured their election by criminal processes; that county officers resist a reduction of salaries and organize to oppose fair fee and salary laws; that "politics" proves the ruin of good men, and that good citizens become more and more disgusted with politics and turn to their private pursuits and leave the offices to the corruptionist and the spoilsman? It is very reasonably said that this practice of assessing and bleeding public candidates is "a festering sore that will taint the whole body politic, make elections a farce, and destroy the republic."

A Summary of Assessment Evils.

Many remedies have been proposed for these evils. The Civil Service Law is designed to protect the office-holders.

Proposed Remedies.

No office-holder shall solicit or receive assessments or contributions in any way whatever from other officers.

No officer shall solicit such assessments in any public building.

No officer shall be jeopardized in his position by his contributing or refusing to contribute to campaign funds.

No office-holder shall give to another office-holder any money, for any political object.

This law is to protect employees and to prevent office-holders from taking an unbecoming part in political solicitation.

To restrain corrupt practices in local politics it is proposed:

1. That the party committeeman should be made a public officer and the party committee should be brought under public control. The purpose is to limit expenses to strictly legitimate purposes. The Committee should be compelled to keep an account of all money expended and the purpose for which it is spent. This should be open to public inspection, together with the amount received and its source. Failure to keep such a record should be a misdemeanor.

2. That there should be a limitation on the expenditures of candidates. Each candidate should be required to keep an itemized account of all money expended and the purposes for which expended,—this account to be open to public inspection by publication, or by being posted in a public place. No officer should receive a certificate of election until such an account is filed with the proper officer, and if it can be shown that he has violated the corrupt practices act, that should invalidate his election. Candidates and committees are to be put on oath as to their accounts.

By these and other such provisions efforts have been made to remedy these evils by law.[1] The evils are confessedly difficult to reach. But the laws should give all possible support to public morals. If the laws against corrupt practices fail it may be because the penalties are too light, or there is no one whose duty it is to enforce the law, or those whose duty it is fail to act. But public sentiment is stronger than law. If the people are corrupt, if their political ideals are low, if they do not demand by their political sentiment and their political practice the prevention of these evils, laws and mechanical devices will do but little good.[2]

[1] See Corrupt Practices Acts of several of the States.

[2] See "Assessments" in Lalor's *Cyclopedia of Political Science*; Bryce, vol. ii., p. 119; *North American Review*, vol. cxxxv.; *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. lxx., and Poole's *Index* for other magazine articles.

CHAPTER XIX

THE GERRYMANDER

THE *Gerrymander* consists in laying out electoral districts in such a way as to give the political party conducting the operation an unfair advantage over its opponent. The party conducting a gerrymander for congressional purposes seeks to group into a few districts the counties which give majorities for its opponents, and to distribute the counties having a majority of its own voters among as many districts as possible; that is, to throw "the greatest possible number of hostile voters into a district which is anyhow certain to be hostile, and to add to a district where parties are evenly divided a place in which the majority of friendly voters is sufficient to turn the scale."[1] The rule of the gerrymander is this: Make your own district majorities as small as is safe; make your opponents' district majorities as large and as few as possible; throw away as few of your own votes and as many of your opponents' as you can. If, for instance, a congressional district is safely Democratic, the Republican gerrymanderer would throw as many Democratic counties into that district as possible, and have his opponents carry it by ten thousand or fifteen thousand majority. This would take Democratic counties away from several surrounding districts which might be thus made safely Republican. The purpose is to enable

The Gerrymander.

[1] Bryce.

party voters to exercise political power out of proportion to their numbers.

There are two legal requirements that act as impediments in the way of the gerrymander:

Legal Difficulties to Gerrymandering.

1. That the districts shall be composed of contiguous territory.

2. That they shall contain as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.

The first of these is provided for in most apportionment acts, both of Congress and the State legislatures. The second is provided for either in the written constitutions of the States, or in the apportionment acts of Congress, or by the understandings of the Constitution as required by the fundamental condition of republican government that the people should be represented in proportion to their numbers and that the majority may be enabled to express the popular and legislative will.

The gerrymanderer generally disregards these requirements. He makes the districts very unequal in number of inhabitants, and he evades the first requirement by distorting the boundaries of the districts and placing the counties out of their natural position. These are the odious features of the gerrymander, but they uniformly accompany the practice upon any considerable scale.

Evasions of Law in Gerrymandering.

The political geography of a State of any considerable size would make seriously unjust gerrymandering very difficult, if not impossible, but for these illegal features.[1] When a State is to be gerrymandered which has, say, one hundred counties, unequal in population and many of them of close party majorities, the problem presented is of considerable difficulty. The party statistical manipulator and student of election tables who evolves from the returns and from the political geography of the State a

[1] In New York in 1888 one district contained 107,000 population, another 312,000, made so for party purposes.

combination acceptable to his party manifests a high order of genius. The problem requires a close, attentive study and a combining talent worthy of a better cause. The most skilful gerrymanderer cannot avoid running counter to the legal requirements referred to.[1]

The gerrymander is clearly a species of intrigue and fraud. Its injustice was early described as such an arrangement of the districts "as virtually to disfranchise one portion of the community and to impart to the other an undue share of political influence."[2] The political inequity of the gerrymandering scheme may be illustrated by a few instances:

The Political Injustice of the Gerrymander.

In 1888 the Republican majority in Ohio was 20,500. In 1890 the Democrats carried the State legislature and redistricted so that the Republicans could get only seven out of twenty-one Congressmen. Later the Republicans redistricted so as to enable them to carry seventeen Congressmen out of twenty-one. A fair representative division of the congressional representation might have been eleven to ten, or twelve to nine.

In 1890, in Indiana, the Republicans cast 216,000 votes; the Democrats cast 238,000 votes. The Republicans, under a Democratic gerrymander, elected *two* Congressmen, the Democrats *eleven:* that is, each Republican Congressman from the State stood for 108,000 votes, while for each Democratic Congressman there were only

[1] If the gerrymanderer's work is unbearably iniquitous the managers of the opposite party may appeal to the courts. The courts will generally overthrow a redistricting act when the written constitution requires the districts to be of equal population, as nearly as practicable. The court will not require mathematical equality, but only a reasonable approach to it. After one unfair gerrymander has been overthrown in the courts, the partisan legislature proceeds to enact another, perhaps not quite so bad. This might be overthrown, too, if the opposing party cared to go to the expense and trouble of testing it.

[2] *Olive Branch*, 1814, p. 413.

21,000 votes. Clearly a large body of the minority were disfranchised in the National House. It required five Republican votes to equal one Democratic. At the same time, the Democrats had so redistricted the State for legislative purposes that nothing short of a political upheaval would enable the Republicans to carry the legislature in order to undo the work.[1] "A leading politician of the State is said to have remarked that he had so fixed his State that his opponents could not carry the legislature without at least 150,000 popular majority."[2] Thus, as President Harrison says, "a minority rule is established that only a political convulsion can overthrow." In a county of a certain State to which were allotted three representatives to the legislature, instead of electing the three representatives on a common ticket for the whole county, the county was gerrymandered into districts; one district was made to consist of 65,000 population, one of 15,000, and one of 10,000. Presumably the small districts were made safe for the party, while the populous district was expected to elect an opposition member. In another county, detached, non-contiguous sections were united to make a legislative district.[3]

"Concerning the origin of the gerrymander it is related that in 1788 the opponents of James Madison in Virginia attempted

[1] The upheaval came in 1894.

[2] Lalor's *Cyclopedia of Political Science*, on "Gerrymandering."

[3] See annual message of President Harrison, December, 1891, and A. J. Turner's *Science of Gerrymandering*. For other illustrations of inequalities in representation produced by the gerrymander, consult Commons's *Proportional Representation*.

As illustrations of the distorted districts, the reader's attention may be called to the "Shoe String District" in Mississippi, 250 miles long and 30 miles broad, in which the negro vote was concentrated; or to the "Dumbbell District" in Pennsylvania, made for the purpose of making an opposition district contiguous; or the Missouri district, which was made longer than the State itself, "if traced by its windings, into which as large a number as possible of the negro vote were thrown."

to defeat him for election to the first Congress under the Constitution by making a hostile district for him and providing that the Representative should be required to live in the district from which he was chosen. Patrick Henry led this movement in opposition to Madison, and it was mere fortune that the political device did not come to be known as 'Henrymandering.'" [1]

Origin of the Gerrymander.

"In 1814 the trick was introduced into Massachusetts. The Jeffersonian Republicans had carried the legislature with Elbridge Gerry as Governor, and they redistricted the State in such a way that the shapes of the towns forming a single district in Essex County gave to the district a dragon-like contour. 'This was indicated upon a map of Massachusetts which Benjamin Russell, an ardent Federalist and editor of the *Centinel*, hung up over the desk in his office. The celebrated painter, Gilbert Stuart, coming into the office one day and observing the uncouth figure, added with his pencil a head, wings, and claws, and exclaimed, "That will do for a salamander." 'Better say a Gerrymander,' answered Russell, and thus the word came into the language.'" [1]

Several remedies for the evil of the gerrymander have been proposed.

President McKinley proposed that appeal be made to public sentiment and that this should demand that the districts should be impartially made and then be required to stand till a new census be taken. But it is doubtful whether public sentiment can be relied on to secure party fairness when party spirit runs high.

Remedies for the Gerrymander.

President Harrison proposed a constitutional amendment forbidding the States to elect presidential electors under a gerrymander, and it has been proposed to give to Congress the function of districting the States for

[1] See Tyler's *Life of Henry*, p. 313; Rives's *Madison*, vol. ii., pp. 653–655; Bancroft's *History of the Constitution*, vol. ii., p. 485.

[2] Fiske, *Civil Government*, p. 217.

congressional purposes. A gross gerrymander in a State affects the whole country by giving the party that makes it an undue advantage, so all the States ought to have a voice in control of this. This would be a highly centralizing step and would merely substitute congressional gerrymandering for State gerrymandering.

The most prominent remedy proposed, and the one most seriously considered as being effective, is the election of Congressmen and other officers, where feasible, on a common ticket under proportional representation.

Proportional Representation is a plan to secure the representation of minorities. Its purpose is to defeat the gerrymander by giving to all considerable minorities votes in the legislature in direct proportion to their numbers. This is worked either by what is known as the "limited vote" or by the "cumulative vote." Under the limited vote, if there were thirteen Congressmen to be elected from a State, or thirteen aldermen from a city, these should be elected on a common ticket by the State, or city, at large. No voter is allowed to vote for more than, say, eight candidates. Each party may nominate a list of thirteen and seek to elect as many as it can; but the minority will be apt to nominate fewer candidates, and in any case they will elect five out of the thirteen if the law gives them this relative importance.

Proportional Representation. The "Limited Vote."

The "cumulative vote" also requires that several persons be elected on a common ticket. Each voter may cast as many votes as there are offices to be filled. He may cast all his votes for one person, or divide them among different persons, as he likes. This is done in Illinois in electing the members of the legislature. In a district where three legislators are to be elected, the minority can always elect one by arranging that all their voters shall cast the three votes to which each voter is entitled for a single candidate. The ma-

The "Cumulative Vote."

jority voters may divide their three votes between two candidates. If they attempt to elect three they run the risk of electing only one.

The objection to these plans is that they are too complicated and impracticable, and that the result would be to break up the solidarity of legislative bodies by introducing minority groups, thus promoting legislative deadlocks.[1]

The Referendum.

Advocates of the *Referendum* claim that their scheme would defeat the gerrymander by making it useless. The referendum is a provision for making laws or determining upon policies, by a direct vote of the people. Under this system the laws would still be framed, in legal form and phraseology, by representative agents of the people, but the public policy of the law and the principle involved *must be referred* to the people in a general election. This is to substitute a direct democracy for republican, or representative, government. The referendum is applied in America when the people vote on tax appropriations for roads and schools or upon constitutional amendments; but whether it is applicable to a much greater extent and over a wide area is seriously questioned. It has been applied chiefly in the small cantons of Switzerland.

The Initiative and Imperative Mandate.

The *Initiative* and *Imperative mandate* are usually associated with the referendum. By the initiative the people begin, or initiate, the law desired, by means of a petition to the legislature. If a certain proportion of the voters, say twenty per cent., petition for a law, this petition serves as an *imperative mandate* upon the legislature, and that body will

[1] Proportional representation is very well and fully presented in Professor John R. Commons's volume on the subject. See also M. M. Forney, *Political Reform by Representation of Minorities;* D. G. Ritchie, *The Right of Minorities;* Harris, *The True Theory of Representation in a State;* J. S. Mill, *Representative Government.* For numerous magazine articles consult Poole's *Index* and the *Cumulative Index.*

be bound to submit to the people the question whether such a law shall be enacted.[1]

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[1] On the Referendum, for objections see Edwin Maxey in "Some Questions of Larger Politics," and in the *Arena*, July, 1900; for defence of, see Cleveland's (F. A.) *The Growth of Democracy in the United States*, pp. 177–240. *The Independent*, February 20, 1902, Oberholtzer, "The Referendum in America," is the chief authority. See *Cumulative Index*.

CHAPTER XX

PRIMARY ELECTION REFORM

ONE of the growing causes in the interest of better politics is the movement for primary election reform. It is believed that this will tend to destroy the power of the machine and the boss. This reform proposes to nominate party candidates in a primary election of the party voters instead of by a delegate convention. This throws the responsibility for party candidates on the whole body of the party and is an advance toward a larger democracy. The demand for the primary election has come from the feeling that the delegate convention has become corrupt; that the convention is manipulated by rings of professional politicians and office-holders; that "deals" are made and delegates are bought and sold; that a mere handful of men determine the action of the convention, and that the rank and file of the party, who cannot make politics their business and who will not indulge in dishonorable practices, cannot make their influence felt.

Objections to the Delegate Convention.

The Primary, it is claimed, will give all an equal chance. We are governed by parties. It is only through parties that the people can rule. Whether we are to have good government or bad government depends upon how the party—especially the dominant party—is conducted. Therefore, the preliminary party meeting at which candidates are named, or delegates are appointed,

or policies determined upon, is of vital concern in popular government. If the people can only ratify or reject at the general election what this preliminary party meeting has determined upon, they will exercise but little control; and if they leave the preliminary meetings of both parties to be managed by a handful of interested professionals, the people will find that the general election will present only a choice between two evils, and instead of having government of the people, for the people, and by the people we shall have a government of, by, and for the bosses. If the people are to rule under party government, the party organization and its action must be brought under popular control; party government must be made truly representative in order that the majority may rule. The fundamental purpose of primary election reform is to secure this by taking party elections, preliminary to the general election, out of unregulated, irresponsible private management and by placing these elections under regulated State control, with provision against fraud, mistake, or neglect, where every man may count one, and no man more than one, where there will be equal chances for all and special chances for none. If the party is to be regarded as a kind of private corporation whose business is to be managed by a set of professionals; and if, in the party primary, or caucus, the boss is to appoint the chairman who is to name the committee to name the delegates; if party caucuses are called to meet in saloons or other uncomfortable and disreputable places; and if the professional chairman makes decisions according to the "majority of noise," or appoints counters to retire to count the votes that have been deposited in a hat passed round in a promiscuous crowd; or if, after delegates are elected at precinct meetings, the convention, through its "credentials committee" in star chamber, always finds, or makes, a majority subservient to the boss,—then no matter how

If the People are to Govern, they Must Govern their Parties.

much honest men may strive in the party they will find striving in vain. They will quit politics as unprofitable business. They will retire from party meetings and the party will be given over more and more to the unscrupulous professionals. This is what has happened, to a large extent. It is in this way that independents are made, and the effective service of honest men is lost for party government. If party government is to be good government these men must be kept with the party to work with it and through it.

The purpose of primary election reform is to prevent these evils and to restore the government of the party to the masses of its voters. The reform involves allowing the people either to nominate good candidates directly, or allowing them a fair chance to elect delegates to a convention for that purpose, and to prevent the delegates after they are elected from being unseated in the convention. This is the substantial part of the reform.

Essence of the Reform in Public Control.

If all party officers and party candidates are to be named at primary elections, this, of course, will do away entirely with the delegate convention. This is the object of many primary election reformers. They think the convention is beyond repair. To this system of making nominations and to the successful working of a good primary election law the following features are considered essential:

1. The Primary Elections of all parties should be held together in every election precinct on the same day. The time and place of these elections should be fixed by law and not left to be determined by party committees. In this way the election day will be known, the polling places will be fixed and not precarious; machine gerrymandering and snap primaries will be prevented; and the voters of one party will be prevented from

Essential Features of a Primary Election Law.

1. Coincident Primaries.

packing the Primary of the other for the purpose of nominating weak candidates for their opponents.

2. A good registration law. The party voters must be registered a certain number of days before the Primary. Careful registration always tends to promote fair elections.

2. Registration.

3. The right to vote at a party Primary should be secured against fraud by the registration of the party affiliation, or preference of all voters who seek to vote at the Primary. No opponent of a party has a right to participate in its Primary. The law should protect a party from its enemies who may seek to disrupt or weaken it. The test of party membership, or party fealty, is the most difficult matter in framing primary election laws. Experience shows that liberality in this direction should be encouraged. It is not necessary, nor is it generally desired by party managers, to shut out the independent element within a party. It is not necessary to apply hard party tests or a cast-iron pledge to support the nominees. Self-respecting men will not seek to vote in the Primary of a party to which they are not attached, and the unscrupulous will do so in the face of pledges, which they will unhesitatingly violate. The Primary should not be a means of pledging a man to abide by an unknown result. This would cultivate hypocrisy and lying, and only the unscrupulous will take such a pledge.

3. Party Protection, with Reasonable Recognition of the Independent Voter.

With the Primaries of all parties on the same day, the voters of each party will be led to give their attention to their own nominations. The primary system is not to destroy parties, but it implies that the party is not merely its managers, its machine, but the whole body of its voters. The independent voter should recognize that the registration of a voter's party affiliation, as the Kentucky law requires, is a desirable protection to the party organization. Very few would object to stating their party

affiliation, if other information and pledges as to the voter's past and future are not exacted. If this seems to a voter to violate his independence he may either refrain from voting at the Primary, or other provision may be made for him.[1]

4. The Australian secret-ballot system of voting should be used in the Primary as in the regular election day.

4. Use of the Australian Ballot.

All the ordinary safeguards of the law should be placed around the primary election. All trickery and personal and party favoritism in choosing election judges and clerks should be reduced to a minimum. Ticket-peddling and electioneering at the polling-place should be prevented, and the use of corruption money should be checked.

Other minor features urged by primary election advocates are: (1) The application of the law should be made mandatory and not be left to the option of party committees. Primary elections should be under State control, not under party control; (2) The rotation of names in the printed ballots. Any name appearing first in all the ballots would have a manifest advantage. The unknowing and indifferent voters are apt to vote for the first on the list. In a poll of fifteen or twenty thousand votes the first place is probably worth one thousand votes to a candidate. Fairness requires rotation. The Minnesota Law provides for this. If the first who files his name with the party chairman is placed first on the ballot, the way is open to favoritism and fraud.

5. Mandatory Primaries and Rotation in Names of Candidates.

Under the primary system nominations will generally be made by a plurality vote. As the Primary will be held on registration day and no one may vote at the general election who does not register, voting at the Primary will be greatly encouraged. Indiscriminate candidacy may be

[1] See p. 288.

checked by requiring that a candidate's petition should contain five per cent. of the party vote at the last election before his name can go on the ticket at the Primary, and a reasonable public fee may be required of all candidates. No candidate's petition should be accepted within twelve days of the Primary, and sample ballots should be posted at least ten days before the election. The voters should have ample time to inquire as to the merits of the candidates. On registration day, which is primary election day, the voter goes to his voting-place to register. He is asked if he wishes to vote at the Primary. If he says yes, he will be asked in which party Primary he wishes to participate, in order that a party ballot may be furnished him. If excessive independence or reticence prevents his stating his party affiliation, and he still desires to vote in the Primary, he may be given one of each of the tickets fastened together; he retires to the booth, marks the one he desires, presumably the one of his own party, folds them together and deposits them all together in the ballot-box. If he votes on more than one ticket, only that one is counted containing the largest number of offices voted for. If the same number of names is marked on each, both are thrown out, thus preventing the nomination of weak candidates by voters of the opposite party. The votes are then canvassed and returned by a responsible official board as prescribed by the general election law. The persons receiving the highest number of votes of their party become the candidates of that party for the offices for which they stood, and their names go upon the ballot at the regular election.

Practical Operation of the Primary Election.

"This will do away with the delegate convention. No ring, coterie, or clique can prevent a candidate from securing the nomination, provided a majority of his party wish to vote for him. It encourages the candidacy of able men, too indepen-

dent to truckle to the machine. It encourages the attendance of voters who under the present system think it useless to attend a caucus or a convention. As one must register in order to vote at the final election, if the primary be held on registration day primary voting will be encouraged.

"The machine may continue to recommend, but it can no longer dictate nominations. By placing the responsibility on each voter for the candidates put forward public spirit is awakened, and public spirit is vital to a democracy." [1]

But it has by no means been conclusively shown that the primary election system should entirely displace the convention system, provided the latter can be properly guarded and regulated by public law. It is held that the essential benefits of primary election reform may be obtained and the benefits of the convention system retained at the same time,— that the convention system should be reformed not abandoned. It has been the abuses of the convention system that have led to the general public demand for primary election reform. If the convention can be made truly representative and directly responsible to the constituencies it is contended that it will afford a better system for making nominations. Several objections are urged to the system of making nominations by direct primaries:

Objections to the Primary Election System.

1. It tends to promote rather than to check electoral corruption. A primary election is merely another election, and as elections are now conducted we have enough of them. A Primary is merely another opportunity for the "floater" and the "grafter." A large and corrupt use of money is encouraged. A boodle candidate, if he has money and is a good organizer and a "good fellow," has as good a chance for the nomination in a Primary as in a convention. It

1. Electoral Corruption in Primaries.

[1] See the *Outlook*, May 1, 1897, and May 20, 1899.

merely requires more money and more corruption. Recent experience with municipal misrule in Minneapolis and the primary election experience in Indianapolis are cited to sustain this view. The machine can control the Primary as well as the convention. There is solid foundation for the belief that *election* reform should precede *primary* election reform.

2. It promotes plurality nominations. A man may be nominated who represents but one third or one fourth of the party voters. A plurality nomination, which the primary system makes almost necessary, may be quite contrary to the party desire and prove very unsatisfactory to the public. Under the South Carolina system, if no candidate for Governor receives a majority of the votes cast in the party Primary, a second Primary is held to choose between the two leading candidates. But this process is expensive and requires trouble and time and the sustained attention of the voters. And, besides, the candidate third on the list at the first Primary might be preferred by a majority of the party as against the two leading candidates, after all minor candidates are out of the way. In a convention a majority is required for the nomination of a candidate, and a series of ballotings may be had resulting in the average majority judgment of the party.

2. Plurality Nominations.

3. It tends to a multiplicity of candidates and the consequent confusion of the voters. The ring influence can easily cause a number of respectable candidates to be brought out, and thus divide the vote of the best citizens, while the ring or machine candidate may easily obtain a larger number of votes than any one of his opponents. The voter is confused by the great array of names placed before him. If he has to choose forty-five candidates out of a list of two hundred names the voter cannot choose intelligently.

3. Multiplicity of Candidates.

4. The primary system tends to weaken and destroy

the party. It causes jealousies and divisions within the party and prevents efficient party organization. It offers no security for a geographical distribution of the candidates which is calculated to strengthen a party throughout a State. In districts where the party nomination is equivalent to an election, as in the Southern States and in some local districts in all the States, the primary system is called for by the people; in such places it may be wisely used and may not injure the party. Even there, however, only the majority party can afford to use it. In these cases the Primary is the real election. But where there are close and regular party contests the Primary, it is claimed, tends to weaken and disrupt the party that applies it.

4. Loss of Party Strength.

It might be said, in reply to this, that the primary system would bring influences to the support of parties that would more than counteract its weakening effects. It would so reform parties and bring them to the performance of their proper functions that many men who are now detached from parties, being disgusted with party management, would come into closer party relations and activities. Extreme independents, who wish that still greater independence of party control should be cultivated, criticise the movement for primary election reform because, as it appears to the critics, to invest primary meetings with a legal character and to legalize the caucus would tend to abridge the freedom and independence of those who take part in them. It would bind men to support the party. Such a system of nominations would, no doubt, give less occasion or apology for independence and would, without destroying reasonable independence, bring to the party councils and support a large number of citizens who now act in more or less independent isolation.

Practical Operation of the Reformed Convention.

Those who propose to reform and not abandon the delegate convention propose, as an illustration,

that after the precinct delegates are elected in fair, well-guarded Primaries, each township or county delegation to the convention should elect a chairman or foreman, and that this foreman, acting for the delegation,

"should hand in to the convention all the nominations desired by a plurality in his delegation and the nominations thus filed by the different delegations the convention should post on a large bulletin board; and the convention should vote on such names, and no others, by a secret Australian ballot, under the care of officials named by public election commissioners."[1]

This proposes to bring the convention under fair public control and regulation. The advocates of the reformed convention system hold that the evils of democracy are not to be cured by more democracy; that it is not the application of pure, unrestricted democracy that we should strive for, but for the principles of the republic,—government by the people through their representatives; that any other system of party government is impracticable among millions of people over an extended area. The party should be a republican institution, and its nominations and control should be conducted under republican forms. This points to the representative convention as the governing body in the party. It is not wise or necessary to cheapen the franchise and extend the influence of the ignorant and irresponsible voter, as the primary system does. What we should do, say the advocates of the convention, is to safeguard the delegate system. Instead of asking the voter to vote for forty-five candidates out of a list of 132 names, let him vote for *one delegate*, and have an equal chance with the rest of the party voters in his precinct in choosing this delegate. Not one man in fifty

Direct vs. Indirect Control: Pure Democracy vs. Representative Government.

[1] See an article by Mr. Frederick Rush in the *Partisan* (Indianapolis) for July, 1902. Mr. Rush is the author of the Illinois Primary Election Law, and is the attorney for the Civic Federation of Chicago. The Illinois law is probably the best yet attained.

can know the qualifications of the candidates, and probably ninety out of a hundred vote at random. It is no more logical to abolish the delegate party convention because it has been abused by designing politicians than it would be to abolish legislatures and congresses for the same reason. The delegate convention is controlled by designing schemers merely because of the indifference of the general body of the voters, and because of the ignorance and political corruption prevailing among so many party voters, and because the body of the voters feel that they have not a fair chance in the caucus. The remedy is to arouse public opinion and to bring the constitution of the convention—that is, the men who compose it and the rules under which it is to work—under proper public control. On this fundamental point the advocate of the reformed convention and of primary nominations are in agreement. Both propose to take the preliminary party meetings—the self-constituted caucuses that now name the delegates and dictate nominations—out of the hands of private and unregulated party management and put them into the hands of public and regulated State management. The advocates of the reformed convention accept this principle, but they hold that it can be applied and the convention retained. One of these advocates thus sums up the principal points in a good convention law:

Proposed Provisions in a Good Convention Law.

1. A practically permanent and autonomous precinct, the boundaries of which are not susceptible of alterations easily or frequently.

2. One delegate to a precinct.

3. All nominations in the convention to be by printed ballot, each ballot bearing the name of the delegate voting it, and to be given official record. This would make the delegate responsible to his constituents and to the public.

4. Penalties for bribery, corruption and unfair manipulation. The tricks of the ring must be guarded against.

"All that is necessary is to elect one good delegate in each precinct, instead of voting for forty-five candidates. If you cannot elect one good man, an honest and public-spirited man, for your delegate, you are not capable of nominating a host of candidates for your party.

"There would be no ring if you chose the right kind of men for precinct committeemen. And there will always be more or less of ring rule until you take away from the professional politicians the control of the party organization. Party organizations are necessary under popular government, and the delegate convention is the best system for making party nominations, if it is properly conducted." [1]

But it should always be remembered that no organization nor machinery nor party system can save the state; that the merits of party government will always depend upon the character of men rather than upon the framework or machinery of institutions. Until we have grapes from thistles we may not expect good government from bad men. Good citizenship is the first and constant necessity.

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CHAPTER XXI

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND PARTY LOYALTY

A PROBLEM that constantly confronts the intelligent voter is that of the conflict between his personal independence and his party obligation. To what extent is the citizen bound to subordinate himself in order to co-operate with a party?

The Citizen's Attitude toward Parties.

There are a number of attitudes that a voter may assume toward parties involving varying degrees of independence.[1]

1. He may abstain entirely from all political life and activity. He may look on the Constitution and the Government as godless and forsaken and refuse to vote or co-operate with any party, or in any way support the political institutions or organizations of the country. Garrison and his Abolition coadjutors did this. They would not vote, nor hold office, nor seek to put one of their advocates in office, and, of course, they would attach themselves to no political party. They lived and spoke entirely on a moral plane. One may pursue this course also from utter indifference to public affairs or from a feeling that politics are "too dirty and corrupt" to give hope for purification and redemption. This attitude is that of the extremist in moral reform, or in selfishness, or of the political

1. Abstention from Political Life.

[1] See an article by Dr. Washington Gladden, on "The Uses and Abuses of Party," the *Century Magazine*, vol. vi.

pessimist who gives over to faithless despair. There are not many of this class.

2. The voter may consent to vote and to influence voting, but avow no party allegiance whatever. These are the pure independents who acknowledge no party obligations or ties of affection. They assume to act as judicial umpires between the parties, voting as readily with one party as with another, as they think the interests of the country demand. They may be represented as standing in the middle of the balancing board, giving the tilt first to one side, then to the other, but they are not a part of the game. This generally reduces one's participation to a choice between two courses prearranged by others, though the hope of receiving the weight of this element may influence the pre-arrangement. This class of voters is also relatively small.

2. Denial of Party Allegiance.

3. On the other hand, the voter may be a blind or unscrupulous adherent of a party, supporting his party in every emergency no matter whom it nominates or what policy it proposes. These are the unscrupulous managers, or the unthinking party pawns with which the managers play the game. It has been estimated that fully eighty-five or ninety voters out of a hundred of the voting mass of a party may be absolutely relied upon by the party managers to follow the course marked out for them by the party convention or organization. Such men are governed in their voting by prejudices, tradition, and habit, not by any real opinion.[1] That there are party managers

3. Unreasoning Party Spirit and Attachment.

[1] It is related that in the early part of 1896 one of the Democratic Federal office-holders in one of the Western States made a labored speech in favor of maintaining the gold standard, that the party might be saved "from the silver heresy," and the country "from repudiation and national dishonor." After the National Convention of his party declared for the free and unlimited coinage of silver he again came to speak in the same town to advocate the cause of his party in the campaign. In answer to expressions of surprise that he proposed, under the circumstances, to speak in his

and place-seekers and ignorant voters who with cunning purpose or Bourbon stupidity are always ready to follow the party, regardless of party consistency or party principles, is not a matter of surprise. It is more surprising and more to be deplored that so large a proportion of honest men among the party voters consent to become the dupes of the unscrupulous, and by following their traditions and prejudices rather than their intelligence and conscience, become the principal means by which knaves and rascals acquire political power for their own ends. If we could imagine the whole body of our citizenship assuming this attitude toward party and thus resigning the right, or habit, of independent thinking, or independent action, we should have to reconcile ourselves to the inevitable decay of popular government by party. Party would degenerate into the ring, the clique, the faction, and party rule would be but the despotism of the boss.

4. But there is a large and growing element in our citizenship that does not assume any of these attitudes

party's defence, he said he had come "to answer the speech he had made a few months before." In the same year in Pennsylvania a Democratic congressional convention that had been called to meet *before* the National Convention had declared itself on the controverted issues, declared unequivocally for the gold standard, and denounced the "silver heresy": it nominated a candidate who loyally accepted the platform declaration. *After* the National Convention of the party had declared for free silver coinage, the congressional convention was again called together, rescinded its former declaration, and nominated the same candidate, who conveniently and loyally changed his principles to accommodate himself to the new situation. Similar, if not such glaring, inconsistencies came to light within the Republican ranks in that eventful political year. It would seem to ordinary morality and intelligence that such an exhibition of party subserviency is an absurdity, or a species of rascality. Of course, a man may change his mind, but such leaders (?) would hardly be looked to as safe guides. These cases illustrate how little local political managers are governed by opinion (that is, their own opinion) and how little they are leaders of political thought. They are mere creatures of forces put into operation by men of independent thought and action.

toward party. These believe in parties as a means of effecting political action. They identify themselves with a party and take part in party management, attend primaries and caucuses, help to conduct conventions and make platforms and nominations. As party men they recognize the usefulness of parties, and believing in their own principles they are willing to adopt the party means of reducing these principles to practice; but with the spirit of true independence they hold their political principles above party success or party interests, and they will follow their convictions and their sense of the public welfare against the temporary decisions of the party organization.

4. The Rational Party Spirit.

Voters of this kind have a proper conception of, and recognize the true office of party. The party managers and hide-bound partisans are disposed to look upon a party as a disciplined army, to be directed by a commander-in-chief and his staff, while the voters, like machines or unthinking soldiers, are to move at the word of command. This, of course, is a perversion of the idea of party. A party is to represent the aggregate or composite opinion of its members. It exists for the purposes of its voters, not for the purposes of its managers. The party is not an end in itself; it has no claims apart from the claims of the cause that it represents. The party is a *means* to secure the common ends that its voters have in view. It is not merely an organization for the purpose of securing majorities, carrying elections, and getting the offices for the party workers. It may do these things as a means for working out the end for which it exists; but the party's constant and fundamental purpose is to stand for principles and to commit itself to policies in harmony with these principles. A party is not a mere club, with tests of membership apart from, or above, its principles. It cannot exact pledges to obey orders or to vote for all nominees that

Character and Function of Party.

an obedient party machine may offer. No voter should think of a party apart from, or above, its principles, and a party without principles, or the courage of its principles, is a paradox, and it can claim no allegiance from any citizen.

Burke's classic definition of party gives us as definite and at the same time as flexible an idea of the true party as we can anywhere find:

> 'A party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some principle on which they are all agreed."

With this conception of party, true independence can be made consistent with true party allegiance. It is urged in behalf of party loyalty that parties are necessary to popular government; that they are expensive to organize and maintain, and that they should not be weakened and disorganized for transient and trivial reasons; that the "united wisdom" of the party is a safer guide than the individual judgment of any man, since "everybody knows more than anybody"; that, though the party may be temporarily wrong, the loyal party man should think of it as the party of his fathers that has rendered the country great services in the past, and the plea is made that its strength should be conserved for the sake of greater services in the future; that if men desert the party they weaken their influence for good government by weakening, or destroying, their influence with the party, thereby injuring their future usefulness; that men should not expect to keep "running in and out of a party"; that they should belong to a party completely, with loyalty and devotion, and not merely with spasmodic loyalty, giving no certainty of reliance or support; that if men bolt to a minor party it is but to "vote in the

Reasonable Independence is Consistent with Party Allegiance.

Pleas for Party Loyalty.

air," or "to throw away your vote," or to give a half-vote to the enemy; and that to vote with the opposite party is, of course, "to turn the government over to its enemies." All that is bad in one party is urged by the advocates of the other as reasons against independent voting.

These are the usual party pleas, and many of them have weight. The natural party disposition of most men is to give them full force and effect. But sensible party men who make these pleas do not themselves surrender the "divine right to bolt." They know the need of a reasonable measure of personal independence, and they recognize that throughout our party history such political independence has been a constant and powerful influence in determining the course of political events.

History of Party Leadership Illustrates the Spirit of Independence.

The history of American parties is full of illustrations: Salmon P. Chase, Charles Sumner, George F. Hoar, George A. Boutwell, Henry Wilson, and others who as young men left their party for their cause in 1848; Lincoln, Seward, Trumbull, Colfax, and all who were in at the making of the Republican party in 1854 and 1856, and who, for their cause, were ready to see their old parties defeated and shattered; Horace Greeley, Charles Francis Adams, Senator Depew, Whitelaw Reid, Murat Halstead, who, later in the history of the Republican party, sought to bring it to defeat in 1872; Martin Van Buren, Samuel J. Tilden, David Dudley Field, William Cullen Bryant, among Democrats in 1848; Breckinridge in 1860; Cleveland and Hill and Palmer and others in 1896,—all these renowned leaders and party managers among both the great parties have at times asserted their independence of party authority and have sought to compass their party's defeat. If party men by withstanding party authority are likely to lose influence with their party or weight in its councils (which is not always the case), it by no means follows that they

weaken their influence over the course of events, or receive a more unfavorable judgment from history.

No absolute rule for determining one's relation to party can be laid down. It is a part of the universal conflict between freedom and authority, between individualism and social action. What one will do in such a matter will depend upon his circumstances; upon the merits of the situation; upon personal disposition; upon one's estimate of the value of the party; upon the intensity of one's interest, conviction, and purpose in reference to the public policies at issue.

The Rule for Party Authority and Personal Independence.

It is obvious that men sometimes act independent of parties from good motives, sometimes from bad motives; sometimes from public interests, sometimes from personal and selfish interests; sometimes for a noble cause, sometimes for an ignoble cause. Recognizing party as a necessary or beneficial agency in popular government, if it be asked *whether bolting is justifiable*, it must be answered that it *is not* if the bolting is prompted by reasons that are trivial, petty, spiteful, selfish, ignoble; but that it is justifiable if the reasons given are good and sufficient. Who is to judge the reasons that are given? Manifestly the only reply is that every man must answer for himself to his own individual conscience and judgment. There is no other tribunal to which he can appeal. He may seek guidance and wisdom from experience, history, revelation, from whatever source he will, but if he is an intelligent, self-directing agent his action must be his own, and he alone is responsible. And he must stand or fall before public sentiment and posterity—the Court Supreme to which he must be willing to submit his case—*by the reasons that he gives*. According to the judgment wherewith he judges shall he be judged.

It is certainly only reasonable independence for the voter to insist that party interest shall always be subordinated

to the country's interest; that one should never unreservedly pledge himself to an unknown result of party action; that the party's principles in the opinion of the voter be designed to promote the public welfare; and that the party should be faithful to its principles; and that when the party abandons its principles and fails to present faithful and fit candidates for offices, it is not only the privilege but it is the duty of all good citizens to withhold their votes.

"Let it be known that you are interested in the success of the party. Asking nothing for yourself take a hand in shaping the party policy and making nominations, being guided by public interests rather than personal ones. If against your protests they make bad nominations, *bolt them* and return to the charge. Keep standing up for men and things that are honest and of good report." [1]

"Party is always to be subordinated to patriotism. Perfect party discipline is the most dangerous weapon of party spirit, for it is the abdication of individual judgment. It is for you to help break this withering spell. It is for you to assert the independence and the dignity of the individual citizen, and to prove that the party was made for the voter and not the voter for the party. When you are angrily told that if you erect your personal whim against the regular party behest you make representative government impossible by refusing to accept its conditions, hold fast by your conscience and let the party go." [2]

The services of party to liberty and popular government should be recognized.[3] But when national interests are sacrificed or subordinated to personal interests parties degenerate into factions. As long as the party is bound together by a common attachment to principles and a supreme regard for the national welfare its existence is

[1] Washington Gladden, *Century Magazine*, vol. vi.
George William Curtis, *Orations*.
[3] See May's *Constitutional History of England*, vol. ii., chap. i.

justified. When it becomes a machine for the dispensation of patronage it is a menace to the State.[1]

Commercialism and Corruption.

Critics of democracy have imputed its failures and blunders and misgovernment in America, as seen especially in large cities, to the ignorant and the poor and to the evils of an unrestricted suffrage. The indictment is misplaced. Ignorance and poverty are but the prey, not the source, of political corruption. Its source is found farther up, in the commercialism of the rich and powerful classes, among the "respectable" and the "well-to-do," who look upon polities and the laws only as a means of private gain.[2] Usually in the rank and file of the common people we find the intelligence and patriotism that are the saving forces of the state. They will not fail to deliver their parties and their party government from the control of the selfish and the venal. To this end the great need in American politics to-day is that young men of high ideals and resolute purposes for good government should devote themselves to political activity, standing up stoutly and constantly for honest government, high ideals in politics, and that active participation in political life by which better government is brought to pass. This is a path to honor and to the highest service, and it may be a path to national fame. For our political history shows that it is the men who have these high standards of integrity and ideals of public service whom the vicissitudes of polities and party struggles bring into leadership and into the highest honor and office in the gift of the people.

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
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